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INTRODUCfION 
In the years 1984 and 1985, the Southeast Asian Studies Program of the 
University of Hawai'i arranged to bring a number of speakers to its campus in 
what was called its Distinguished Scholars Lecture Series. I was asked to take 
charge of this program. The endeavor was extremely successful, bringing some 
ten scholars to the campus, each of whom gave at least two lectures or 
demonstrations. These events were well attended and were enthusiastically 
received by students, faculty, and town folk. It was the intention at the time to 
publish at least one of each scholar's papers in a volume in the series of Southeast 
Asia Papers. That intention suffered many delays from many causes, not the least 
of which was the reorganization of the Southeast Asian Studies Program into the 
Center for Southeast Asian Studies, which became one of the units within the 
new School of Hawaiian, Asian, and Pacific Studies. The publication of these 
papers was literally lost in the shuffle. By the time the project was revived in early 
1989, some of the scholars had used their papers for other purposes and others 
could not be reached, but six of the original participants agreed to submit their 
revised papers for publication in a single volume that would commemorate the 
Distinguished SCholars Lectures and also make available to a wider audience the 
views and concerns expressed by these scholars. This volume is now in hand. 
It was never the intention of the Distinguished Scholars Lecture Series to 
select speakers on the basis of a single theme. Rather, we hoped to bring to the 
University of Hawai'i campus scholars whose ideas and research were on the 
frontiers of their particular disciplines and who were thus laying down themes and 
patterns for future scholars to take into consideration. It is this fact that gives the 
papers in this volume a freshness that helps to overcome the delay in publication. 
But it is also this fact that results in the papers having little commonalty other 
than that they deal with Southeast Asia. It is well known that collections of 
diverse papers bound together in a volume such as this tend to become fugitive 
unless they strike a strong chord of scholarly interest and concern. While I am not 
versed in each of the disciplines represented by these papers, I feel certain that 
several of the papers in this volume ,will strike such a chord among readers. For 
my part, I shall attempt to provide pithy synopses of each author's contribution so 
that the reader will be moved to explore the contents of each paper more fully. 
In his paper on "The Art of Sitep (Sri Deva) in Thailand," which was 
accompanied by a slide show, Prince Subhadradis, Rector of Silapakorn 
University and an art historian, describes an early site on the Pasak River in 
north-central Thailand. The earliest influences were Indian from Gupta times 
and Dvaravati. Later, from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries, the site 
became a Khmer town. Excavations by the Thai Fine Arts Department have 
found indications of both Buddhist and Hindu influences. The town seems to 
have been abandoned in the early thirteenth century and was not again a settled 
site. Consequently the archaeological finds in the area help to reconstruct the 
early history of Thai and Khmer society. 
Professor Kenneth R. Hall of North Adams State College in Massachusetts 
has written a paper on "The Politics of Plunder in the Cham Realm of Early 
Vietnam." The organizational structure of the Cham "state" [Champa] which 
controlled the southern portion of present-day Vietnam from the second 
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through the fifteenth centuries is explicated. The nature of this "state" was 
extremely segmentary, but the Cham peoples were held together through a 
shared value system that allowed a central authority to emerge. Cham kingship 
was closely related to the economic system: raiding and plundering were an 
essential part of Cham statecraft, supporting the royal position through 
redistribution of booty and captured slaves. A cultural relationship developed 
with Java that brought art styles and marriage partners to Champa, but this could 
not save the Cham realm from succumbing under the retributions of its neighbor 
to the north. 
Professor Shelly Errington, an anthropologist from the University of 
California, Santa Cruz, has provided "Two Lectures on Political Process in an 
'Indic State'." These two lectures are closely interrelated and actually form a 
single recounting of the essential conclusions of her field work in Luwu, which is 
(or was) a "state" on the island of Sulawesi (formerly Celebes) in Indonesia. The 
social relationships of the people of Luwu, both vertical and horizontal, and the 
system and symbols that guide these, are central in these two lectures. Persons 
familiar with the archipelago world of Southeast Asia will recognize the 
description of a hierarchical social structure as extant in former times in Luwu, 
but will also have experienced the changes that have been occurring since 
Indonesian independence. The deeply penetrating analysis of both the personal 
and the public aspects of living in a society that is always on the alert for 
aggressive penetration is so engagingly presented in these two lectures that 
everyone with an interest in Southeast Asia will gain something in the reading. 
Professor John Emigh of Brown University takes the reader into 'The 
Domains of Topeng," which is a solo masked dance-drama indigenous to the 
island of Bali, Indonesia. In this paper, the reader is not only enveloped in the 
intricacies of this form of popular dance-drama, but is also brought into touch 
with the broader practice and theory of dramatic performance on a world-wide 
basis. The result is a robust and penetrating analysis of the Balinese topeng, as it 
is seen by the Balinese and as it has been viewed by outsiders. When he visited 
the University of Hawai'i campus, Professor Emigh performed a topeng dance­
drama, "Little Red Riding Shawl," which served to bring home many of the points 
made in his paper as well as providing splendid entertainment for those in 
attendance. 
As a historian at Rutgers University, Professor Michael Adas analyzes a slice 
of modern Southeast Asian history in his paper, 'The Annex of the Raj: The 
Anglo-Indian Interlude in Burmese History, c. 1826-1941." Asking the question 
why post-independence Burma has isolated itself from the rest of the world, he 
finds the answer not in a simple response to British colonialism (which did not 
produce similar effects elsewhere), but rather in the unique situation of Burma 
being "twice-colonized." This refers to the flood of Indians who were brought in 
or came in with the British, who treated Burma as an adjunct to their Indian 
Empire [Raj]. First Indian precedents in governance and law, then Indian 
entrepreneurs, and finally Indian migrant laborers led to a situation in which 
Burmese felt themselves being displaced in their own country. It was this 
circumstance, argues Adas, that may underlie Burma's withdrawal from the 
world. 
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What is imperialism? This question is at the heart of Professor Stephen 
Rosskamm Shalom's paper on ''The United States and the Philippines: 
'Sentimental' Imperialism or Standard Imperialism?" Professor Shalom is a 
political scientist on the faculty of William Patterson College in New Jersey. 
Applying political and economic arguments and interpretations, he argues 
strongly for regarding American policy, past and present, as imperialist in the 
standard, unadorned meaning of that word. He sees the economic forces in 
American society as determinant of America's involvement in other societies, 
especially those of the third world. His thesis is advanced through a dialectic with 
those scholars who have advanced contrary views about America's role in the 
Philippines. 
This collection of papers presents a wide diversity of disciplines and interests 
as did the talks of the other scholars whose papers are not included in this 
volume. For the audience, the talks were interesting and elicited many questions 
and often lengthy discussion. Though readers will not have the pleasure of 
discussing these papers with the authors, it is my hope that they will find them 
pleasurable and stimulating. 
The Center for Southeast Asian Studies of the School of Hawaiian, Asian and 
Pacific Studies at the University of Hawai'i at Manoa is pleased to make these 
papers available to an extended audience. 
Robert Van Niel 
Professor of History 
Honolulu, Hawai'i 
October 1989 
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The Art of Sitep (Sri Deva) in Thailand 
M.e. Subhadradis Diskul 
The town of Sitep is a deserted ancient town in the Province of Petchabun in 
northern central Thailand. It is situated about five miles (8km) from the left bank 
of the Pasak River and is marked on the maps of Thailand as being 
approximately at latitude 150 27' North and longitude 1010 612' East. It was 
discovered in 1904 by H.R.H. Prince Damrong Rajanubhab, then Minister of 
Interior and also the founder of the study of Thai archaeology and art history. 
The town can be divided into two sections: the original or inner one in an oval 
form about a mile square on the west surrounded with moats and earthen 
ramparts, and the outer or subsidiary larger one on the east in a more or less 
rectangular form, also surrounded with moats and earthen ramparts. They are 
adjoining and the western rampart and moat of the latter are also the eastern 
ones of the former. This is typical of an ancient oval or round town in 
Thailand--when there was more population, an adjacent town would be created 
by sharing the same moat and rampart in one direction. 
The inner town of Sitep, from an archaeological point of view, can be dated 
back to about the 5th century A.D. from a stone inscription in Sanskrit in the 
form of a bell or an inverted lotus bud which might originally have been the top 
part of a town pillar. Though it cannot be deciphered properly, the palaeography 
of the script points to the 5th century A.D. The upper part of the body of a stone 
Krishna statue has also been discovered. It still retains strong Indian Gupta 
influence so the statue might belong to the same date. Also, another stone 
inscription has been found about 10km north of Sitep. It is also in Sanskrit and 
might date back to the 7th century A.D., mentioning the erection of images of 
Siva by the king when he ascended the throne. This king's name is Bhavavarman 
and Professor George Coedes, an eminent French epigraphist, surmised that he 
was probably King Bhavavarman I of Chenla who was a half-brother of King 
Mahendravarman by a different father. If this surmise is correct, it means that the 
kingdom of Chenla in Laos and Cambodia spread its influence at a very early 
stage into the present-day northern central Thailand. This supposition has now, 
however, been contested by other epigraphists whose theory is that the text 
mentions only a comparison to King Bhavavarman, and was not issued by King 
Bhavavarman I himself. Therefore, the inscription might be later than his reign. 
The history of the town of Sitep can be divided into two epochs. The first one 
might be termed the Indian period. Apart from the stone inscriptions and a statue 
mentioned above, a number of stone Hindu god images have been found. Most of 
them represent Vishnu, wearing an octagonal hat with receding stages on top and 
fringes of hair falling on the back part of the neck. Two of them, at least, are 
standing in triple flexion. The dress is a short one with the end of the robe tucked 
behind the body (sampat). Most of them are sculptures in the round but different 
from the early Khmer sculptures in that they have no reserve de pierre to connect 
their upper hands to the head or the hat so all the upper arms have been broken. 
Apart from Vishnu, there are also Sivalinga, standing Siva with his bull, Nandin, 
and Surya (the sun-god). One of the latter can be dated back to the first half of 
the 7th century because of the necklace which resembles strongly the belt of the 
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image of Uma from Koh Krieng in Cambodia dated by French scholars to the 
Khmer Sambor Prei Kuk style. 
At the end of this Indian period, about the 8th-9th century, the Dvaravati 
artistic influence from central Thailand crept in as the town of Sitep in the old 
days was probably on the route linking the Dvaravati kingdom in central Thailand 
to the Khmer empire. This influence was Buddhist, as some stone Wheel of the 
Law, bases and pillars have been found. Unfortunately, most of them were 
clandestinely dug up and fell into private collections both in Thailand and abroad. 
A phonolith (stone bell) which was popular during the Dvaravati period was also 
discovered. All of these objects have been found in the inner town of Sitep. 
It can be said that the stone Hindu images at Sitep lasted for a long time as 
one can notice their evolution in style. At first, the ears of early images are carved 
naturally and the back part of a hat ends in a horizontal line. Later, the upper rim 
of the ears has become rectangular instead of oval and the back part of a hat 
curves down on the neck, sometimes even divided into two flaps or layers instead 
of only one. The triple flexion has also become hardened. 
In 1976, students of the Faculty of Archaeology, Silapakorn University, 
excavated at a site near the town of Sitep. A Buddhist monk who resided in the 
town came to watch the excavation and informed the excavators that he had 
found a stone Chinese head inside the town. This head turned out to be Vishnu 
wearing a cylindrical hat, so the Faculty of Archaeology acquired it and later 
donated it to the Thai Fine Arts Department, as it fits very well on a stone torso 
wearing a short dress that had been discovered a long time ago at Sitep. The 
image, with the head, is now being displayed in the Bangkok National Museum 
and can be regarded as a mixture of the early Vishnu image of southern Thailand 
style, wearing a cylindrical hat with a torso of the northern central school, wearing 
a short dress. 
The second epoch of the town of Sitep can be called the Khmer period from 
the 11th to the 13th century. In the inner town there exist three Khmer brick 
towers which the Thai Fine Arts Department has excavated. The main one is 
more or less at the center of the town on a laterite base and facing west. H.G. 
Quaritch Wales, an English scholar who surveyed the site in 1935·36, thought that 
it might date back to the 6th century because of the three niches luminaires inside 
imitating the window of a wooden structure. This supposition has been contested 
by Professor Jean Boisselier, a French scholar who is an expert on Khmer art. 
The latter expounded that the niches luminaires existed for a long time in Khmer 
art and he thought that this main central shrine should date only to the 11th 
century because of its many outer redented corners. Quite near this tower on the 
south lies a terraced structure of laterite in a rectangular shape, probably facing 
east. On top have been found some pieces of brick. Since this terrace has not yet 
been excavated by the Thai Fine Arts Department, one has to wait to learn about 
its real function. Many stucco decorations have recently been discovered. 
Two more Khmer temples stand in front of this main shrine on the west and 
also face the same direction. Originally there was only one shrine above the 
ground on the north and an earthen mound on the south. The Thai Fine Arts 
Department excavated this site in 1984 with Bovornvet Rungruchi as supervisor. 
They found that the northern one which is in brick on a laterite base has a long 
porch on the west. It also contains three niches luminaires in the chamber and in 
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front on the floor lies a large semicircular limestone pedestal decorated with 
designs of lotus petals which might have originally been a base of a Dvaravati 
Buddha image. From the excavation, there appears on the south another smaller 
prang, also of brick, situated on the same laterite base and also facing west. The 
top part of this prang has crumbled down leaving only half of the false back door 
on the east to be seen. The result of the excavation here is fruitful as many stone 
decorations have been brought to light. The most important item is probably a 
complete stone lintel representing in the middle Siva and Uma riding on the bull, 
Nandin, over a Kala face (a monster without a lower jaw) which is holding in each 
hand a three-faced naga whose body turns into a garland with a number of floral 
motifs on top and underneath. The style of the dress and of the lintel point to the 
Khmer Baphuon style of the 11th century, therefore supporting Boisselier's 
opinion about the date of the Khmer temples at Sitep. 
Apart from the two stone lintels, the other one being unfinished, many stone 
architectural fragments have been brought to light such as door-columns carved 
with small figures of seated hermits at the bottom, window balustrades, a 
foundation stone with small holes for containing semi-precious stones, etc. These 
Khmer temples were probably built for Hinduism, as Sivalinga (a phallic emblem 
representing Siva), Yoni (a stone base for Sivalinga), and a broken figure of 
Nandin (a bull) have been unearthed. Also fragments of pottery, some semi­
precious stone, beads and terracotta coins have been discovered. 
On the north, outside the inner town of Sitep, stands a large mound. It has not 
yet been excavated but one can surmise from its form that there is a central brick 
prang surrounded by a smaller one at each corner. Such architecture would be 
constructed at the center of a Khmer town, but here it is, surprisingly, outside the 
town. 
The town of Sitep was probably abandoned after the Khmer had lost their 
power following the reign of King Jayavarman VII, the last great monarch of the 
Khmer empire (1181-c. 1220). A large stone statue of a dvarapala [door guardian] 
dating back to the Khmer Bayon style of that period was found in the town. It is 
now preserved in the Bangkok National Museum. After this period, no Thai 
Buddha images or Sawankhalok ware of the Sukhothai period have ever been 
found in Sitep. Sitep was probably replaced by the town of Petchabun during the 
Thai period from the 13th century onward. 
Khmer monuments in the town of Sitep face west, which might be because of 
the Pasak River that flows down from the north to the south on that side or 
because of an important natural hill, Khao Thamorat, which is on the west of the 
town. On that hill there exists an important cave containing high-relief figures 
probably of Mahayana Buddhism: images of the Buddha and Bodhisattva. 
Unfortunately, the heads of these high-relief figures had been cut; the Fine Arts 
Department could retrieve five of them, which are now displayed in the Bangkok 
National Museum. Two belong to Buddha images and one portrays Maitreya 
Bodhisattva because of a stupa on top of his chignon. They belong probably to the 
early Dvaravati style (7th-8th century A.D.). Outside the cave one can still 
perceive a large standing Buddha image in the attitude of argumentation with 
both hands and, inside, a seated Buddha in the attitude of meditation flanked by a 
stupa on the left and a Wheel of the Law on a pillar on the right, typical of 
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Dvaravati style, and two figures of Bodhisattva with four arms, the lower right one 
in the attitude of giving benediction. One is standing in tribhanga [triple flexion]. 
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Among historians who study Southeast Asia's pre-1500 history, there is 
substantial disagreement on what constituted a "state." Is the standard a unified 
bureaucratized polity that is consistent with traditional Western understanding of 
what an advanced state should be-a view that is reinforced by the accounts of 
Chinese historians, whose dynastic histories contain highly flattering views of their 
southern neighbors' accomplishments (and consider several of the early 
Southeast Asian civilizations to have possessed state systems that were similar to 
their own)? Or could an institutionally weak yet integrated society still be 
considered a major civilization? 
One standard by which early Southeast Asian states are measured is the 
number of stone temple complexes they have left-the more impressive the 
archaeological remains the more prosperous and accomplished was the state, or 
so the reasoning goes. Thus, the massive temple complexes of central and eastern 
Java, as well as Pagan (Burma) and Angkor (Kampuchea) on the mainland, 
suggest that accomplished political systems were responsible for their 
construction, via a central administration that mobilized a realm's wealth and 
manpower to create these architectural wonders. But historians now are coming 
to find that broad levels of social, economic, and political integration were not 
necessary for such construction, nor did the building of impressive religious 
edifices necessarily demonstrate the political and economic accomplishments of a 
society. 
The Cham state that ruled over the southern region of Vietnam from the 
second through the fifteenth centuries exemplifies the accomplishments of a 
culturally integrated yet decentralized polity. Like its contemporary Southeast 
Asian civilizations, Champa, the name by which the realm of the Cham people 
was known in its epigraphic records as well as in external sources, left impressive 
temple complexes and numerous inscriptions (composed in both Sanskrit and in 
the Cham language), which are the main source for early Cham history. On the 
basis of its archaeological remains, Champa would have to be classified as a 
major early Southeast Asian state. Yet Cham epigraphic records reflect a weakly 
institutionalized state system that depended upon personal alliance networks to 
integrate a fragmented population. 
The Cham realm consisted of scattered communities in river valleys and 
coastal plains between the South China Sea and the mountains. Chams lived in an 
environment conducive to multi-faceted subsistence from agriculture, 
horticulture, fishing, trade, and piracy; their capitals were widely separated 
settlements on different parts of the coast, which took turns assuming hegemony 
over others; each hegemony was known to the Chinese by a different name. 
Weakly integrated politically, Cham culture still was highly cosmopolitan and was 
in constant communication with its neighbors by land and sea to the south and 
west. l A network of lagoons and navigable rivers between Hue and Quang Tri 
provided protected waterways for internal communication. Cham archaeological 
remains dot the upriver and highland regions. Cham ruins upriver from Binh-dinh 
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(Vijaya) at Cheo Reo, Yang Prong, and other highland locations especially 
document Cham presence throughout the Song Ba river network that bends 
around the Binh-dinh mountains, with mountain pass access beyond the 
highlands into Laos and Kampuchea.2 
Lowland landholding rights were often shared by several villages, whose 
leaders cooperated in control over activities therein. Inter-village economic 
coordination included the maintenance of shared water management systems and 
the provisioning of communal granaries. Cham farmers cultivated paddy fields 
using relatively sophisticated iron plowshares and large water wheels for 
irrigation. Each village had a "water chief" who organized villagers in the 
clearance of land and the preparation and maintenance of water channels and 
dikes. Village chiefs met to coordinate overall system maintenance. The Cham 
realm was especially noted for its "floating rice," which was quick growing 
("hundred day") and could be grown even under water cover of up to five meters. 
Cham agricultural settlements were scattered up river valleys and on terraced 
hillsides and entered an ecological frontier between the highlands and lowlands 
where wet-rice cultivation was practiced in Cham areas, but where swidden 
shifting (slash and bum) cultivation and hunting and gathering predominated 
among adjacent hill tribesmen. 
The Vocabulary of Cham Kingship 
Rather than representing shifts from one dynasty's rule to that of another, the 
periodic movement of the Cham royal center ("capital") among several river 
mouth urban centers bearing Indic titles-Indrapura (Tra-kieu), Vijaya (Binh­
dinh), and Kauthara (Nha-trang)-corresponded to transfer of hegemony from 
the elite of one Cham river valley system to that of another, as one river system's 
elite became dominant over the other river mouth urban centers of the Cham 
coast. As such, the Cham polity was more like the Malay riverine states to the 
south than its mainland wet-rice plain neighbors to the west and north.3 Like the 
rulers of the archipelago riverine-based political economies, the authority of a 
Cham monarch was concentrated within his own river mouth plain; beyond his 
river mouth urban center base, a Cham monarch's sovereignty depended on his 
ability to construct alliance networks both with the leaders of the populations in 
his upriver hinterland and with those of the Cham coast's other riverine systems. 
Despite the periodic spatial transfers of authority from one river mouth urban 
center to another, there was one constant. The Cham sacred center at Mi-so'n, 
located on the edge of the highlands and upriver from the early Cham political 
center at Indrapura (Tra-kieu) on the coast, served as the locus of Cham royal 
ceremony that promoted a sense of cultural homogeneity among the disparate 
populations of the Cham realm. Thus, although Cham society was weakly linked 
institutionally, the common values expressed in Champa's widely distributed 
inscriptions demonstrate a high level of societal integration that provided the 
foundation for a functional Cham polity. 
The vocabulary of Cham statecraft as it is portrayed in the inscriptions places 
stress on the personal achievements of the Cham monarch. Early local belief 
supported the idea that some individuals (especially the Cham society's leaders) 
could be superior to others. It was held that there was an uneven distribution of 
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both secular and spiritual prowess. An individual's heroic secular 
accomplishments confirmed his spiritual superiority. Personal achievements in 
one's lifetime earned an individual ancestor status. 
There were strong traditional concerns for the dead. Just as one allied oneself 
with those of superior prowess in life, so too one desired a personal bond to 
"ancestors of prowess" whom it was believed could bestow material and spiritual 
substance on their devotees.4 Those who achieved greatness in life were 
considered to have contact with the ancestors that was greater than that among 
others of their generation. By establishing a relationship with a successful leader, 
the follower confirmed his own bond with the ancestors; homage to one's 
overlord was thus a gesture of obedience to the ancestors. 
Subject populations validated their own potential for ancestor status by 
sharing in their overlord's continuous achievement. The successful overlord 
projected himself as influencing his supporter's stature intife as well as their 
hopes for recognition after death. Successful patrons carefully recognized their 
clients' achievements and meritorious deeds by bestowing material (i.e., titles and 
wealth) and spiritual (e.g., ritual and death status) "gifts" on those whose secular 
performances on their patron's behalf were noteworthy.5 
Early Cham society thus rallied behind spiritually endowed leaders who were 
supported by a blend of local and Indian cultural symbols and values that allowed 
their leaders to mobilize local populations and their resources for various inter­
regional adventures. Specifically, early Cham rulers patronized Siva, noting his 
patronage of asceticism and his identification as the lord of the universe and the 
abode of the dead; they also had affinity for Indra, the Vedic god of war and, in 
various later times equally identified with Visnu and Buddhist deities.6 Cham 
rulers were little concerned with developing state institutions, but instead 
initiated syncretic religious cults that allowed their followers to draw from the 
leader's spiritual relationship with the ancestors as well as Indian universal 
divinity. 
Among the remaining Cham records, two inscriptions from the late eighth 
century reign of the Cham monarch Indravarman I (c. 787-801) are especially 
comprehensive in their display of the vocabulary of Cham polity. Indravarman 
assumed authority over the Cham realm during a period of political turmoil. Prior 
to and during Indravarman's early reign, Champa's old political centers were 
ravaged by maritime raids that were attributed to seamen who are described in 
Cham inscri~tions as "ferocious, pitiless, dark-skinned people from other 
countries...." In 774 the first of two raids by sea pirates destroyed the Po Nagar 
temple at the Cham political center of Kauthara (Nha-trang). King Satyavarman 
(c. 774-784) claims to have repulsed the invaders in a 784 inscription that reports 
the dedication of the restored temple complex.s Indravarman, Satyavarman's 
younger brother, faced a second raid in 787 that desecrated the Siva temple of 
Bhadradhipatisvara west of his new capital at Virapura (Phan-rang).9 
Indravarman had to stabilize the Cham political order, and his inscriptions 
provide a summary of early Cham traditions that he drew upon to substantiate his 
legitimate assumption of Cham sovereignty. 
In 799, Indravarman dedicated the reconstructed temple at his capital, and 
the inscription that records this restoration provides the following commentary: 
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King Indravarman, who is honored by good men; who is foremost 
among those who regard sacrifice as theirprincipal treasure; who is 
celebrated in this world on account ofthe efficacy ofthese sacrifices.... 
Glory to him, who like Vzsnu raised the world, as it were, by his two 
hands; who is like Indra, fallen to the earth ruling over the whole of 
Champa; who like Dhananjya is ofirrepressible valor, and yet, like 
Hari [Siva], prospered after having conquered many groups of 
enemies, andplaced his feet in a large number ofcountries...; who is 
like Indra in this world, by virtue ofperfect austerities, and constant 
sacrifices performed in previous births; who is like Chananda [god of 
gifts] by his liberality; and whose charming body is embraced with 
pleasure by the Goddess ofsovereignty. 
The King, who, on account ofhis capacity to govern better and 
better a countrymcelebrated for its urban centers...had a capital city 
[built] like the city ofthe gods. This fortunate king is always victorious 
over his enemies in the world in all directions. In the height ofhis 
strength he combines in himselfthe prowess ofCandra, Indra, Yama, 
and Kubera [the gods of the four sacred quarters, i.e., he was the 
master of all regions]; originatingpartly from Brahman, the master of 
immense wealth, possessed offortune and prowess, crushing, like 
Vzsnu, his enemies by means ofhis prowess, he established the proper 
law [in his kingdom].... 10 
This prolonged eulogy celebrates Indravarman's association with various Indic 
divinity that provided the foundation for Indravarman's achievements. Looking 
backward to the initial institution of the sacred linga at Virapura, Indravarman's 
inscription proceeds with the purposeful linkage of the reigning monarch to the 
legendary Cham king Bhadravarman. Bhadravarman ruled the Cham realm 
around 400 c.E. and was said to have founded the sacred Mi-so'n temple 
complex, where he instituted the original Bhadresvara Siva linga that became the 
symbolic source of Cham sovereign power. Indravarman's inscription eulogized 
Bhadravarman, and implies that one intent of the inscription was to proclaim that 
the legendary Bhadravarman's spiritual powers were drawn upon by his 
legitimate successor Indravarman: 
[He] is called Bhadhipatisvara because he is the master ofwelfare, 
and maintains, by his splendor, the welfare, the health, and the goods 
ofthe worlds. Now, for a long time...he, the dust ofwhose lotus-feet is 
worshipped by the three worlds, became, by his own [spiritual] 
prowess the cause ofprosperity ofthe world. [But] then, owing to the 
excess offaults in the [world] the temple called Bhadradhipatisvara 
was burned by an army...coming by ships, and [the temple] became 
empty [i.e., it was plundered in 787].... 
[The king] Indravarman reinstalled it [the Bhadradhipatisvara 
linga in 7991 and out ofthe goodness ofhis heart gave it treasures:... 
Indravarman also installed an earthen linga ofthe God, which [after 
his death] came to be known as Indrabhadresvara [in his honor]. 
When this king protects the earth, his subjects are delighted at his 
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prowess. Renowned in the world for his zeal in protecting Dharma 
[order], he always triumphed over his enemies by his own [spiritual] 
prowess. Endowed with virtue, and born in a noble family, charitable, 
surrounded by heroes, and defeating the enemies by his prowess, he 
protects the world on all sides.... 
The vocabulary of Cham statecraft is well summarized in the last line of this 
inscription; Cham monarchs were 1) virtuous, 2) associated with ancestors of 
prowess, 3) able to bestow gifts and prosperity upon their subject population, and 
4) were substantially supported by a warrior elite who 5) allowed their conquests 
of surrounding and potentially threatening populations. 
A second and somewhat later inscription of Indravarman from another 
temple at his political core also emphasized the prowess of Indravarman's 
immediate dynastic predecessors. But this second inscription focused on each 
monarch's personal accomplishments that brought his subjects prosperity rather 
than more abstract spiritual aspects of royal prowess: 
[King Prathivindravarman, (c. 758)] famous in the world for his 
family and prowess, enjoyed the lands by conquest ofall his enemies 
by his [own power]:.... Having enjoyed the whole of Champa [by 
conquest], he flourished as a great king. There were abundant means 
ofsubsistence and various things in his kingdom. The king destroyed 
all the thieves, as the sun dispels the darkness. He shone in his family 
as the moon does in the sky. 
[He] was succeeded by Satyavarman, who was very heroic, and 
renowned in the world by his actions...the world was subject to his 
greatpower.... In combat, enemies could not stand theirground in his 
presence, but turned their face on seeing him [i.e., they ran away from 
him in battle]. By his victories, he was comparable to Indra; by his 
[physical] prowess, he was like Siva; among those who desire glory, he 
was very strong, like the son ofIndra; in the assembly ofmen, he was 
respected by honest persons...he, the master ofall creatures, is 
victorious by having churned all his enemies [i. e., he, like Visnu, 
churned the creative ambrosia of the universe to sustain the 
"golden age," and thus exterminated his enemies]. 
[His younger brother Indravarman became king]. He was 
fortunate, dutifu~ powerfu~ and renowned in the world for his 
strength. Although a king andprotector ofmen, he was a destroyer of 
enemies and accompanied by his army ("heroes in combat"); he 
attacked his enemies as soon as he saw them, as a lion attacks an 
elephant...he destroyed the army ofhis enemies. The king, who was 
very wise, and surrounded by heroes [i.e., his military 
subordinates]...[his realm thus] flourished...[and]...his noble actions 
fostered good fortune. Indravarman, ofthe house ofSatyavarman, 
[is] the cause ofthe prosperity ofthe [Cham] world.... l ! 
As opposed to the normal focus on hypothetical sacred spiritual prowess in 
earlier Cham inscriptions, a topic that received ample discussion in the first noted 
inscription from Indravarman's early reign (when he was establishing his 
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sovereignty), Indravarman's second inscription (which was a product of an 
established, legitimated reigning monarch) placed its focus on the demonstrated 
physical prowess of Indravarman and past monarchs and highlighted their 
illustrious military victories against assorted rivals of the Cham state. The second 
inscription's theme was that when Cham monarchs had successfully destroyed 
various armies of their enemies, only then could the state reach its full potential. 
Thus, in early Cham epigraphy greater stress was placed on the moral purity 
and ritual aestheticism of past and present monarchs that made conquest and 
economic prosperity possible. Indravarman's late eighth century inscription still 
acknowledged the sanctity of past and present monarchs. But in this and the 
inscriptions of Cham monarchs who follow, greatness was measured by the 
monarch's physical capacity, as demonstrated by his successful leadership of 
military expeditions (which provided consequent material reward), with 
increasingly limited reference to a monarch's spiritual powers. Conquest, 
according to these later inscriptions, resulted in Champa's prosperity more so 
than the dutiful performance of sacrificial ritual. 
Ultimately, the ruler ''bestowed with superior prowess" had to generate 
income to his direct subordinates and secure for his subjects the material well· 
being that Cham monarchs were expected to provide. With the loss of economic 
prosperity, serious questions undoubtedly arose regarding the successful magical 
qualities of the ruler's cults, and the autonomy of regional units soon would be 
reasserted. 
The Cham Political Econom}: 
Throughout Champa's history there was periodic regional autonomy and 
resistance to the centralizing ambitions ofwould·be Cham monarchs that was 
coincident with an inability to provide expected economic returns. While 
Southeast Asia's early major wet-rice state rulers based their sovereignty on 
income derived from a relatively stable agricultural base, the various records of 
Cham civilization indicate that Cham rulers could not expect a sufficient flow of 
agricultural surpluses to finance their political ambitions. 
There is disagreement among historians relative to the agricultural 
productivity of the Cham realm. Chinese sources substantiate that the Cham 
were wet-rice cultivators, and that the Cham territory was especially known to the 
Chinese as the source of quick growing "floating rice," which the Chinese adopted 
in southern China. But the remaining evidence of Cham civilization, including 
Chinese sources, does not demonstrate the extensive hinterland agrarian 
development that is found in the evolving major wet-rice states that were 
Champa's contemporaries in Cambodia, Burma, Java, and the Red River Delta 
of Vietnam. The comprehensive problem faced by Cham monarchs was that the 
region between the Mekong Delta and Hue where Cham authority was 
concentrated did not have a broad plain that could have served as a rice bowl to 
support an elaborate polity. 
The king's place, according to Cham inscriptions, was not in managing the 
day-to-day affairs of his state, but in the battlefield where the Cham monarch 
protected his subject communities and thereby secured their prosperity. Cham 
monarchs are never referenced in records of local water management. Nor did 
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Cham monarchs assume a role as supervisors of communal granaries, which, 
along with the local water management networks, were the source of unity among 
local peasant communities. However, Cham monarchs did periodically assign the 
responsibility for the supervision of new or existing public granaries to newly 
established temples. 
Inscriptions report that in return for securing his subjects' prosperity, the 
Cham monarch was entitled to receive one-sixth of local agricultural production. 
But it is repeatedly proclaimed that due to the ruler's "benevolence," the state 
expected to collect only one-tenth. Since such references appear in inscriptions 
reporting transfers of the ruler's remaining income rights on property to temples 
(which assume an increasingly significant role as centers for the concentration of 
economic resources), it can be inferred that the state was either unwilling or 
incapable of collecting a share of local production even in its own river system 
base, and thus assigned its token one-tenth share in the hope that a temple, an 
institution with local roots, might have better luck making such collections. What 
was normally assigned were income rights to uncultivated and unpopulated lands, 
further indication that the state had only limited rights over cultivated lands. 
Manpower (war captives or other bondsmen) was frequently assigned as well 
to support the extension of agriculture under the direction of a temple and its 
temple staff. Such consolidation of control over land and existing granaries and 
their assignment to temples, which in turn promoted the king's sovereignty in 
their religious cults, might have provided the Cham king with indirect access to 
local production that was otherwise inaccessible to the state. 
The inherent instability of Cham sovereignty is especially revealed in the 
inconsistency of the epigraphic stress on the ruler's spiritual and physical prowess, 
yet the inscriptions indicate that this prowess was insufficient to guarantee the 
future security of endowed temples. Inscriptions invoke curses to protect temples 
rather than threatening physical retribution to offenders. Cham inscriptions 
glorify the physical capacity and personal heroism of Cham rulers, but normally 
end with the proclamation that those who plunder temples, which, based on 
consistent reference would seem to have been a common occurrence, were 
subject to divine retribution--normally a shortened and unprosperous life and the 
promise of hell as one's destiny in life. For example, the first eighth-century 
endowment inscription of the assertive Indravarman I, noted above, ends with the 
following warning: 
Those who protect all these goods of Indrabhadresvara in the world 
will enjoy the delights ofheaven along with the gods. Those who carry 
them away will fall into hell together with theirfamily and will suffer 
the sorrows ofhell as long as the sun and moon endure.... 
One may conclude from the epigraphic evidence that, during a king's reign, 
but especially after his death, his territory and notably his richly endowed temples 
were subject to pillage by his various political rivals. Thus, inscriptions of Cham 
monarchs report their restoration of the temples of previous Cham rulers; these 
temples had been destroyed by demonic "foreigners," but also by various Cham 
chiefs who had attempted to acquire the material resources and manpower 
necessary to proclaim their own sovereignty. The act of restoration was a 
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statement of legitimacy, and was a proclamation that the new monarch had 
sufficient resources to guarantee his subjects' future livelihood. 
Since Champa possessed an extensive coastline, one alternative source of 
income for Cham monarchs was the sea. But here, too, there is little evidence that 
Cham monarchs depended on trade revenues-port cesses or the returns on royal 
monopolies on the sale of local commodities to international traders-to finance 
their sovereignty. 
Trade on the Cham coast depended upon the summer monsoon winds, which 
propelled sea traffic north to China. Prevailing fall to spring winds from the north 
made the Cham coast a natural landfall for South China sea merchants, known 
collectively to the Chinese as Yueh, who were headed for the archipelago and 
beyond. Despite the Cham coast's favorable position relative to the prevailing 
seasonal winds, Chinese sources always considered Cham ports to be secondary 
rather than primary centers of international commercial exchange. Yet Cham 
ports did have important products the Chinese and other international traders 
desired-notably luxury items such as ivory, rhinoceros horns, tortoise shells, 
pearls, peacock and kingfisher feathers, spices, and aromatic woodsP 
Chinese and Vietnamese sources enumerate the commodities available at 
Cham coastal ports and demonstrate the importance of the highlands as the 
source of Cham trade goods. Elephants and their tusks, for example, were 
desirable and were included among the tribute gifts the Cham monarch sent to 
the Chinese court on fourteen separate occasions between 414 and 1050 GE. 
These elephants came from the highland regions upriver from Vijaya (Binh-dinh) 
and Panduranga (Phan-rang). Rhinoceros horns (ground rhinoceros horn was 
prized as an aphrodisiac by the Chinese), cardamom, bee wax, lacquer, resins, 
and scented woods (sandalwood, camrhor wood, and eagle/aloeswood) were also 
products of the same upriver region.1 Areca nuts and betel leaves, the chewing of 
which gave teeth a distinct red color, were products of the highlands upriver from 
Indrapura (Tra-kieu); cinnamon was a product of the region upriver from Vijaya, 
and gold was said to be mined at a mountain of gold some 30 Ii from modern 
Hue.14 
Highland oral histories provide valuable insight into the nature of Cham 
realm commercial exchange, which is ignored in all the remaining written sources. 
In local legend among the highlanders in the Darlac Plateau region near Cheo 
Reo, the prime source of the highland products enumerated, Cham are reported 
to have made attempts to better integrate highlanders into the Cham political 
economy via negotiation rather than by force. Highlanders were offered the 
protection of the Cham armies, as well as the privilege of becoming trade 
partners of the Cham.IS Apparently, the most valuable among the trade 
commodities the Cham offered was salt, which was critical to the highland diet as 
well as in local animal husbandry. In addition to substantiating that the highlands 
were the source of the trade items enumerated in external sources, highland oral 
histories report that Cham monarchs were entitled to receive locally woven cloth 
as tribute.16 
Among the highland populations in the region north of the Mekong 
Delta-the source of eaglewood that was valued for its fragrance when burned in 
Cham, Vietnamese, and Chinese ritual-the Cham were said to have come and, 
with local headmen, organized bands of men to assist in the search for the 
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aromatic wood. Local tribesmen became Cham vassals and received a Cham 
saber, seal, and a title which roughly translated "lord/master," thereby confirming 
their leadership statusP 
An especially close Champa-Java network of cultural dialogue that included a 
special trade partnership emerged by the eighth century. From the seventh 
through the tenth centuries, there developed what art historians call "Indo­
Javanese architecture" in Champa, which expressed tantric Mahayana Buddhist 
themes that are similarly depicted in contemporary Javanese art. The reliefs of 
the temples at the Cham sacred center at Mi-s'on are said to resemble those of 
the Borobudur.18 There was a unique Siva-Buddhist syncretism at temples 
downriver from Mi-s'on at Don-duong (Indrapura); here there is an inscription 
dated 911 C.E. that records the adventures of the tenth century Cham courtier 
Rajadvara. Rajadvara twice traveled to Java to study Buddhist magic science; the 
word used in the inscription is siddhayatra, the same tantric term used to describe 
the magical powers of supernatural prowess contained within Buddhism that 
were pursued by late seventh century Sumatra-based Srivijaya monarchs.19 
The Italian adventurer Nicolo de Conti visited Champa in 1435 on his way 
from Java to China. During the fourteenth century, the Cham monarch Jaya 
Simhavaraman II married a Javanese princess, Tapasi. A short time later Che 
Nang, the Cham puppet ruler set up by the Vietnamese conqueror An Huang 
asserted his independence by fleeing to Java-perhaps he was the son of the Java 
princess.20 There is also the Javanese legend of Dvaravati, sister of a Cham king, 
who married the ruler of Majapahit and then promoted the spread of Islam in 
Java during the late fourteenth century. Cham sources that document an Islamic 
commercial community resident at Panduranga in the late tenth century,21 
support Javanese belief that the spread of Islam to Java was attributable to 
Champa. 
Despite this evidence which indicates that international trade on the Cham 
coast could be an important source of income, dependency on sales of local 
products to an external marketplace was not an adequate economic base upon 
which to build a state polity. Periodic fluctuations of the sea trade due to 
disorders at the route's ends in China and the Middle East meant that, like the 
leaders of the Malay states to the south, Cham monarchs could not depend upon 
international commerce as a stable and continuous source of royal 
redistributions. That Cham rulers did not directly control external trade can be 
concluded from records of Cham coast commerce. These report that the major 
center of international trade was at Panduranga, at the extreme southern edge of 
the Cham political domain. The maritime populations of Panduranga must have 
maintained a good deal of autonomy from Cham political control, judging from a 
description of the community that appears in an eleventh century inscription 
which characterized the Panduranga population as "demonic, unrespectful, and 
always in revolt" against the state's authority. 
Based on the total omission of reference to merchants in remaining 
inscriptions from the Cham heartland, it appears that international trade was 
confined to Panduranga. Here at the extreme southern edge of the Cham realm, 
the "ferocious" threatening foreigners could be isolated (not unlike China to the 
north, where seagoing trade with the West was similarly isolated at Canton on the 
extreme southern edge of the Chinese state). Foreign merchants based at 
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Panduranga would have received the enumerated products of the Cham 
hinterland via active coastal and upriver trade networks that were dominated by a 
permanently resident Cham coast seagoing population. 
When they could not depend on the normal flow of commerce to supply them 
with their needed livelihood, this Cham coast seagoing population was likely to 
turn to piracy. During such periods of ebb rather than flow, these seamen were 
likely to pillage neighboring river mouth urban centers and their temples. Thus, 
the eighth century sack of the Po Nagar temple near modern NhaMtrang by 
"ferocious, pitiless, dark-skinned sea raiders" may be attributed to Cham seagoing 
populations rather than "foreigners." It is noteworthy that shortly after this 774 
raid, in 787 Indravarman I established his new capital at Virapura, adjacent to the 
Panduranga commercial enclave. Immediately thereafter he had to repulse a 
second attack from the sea before he could fully proclaim his sovereignty. 
Indravarman's "prowess by conquest" that is referenced in his inscriptions must 
thus have included subjecting the various Cham coast seagoing communities to 
his authority. 
The Chinese court was always trying in vain to compel Cham monarchs to 
assume responsibility for the behavior of their coastal populations; judging from 
the frequency of Chinese demands, it would seem that this coastal population was 
only marginally under any Cham monarch's control. Cham coast piracy was 
widely known among the international trade community. Voyagers were often 
warned to avoid the Cham coast when traveling from the Malacca Strait region to 
China. This weakened the appeal of Cham ports to international traders and 
further increased the likelihood that Cham monarchs could not regularly depend 
on trade revenues to finance their political ambitions. 
Being thus unable to secure sufficient revenue from their subordinate river 
valley agricultural communities or consistent return from internal or external 
trade, Cham monarchs had to seek alternative sources to finance the alliance 
networks that were so critical to their sovereignty. Therefore, it was necessary for 
Cham rulers to seek wealth beyond their own population centers by leading their 
allies on periodic military expeditions outside the Cham realm. Plunder raids 
were thus waged on a regular basis against Champa's neighbors-initially rival 
river mouth population centers and later Khmer territories to the west and 
Vietnamese territories to the north. 
This plunder dynamic explains why Cham history is dominated by seemingly 
consecutive military expeditions. Periodic Cham raids are not only reported in 
Cham epigraphy but also in Vietnamese chronicles and, from the tenth century 
on in, inscriptions from the Khmer realm to the west. Cham military expeditions 
acquired plunder and manpower-Cham ports were widely known as a major 
source of slaves, Le., war captives, who were traded at Cham ports to various 
international buyers. The proceeds from successful expeditions were 
subsequently divided among expedition participants-the various "heroes in 
combat" who figure so prominently in Cham epigraphy as the monarch's principal 
political allies-and/or the coastal populations, whose navigational skills made 
them useful participants on raids against Vietnamese coastal settlements to the 
north as well as against Khmer settlements up the Mekong River in the 
south~who in return acknowledged the Cham monarch's sovereignty. 
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Successful plunder expeditions were also a means by which the Cham 
monarch's needed cultural image as the source of his subjects' well-being was 
validated. Warriors and other key participants in a successful plunder expedition 
were often assigned jurisdiction over land that was either undeveloped or needed 
redevelopment. Inscriptions record that one of the first acts of these royal 
supporters was the lavish endowment of temples, whose staffs subsequently 
assumed supervision of land development projects. Seemingly, these warrior elite 
were donating, or redistributing, a portion of their share of the successful royal 
plunder expeditions via their reassignment ofvarious objects, money,22 and 
manpower that made local development possible. 
Royal subordinates also sanctified the development projects by instituting 
linga and establishing beyond the royal core new temples that honored the 
temple's benefactor but that especially proclaimed the glory of past and present 
Cham monarchs, for whom the temple linga were named. Such recognition of the 
monarch through the endowment and consecration of temples promoted local 
appreciation of the monarch's accomplishments and encouraged the locals' 
subordination, in the absence of a direct royal administrative presence, to the 
sovereignty of the Cham state. 
The Cham state may thus be understood as a loose and periodically 
interdependent polity that encompassed a series of river mouth urban centers 
and their upriver hinterlands. In the absence of a sufficient resource base to 
support their political aspirations, Cham kings by necessity depended on frequent 
military expeditions to acquire plunder that could be redistributed directly 
(sharing booty with their warrior allies) or indirectly (via temple endowments) to 
maintain the loyalty of the inhabitants of the Cham riverine networks. Cham 
monarchs maintained the subordination of their direct military allies by keeping 
them lIin the field" on various plunder expeditions. In the absence of a royal 
bureaucracy that could directly administer the regions of the Cham realm, Cham 
monarchs instead depended on the willingness of local elite to recognize the 
monarch's sovereignty via their participation in his expeditions of conquest and/or 
by their support of religious cults that proclaimed the ruler's superior prowess. 
There was an inherent instability in this political economy that ultimately 
depended upon redistributions from plunder raids. The fate of the Cham state 
was inevitable; following several centuries of reciprocal raiding, Vietnamese 
retaliatory expeditions finally dismembered the Cham realm in the fifteenth 
century.23 
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Two Lectures on Political Process in an "Indic State"l 
"Opposition and Solidarity" and "The 'State' as a System of Signs" 
Shelly Errington 
Introduction 
Clifford Geertz has remarked that in Bali "status and the compulsions 
surrounding it animated most of the emotions and nearly all of the acts which, 
when we find their like in our own society, we call political. To understand the 
negara [Balinese polity] is to locate those emotions and construe those acts; to 
elaborate a poetics of power, not a mechanics" (1980:123). In the following two 
papers, "Opposition and Solidarity" and "The 'State' as a System of Signs," I turn 
to the political life of Luwu, the name of a former "Indic State" of South Sulawesi, 
Indonesia, whose political and social life, like that of historical Balinese and 
Javanese Indic States, was animated by "status and the compulsions surrounding 
it." In these papers I have ignored what could be called the mechanics of 
economic power: land tenure and rents, and the devices by which the rich 
maintained themselves as such. I have concentrated instead on the poetics of 
power, which, in societies such as these, implicates the emotions and acts and the 
institutional arrangements and devices by which people constitute themselves as 
social persons within a hierarchy and try to maintain their places within it. 
Sulawesi and the Circumstances of Fieldwork 
Sulawesi is the name given to the orchid shaped island that lies to the east of 
Borneo and to the west of the Moluccas (Spice Islands). The Gulf of Bone is 
formed by the extension of two southern peninsulas, the western and eastern; 
"South Sulawesi" refers to the southwestern peninsula. For fifteen months, 
primarily in 1976, I did fieldwork in the former "kingdom" of Luwu, which, with 
Goa (centered at Makassar, which is now called Ujung Pandang and is the capital 
of South Sulawesi) and Bone (centered at Bone on the east coast, now the capital 
of the sub-district of Bone), was one of the three major polities of the pre­
independence era. Like other Indic States, Luwu was organized around a high 
central point defined by the ruler or Datu, the state regalia, and the palace. The 
polity was called an akkanmgeng, from the root arong' or "lord." (A glossary 
appears at the end of the second paper. Readers who are speakers of Indonesian 
will recognize that the a-eng construction parallels Indonesian's ke-an 
construction.) In Luwu I stayed with the family of the former Opu Pa'Bicara (it 
would be pembicara in Indonesian), the Lord Spokesman or Lord Orator, one of 
the four main ministers of the akkarongeng; I shuffled between his residence in 
Palopo, currently the capital of the sub-district of Luwu, formerly the center-city 
of Akkarungeng Luwu, and the residence of his unmarried older sister in Senga, a 
small village to the south of Palopo. She was known as Opu Senga, Lord of 
Senga; Andi "Anthon" Pangerang, one of the Opu Pa'Bicara's sons, was an 
important guide and informant, and appears in my fieldnotes (some of which are 
quoted in the following two papers) as "AA." 
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Buginese and Makassarese economy was historically based on long distance 
trade and wet-rice agriculture, and to a large extent it continues to be, although 
an important nickel mine now exists in northern Luwu and tourism is increasingly 
important for Ujung Pandang and Toraja-Iand of the mountainous interior. 
Buginese and Makassarese can be found throughout the Malay archipelago, and 
are best known as fearless sailors and fierce fighters, and for their touchiness in 
defense of their honor. Their word for honor and shame is sin' (analogous to 
Indonesian malu), and it looms large in their accounts of themselves. Their other 
great preoccupation, at least among nobles, is to make good 
marriages-marriages with people of "white blood"-which those who claim 
nobility claim to have. Like other Indic States of island Southeast Asia, 
Akkarungeng Luwu conceived of itself as consisting of three major types of 
people: the nobility, with white blood; the commoners or free people; and the 
slaves. Although none of these has legal status in the Republic of Indonesia, 
people's origins and status claims are still very much a matter of interest to South 
Sulawesians. 
Luwu's linguistic/ethnic situation is mixed. The high nobility there speak and 
write Buginese, but the middle nobility and villagers for the most part speak Tae, 
the same language group as the Toraja. They do not consider themselves to be 
Toraja, for the Toraja are Christians and live in the hills; on the other hand, they 
do not think of themselves as Buginese (ToUgi). If pressed, they will say that they 
are ToLuwu, "people of Luwu," and I will refer to them that way. Because of the 
linguistic diversity and the many cognate words with Indonesian, I have indicated 
throughout the text which language a word belongs to with the indications '''rae,'' 
"Bug.," or "Ind." 
I chose Luwu as a place for fieldwork in part because, coming to field work 
with historical interests in the literature, politics, epistemology, and sensibilities 
fostered in the Indicized states of Southeast Asia, I sought an area in which I 
could see lived some of what I imagined that earlier life to be. Luwu, I was 
assured, was a region outside the main currents of "development." Luwu's Datu 
had died in the mid-1960s and the Opu Pa'Bicara still maintained a very strong 
kapolo or family-following, but he had accepted no position in the Indonesian 
government. Luwu seemed to be caught in a time warp. As it turned out, the time 
warp proved to be as much substance as illusion-not, however, because the main 
currents of history had passed over Luwu but because Luwu had been ravaged by 
them, and ToLuwu were trying to reconstitute their society on the model of the 
old regime, the Datu-centered polity that existed prior to World War II and 
Indonesian independence. Luwu had been very active in resistance against the 
Dutch, and the Datu and the Opu Pa'Bicara had been captured by the Dutch and 
banished for a year. Soon after their return and the establishment of the new 
Republic, the Kahar Muzakar rebellion began, which plunged all of South 
Sulawesi into anarchical civil war (see Harvey 1974). Kahar was from Luwu, and 
the devastation and destruction of all society were especially complete in that 
area. Nearly everyone fled from the countryside to the cities, either Palopo or 
Makassar. Kahar was captured and executed in the mid-1960s, and by the mid­
1970s, when I arrived for fieldwork, the scene seemed peaceable and prosperous. 
People were, however, in the process of reconstituting society as they knew it, and 
they knew it largely as they had known it before the start of World War II, 
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combined with the obvious bureaucratic changes that their membership in the 
Republic of Indonesia brought about. The Opu Pa'Bicara had no legal or 
bureaucratic authority, but he had a great deal of religious and familial authority 
and inspired enormous loyalty He was engaged in arranging marriages, settling 
siri' disputes, and other sorts of activities that he performed prior to 
independence. Moreover, ToLuwu, like all Buginese and Makassarese, continue 
to be very preoccupied with their siri', and the nobles continue to be concerned 
with preserving their children's degree of "white blood" by having them marry 
people of the same or higher amounts of it than they themselves have. 
Opposition and Hierarchy 
The nation-state, such as the Republic of Indonesia, imagines itself to be a 
community of equal citizens bound by abstract horizontal ties, Benedict Anderson 
has argued, where "state sovereignty is fully, flatly, and evenly operative over each 
square centimetre of a legally demarcated territory" (Anderson 1983:26). 
Anderson contrasts the nation-state with the "empire" or "kingdom," a community 
bound by personalistic ties, imagining itself as oriented spatially around and 
toward a high center. Indic States, such as Akkarungeng Luwu, were of the latter 
sort. 
In Indic States, the polity's central city was the polity itself, as many 
commentators have pointed out.2 The conduct of the ruler and the safety of the 
state regalia, whose presence located the realm's most central and socially highest 
point, were considered crucial to the prosperity and peace of the entire realm. 
The ruler in these polities was the fount of social and political status, the high and 
concentrated location of the spiritual potency on which the fertility and prosperity 
of the realm and the individual person alike were thought to depend. Deeply 
centrist, Southeast Asian polities represented themselves to themselves as 
perfect, undivided, centered unities. Like other Indic States, the court of 
Akkarungeng Luwu represented itself to itself with centrist and centered images: 
the banyan tree, whose branches shade and protect those below, and whose 
fertile abundant growth comes from the top; the umbrella, another shading object 
with a high center; the mountain, which has a high central peak and is immovable. 
For such societies that aspired to attain a hegemonic center, dualities of any sort 
implied challenge, instability, and the possibility of de-centering. Needless to say, 
the political center's goal was to remain central-to remain unchallenged, 
immobile, and eternally stable. Just as obvious as the ideal of stability was the 
difficulty of attaining it. Before colonial powers fIxed their boundaries and 
stabilized their centers, Southeast Asian political centers were sometimes de­
centered. Not just polities but persons were (and continue to be) conceptualized 
there as centered entities that embody and locate cosmic energy, which, in Luwu, 
is attached at the navel. The centering and de-centering of realms, whether the 
realms we term "lndic States" or those we call merely "persons," is the process 
that can be called t1politica1" in these societies, historical and contemporary. 
In a hierarchical society like Akkarungeng Luwu, people were, in theory, 
arranged with respect to each other in a continuum of social places, falling away 
from the Ruler in degrees of diminishing purity. Inevitably, some people were 
very close to each other in status: each was approximately the same distance away 
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from the Ruler. Although the Datu was gone when I was in Luwu in the mid­
1970s, many people were oriented towards the Opu Pa'Bicara as their local 
political/social center. I observed and heard about many incidents of status 
competition involving siri' [honor/shame]. I call people who are close in status 
"status-peers" rather than "status-equals" because, following Dumont, it seems 
clear that such a society provides no ideological space for "equals." This point is 
basic to my analysis and is therefore worth expanding. 
Dumont (1965, 1970, 1971) suggests that hierarchical societies do not tend to 
have well-developed notions of persons as separate, autonomous, and equal. (He 
distinguishes, of course between "hierarchical" societies and those that are merely 
"stratified," that is, class societies, legal bureaucracies and the like.) "Equals" are 
people who are separate, and who, therefore, can interact as autonomous beings. 
Equals can interact peaceably without having to choose between deferring or 
dominating. Relations between "equals" need not be structured as a contest, since 
it is not necessary for either to absorb the other into his or her social body. 
In Luwu, people do not imagine that they are autonomous or that their 
identities are self-referential, as the ideology of egalitarianism and utilitarianism 
suggests. In Luwu and in other societies that exhibit sacred hierarchy in Dumont's 
sense (in which the higher ritually encompass the lower), the most prominent 
political characteristic of social relations is that they are cast in terms of high and 
low. In such societies, each person stands socially between people who are higher 
than themselves and people who are lower than themselves. These are the 
relations that I term "vertical": between people who are elder and younger, 
superior and inferior (measured by white blood in South Sulawesi, by different 
attributes in other Southeast Asian societies), protector and dependent, 
commanding and deferring, more powerful and weaker. Central and peripheral 
"vertical" relations are among the most stable in these societies, and they are in a 
sense the paradigmatic model for all social relations. Everyone is enmeshed in 
''vertical'' relations.3 Stable social groupings can be formed between those who 
are juniors and seniors to each other, for each person in such a relation can 
"know his place." A basic part of my account, then, is the local concept of the 
"person"-:-how the person's motives and consciousness are locally construed. 
The logic of a hierarchical system does not admit the possibility of exact peers 
in status. Yet people who are close in status are effectively status-peers. Neither 
is willing to admit the superiority of the other. As a result, their relation is 
unstable and inconclusive, characterized by competition and opposition rather 
than by unity and solidarity. It approaches a contest in its structure and meaning. 
A major preoccupation of near-peers is to try to determine and assert which of 
them is higher. It can be no accident that the contest between closely matched 
opponents is one of the most pervasive structures of narrative, symbolic, and 
expressive forms in the hierarchical societies of island Southeast Asia. The 
contest between near-peers, told as narrative (in rituals, in shadow-puppet 
theater, in retold adventures, in cautionary tales, in recounted conversations) is 
itself a self-representation, a way that these societies have of telling themselves 
what life is like. These contest-narratives are the obverse side of the same 
societies' self-representations as mountains and immovable centers. The wishfully 
immovable center, challenged by a near-peer, becomes embroiled in a contest; 
the contest, lived or recounted, employs lived action or forms the structures of the 
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narrative; the old center or the new one, newly triumphant, becomes the new 
immovable center-immovable, at least, until another peer challenges. 
The geometry of ideal social order in which there is one center surrounded by 
tiers of obedient and loyal followers could be displayed only if people stayed in 
their places. Most of the time people did not stay peacefully in their social places. 
Places in Luwu are not legal-bureaucratic places in which people can rest, as 
though appointed to a sinecure. They must continually assert and embody their 
places in order to retain them. The constitution in Luwu of a mountain-shaped 
society requires, as it were, of its members, to run at full speed merely in order 
not to lose ground. 
In these two papers I analyze the competition between status-peers, a 
competition whose centrifugal consequences continually disturbed the geometry 
of social order in Akkarungeng Luwu and by analogy in other Indic States. The 
first, called "Opposition and Solidarity," concerns political microprocesses, the 
ethos of personal interaction and the analogue of psychology in a world 
dominated by the need to exhibit siri', status!honor. Given that exhibiting siri' is 
the most important attitudinal stance humans can exhibit, the subject of the 
second, "The 'State' as a System of Signs," examines some of the consequences for 
the shape and meaning of the polity, and suggests that the "state" was a system of 
signs of differential status enforced by power at the top. 
Notes to the Introduction 
1.	 Early versions of these two papers were delivered in 1983 at the University of 
Hawai'i as part of the Southeast Asia Program's Distinguished Scholar Series. 
The two papers developed into Part II of my book, Meaning and Power in a 
Southeast Asian Realm (Princeton University Press, 1989), where they appear 
as chapters four and five under the names "Vulnerable Places" and ''The 
Contest for Place," respectively. They are reprinted here, in slightly modified 
form, by permission of Princeton University Press. 
2.	 The literature on the topic of what Geertz calls "the exemplary center" is more 
or less co-extensive with the topic of Southeast Asian Indic States. Some of the 
most useful and concise statements can be found in Anderson 1972, Geertz 
1973 (Chapter Three) and 1980, Moertono 1968, Schrieke 1957, and Tambiah 
1976 (Chapter Seven). . 
3.	 The only exceptions consisted of the Ruler, who had no one above him, and 
the lowest slave of a slave who had no dependents. For an explication of 
slavery in Southeast Asia as dependence, see Reid (1983). 
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When I first arrived in South Sulawesi, I stayed in Ujung Pandang, in the 
household of very high nobles from a Bugis former kingdom to the south of 
Luwu. The following excerpt from my fieldnotes describes my initial puzzlement: 
I thought I should practice doing fieldwork as well as doing language 
so I decided to find out who lives around us. To get the lay ofthe land, 
I asked one ofthe noble cousins ofthe household to come with me. 
We got to the first house and I said, "fVho lives there?" "Kapolo," she 
said, pleased. At the next one I said, "And who lives here?" "Kapolo," 
she said again. And again for the third house. I was beginning to feel 
that this was not specific enough. No names, no relationships-what 
happened to kinship, anyway? At the fourth house and my fourth 
question she stopped, lowered her voice, and all but whispered, as 
though it were a scandal, "ToLaing." 
Eventually, I came to the conviction that if ordinary Buginese were to write an 
indigenous social science-an effort to describe accurately what the world is 
like-they would begin with the great divide between kapolo and ToLaing, 
relatives and strangers, "us" and "them." Only those at the very top of a Southeast 
Asian hierarchy stand outside and above the contest for place. (Those were the 
circumstances of the Opu Pa'Bicara and his immediate high core of relatives at 
the time I did fieldwork; hence he, and I looking over his shoulder, could speak 
about the former akkarungeng as a whole and from the top, for it was in the past, 
and his social place was unchallenged and unchallengeable partly because it was 
past.) Historically, of course, even rulers lived in a habitus, as Bourdien would put 
it, of opposition; there were always other rulers in other kingdoms who could 
challenge them. But rulers were in a better position than most to eradicate 
opposition, and throughout Southeast Asia they imagined themselves as 
unchallenged and unchallengeable. Not so for ordinary humans, who lived in a 
dualistic world of allies and enemies rather than in the center of a wishfully and 
sometimes actually hegemonic center. Historically, the social place that any given 
person held was constantly threatened by status-peers. Status-peers vie with each 
other for a superior social place. 
At the time I did fieldwork, society in Luwu was no longer officially and legally 
a hierarchy, not only because everyone was officially a citizen equal to all others, 
but also because it lacked a ruler and regalia, a peak to act as the ceiling of 
competition and the guarantor of the stability of a hierarchy of places. 
Nonetheless, people acted as though there were a social hierarchy whose local 
summit was the high core of which the Opu Pa'Bicara was the most prominent 
member. In a hierarchy of the Southeast Asian sort, people's social places were 
and are constantly threatened by status-peers, who vie with each other for a 
superior place. In the lived social hierarchy I witnessed during fieldwork, status­
peers in the presumed hierarchy continued to compete with each other for 
"place." (High place in the current era can lead to no honors from a non-existent 
ruler in a non-existent polity, of course, but it can lead to respectable or better 
marriages with people of similar or higher white blood than one's own. But to 
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look at the competition as though it has a specific goal or utility is a little 
irrelevant: siri', defense of "place," honor, is where people "live" attitudinally and 
emotionally.) Awareness of the threatening existence of ToLaing continues to 
inform all social life. In no trivial sense, even conversations are contests. No less 
so is the analogue of etiquette, which is better understood as status negotiation 
than as politesse. 
As I remarked before, the contest is an exceedingly common way of casting 
experience in hierarchical Southeast Asia, whether the medium is a ritual drama, 
a cockfight, a shadow-puppet play, or the retelling of an encounter that happened 
yesterday; all are usually plotted as a struggle between two closely matched 
opponents. It is, simply, a rhetorical form that was and is widely experienced as 
compelling. Everyone in Akkarungeng Luwu had status-peers. Even the ruler, 
looking across to peers in other polities, saw other rulers, whose expansionist 
tendencies were a continual threat to his own. Currently, a high noble with a 
kapolo sees other high nobles with kapolo. Any and all centers have expansionist 
tendencies, which continually pose a threat to their peers. A person involved in a 
contest looks up or down for allies. Looking up, he hopes to find a powerful 
protector who will view the challenge to the lower person as a challenge to 
himself and will bring to bear all his prestige and influence (and warrior­
followers, if necessary) to move toward a satisfactory settlement. That higher 
person is the navel-center to whom the lower one is oriented as a peripheral 
server. Looking down, a person hopes to find many inferiors who offer up loyalty, 
support, and obedience. Those inferiors are the loyal followers who are oriented 
to this person as their navel-center. 
When peers are in opposition, then, the contest is not between individuals. 
When rulers contested each other, when there were akkarungeng, we would term 
the contest "war." When high nobles contested their peers when there were 
akkarungeng, we might label the contest anything from ''vying for prestige" to 
"internal turmoil" or "civil war," depending on the level of violence and its success 
in de-centering the centers in the level above it. Now, when a low noble jostles for 
position with his peers, the social body of followers whom he involves may be 
quite small. In that case, the contest might be labeled "a tense conversation," "a 
boasting challenge," or "a village dispute involving a siri' killing," again depending 
on the violence level and the number of people involved. 
The point, the logic, and the dynamics of lateral opposition were and are 
similar, regardless of level. One continues to be judged by one's rivals, whom one 
challenges oneself, and by whom one is challenged. At a deep level, there is no 
other way to know who one is. 
This lived social theory, like more bookish ones, implies a psychology: an 
ethos, a social stance, and a way of thinking about the constitution and worth of 
persons. In Luwu and in South Sulawesi generally, the stance that underlies both 
opposition to peers and the ability to fuse into a hierarchical unity is called siri'. 
There are people who share one's siri'; they protect and guard it. Those who do 
not share one's siri' attack it. And so the world is divided into two sorts of people: 
"us" and "them", those who protect one's siri' and those who attack it, kapolo and 
ToLaing. 
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Siri' and Ripakasiri' 
Perhaps the main criterion of who counts as kapolo rather than as ToLaing is the 
bond of siri' within a kapolo: 
I was talking to Andi M about sin'. He said that you are one siri' with 
yourfamily, against ToLaing. II I asked him for some examples. He 
said, IISuppose lowe some money to a ToLaing and I have to repay it, 
and the date for repaying it is approaching but I don't have it, then I 
go to my rich uncle and I tell him about it. My uncle will give me the 
money (or lend it). That is because we are one sin: and he would be 
embarrassed just like me if I didn't repay it. II I said, IISuppose your 
uncle refused you the money once you asked for it?1I He said in that 
case, he would feel npakasiri' by his uncle. 
(The term he used, mamesa sUi' [in Tae] or maseddi' siri' [in BUgis] means tlin a 
state of one siri'!' [Mesa and seddi' mean 1I0ne.lI] The term ripakasUi' means lito be 
caused siri',11 to be offended.) 
The term siri' is, so far as I know, unique to South Sulawesi, but variations on 
the themes of shame, embarrassment, performance, solidarity, and respect that 
the term points to appear throughout the island Southeast Asian world. To have 
siri' (to be malu in Indonesian, or to have isin in Central Java, or lek in Bali, or 
hiya' in Tagalog-speaking Luzon) is a good thing; it marks a person as a social 
being. Perhaps like all words, but especially like words that stand at the juncture 
of emotions, processes, reactions, contexts, and understandings, sirl' cannot be 
satisfactorily translated. Conventionally rendered, it would be something like 
IIdignity" or "honorll or IIshame ll-not that the meaning of any of those words is 
entirely transparent even in English. The Javanese term isin is also often 
rendered "shame.1I But the most illuminating translation of isin I have 
encountered is Ward Keeler's (1987:66) "vulnerability to interaction. II Part of the 
meaning of sirl' could also be given as IIvulnerability to interaction," because a 
person who has sirl' is sensitive to, hence vulnerable to, other people. 
When you apply it to yourself, the word indicates that you felt embarrassed or 
inadequate to the situation. For instance, if you tell a joke and nobody laughs, you 
feel siri'. Or you might feel siri' if you find yourself in a situation in which you do 
not know how to behave, as in the presence of a high-status person when you 
can't handle speech levels; or, as we might say, when you are at a dinner party 
and you don't know which fork to use, but everyone is judging you on your suave 
performance. So, when a small child, meeting a gigantic pale stranger from far 
away for the first time, clings and hides behind his mother's sarong, the mother 
says, IIMasiri-ill-IIHe's (in a state of feeling) siri"'-with some pride that the child is 
not so brazen as to approach an important stranger without hesitation. 
I think that this capacity to feel embarrassment, respect, and social 
humbleness is precisely what Keeler meant in translating isin as ''vulnerable to 
interaction." It marks a person as social, as human, in part because it means that 
that person is responsive to social expectations and cues, rather than wild, 
controllable only by force: 
AA observed that Westerners don't have siri ~ and for that reason they 
don't understand anything butpolicing and bntte force. Shocked, I 
24 Southeast Asia Papers Number 32 
Errington Opposition and Solidarity 
said that, quite the contrary, we have inner controls, our hati keeil [an 
Indonesian term that means, more or less, "conscience"]. It is tme, I 
admitted, that when our hati kecil does not jadi [Ind. "to happen," "to 
jell, " "to operate"], we have a problem. That's when we have to use 
police and armies and such, because our cosmos doesn't take care of 
itself, unlike theirs. I pointed out that when they do something salah 
('mistake," "out ofplace"], they suffer mabusung or kasalla'. But our 
cosmos doesn't do anything, so we have to have police. 
Siri' is not an inner control in the same way we imagine conscience to be, but it 
does represent the capacity and sensibility required to adjust one's behavior to a 
situation without force or the threat of force. 
Children are not born with siri'; they have to be instilled with it. In Luwu, as in 
many parts of Indonesia, people are horrified at the thought of hitting their 
children and seldom do. When asked why they consider it bad, they explain that if 
a child is continually hit, especially near the face, the child will grow up lacking in 
siri.' When pressed further about what connection those things have, they 
explicate what to them appears obvious. For one thing, the child becomes used to 
obeying only in response to force. A person with siri', by contrast, knows when 
and whom to obey without being forced. For another, a habitually abused child 
will grow up into the sort of person who expects abuse, and will not react 
appropriately if insulted or threatened. Such a person will be a coward and will 
not insist on the respect that is due him or her. 
And so it is not surprising that various inadequacies and deficiencies in the 
siri' of other ethnic groups is both explained and emblematized by their (alleged) 
habit of striking their children. In actual fact, from the bands of hunting-gathering 
Semai of the Malay interior to the hyper.refined Javanese of the court in 
Yogyakarta, parents of this archipelago are appalled by the notion of using force 
to discipline their children. What precisely horrifies them about it differs from 
society to society, along with the views that each has about how proper social 
beings are constituted. Nonetheless, explaining alien people's inadequacies by 
their alleged child abuse is as widespread in the Malay world as the practice of 
not hitting one's own. 
Again, throughout the archipelago, to be said to be deficient in siri' (or 
whatever: de'gaga siri'na [Bug.], kurangperasaan malu [Ind.], ora nduwe isin [Jav.], 
sing nawang lek [Bal.], walang hiya' [Tag.]) is to be found inadequately human. 
And so in Luwu they say: 
Sm'-e mitu tariase tau
 
Narekko de'na sirita, tanianik tau
 
Rupa tau mani asenna
 
Only with siri' are we called human
 
Ifwe have no siri', we are not human
 
That's called human in form only
 
and 
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Naia tau de ~ sin'na
 
de na nlainna olokolo-~
 
The person who is without siri'
 
is no different from an animal
 
Siri', in short, is a quality that all humans should have. But to be made siri' by 
someone else (ripakasiri') is something else again. 
The word's construction reveals that it is siri' turned back on oneself: 
ripakasiri', "to be caused to have siri'." Again, this construction is found elsewhere 
in the archipelago: dipermalukan in Malay, di gau-~ isin in Javanese, napahiya' in 
Tagalog. ToLaing differ from kapolo precisely because they do not have one's 
siri' as their own. As a consequence, one must be suspicious of them, for they wish 
to be insulting and denigrating if they find the slightest opportunity to do so with 
impunity. "Makaretutuko ak~ deng ToLaingt' ("Be on your guard if there are 
ToLaing!" [Tae]) 
Ripakasiri' 
All social relations are conceptualized in terms of shared siri'. There is a 
presumption that people from the same "source"-siblings, their juniors, and 
lower-status kin who trace relations to the same forebear-should be of one siri'. 
In this way, "kinship" can be, to some degree, mapped onto and meshed with siri'. 
But kinspeople can become ToLaing to each other by offending one another. 
Conversely, people who are initially ToLaing to each other can, through 
association and habit, become joined in siri'. People in Luwu are very clear that it 
is intense and prolonged association, assiwolongpolongeng, that joins people in 
siri'. One farmer in Senga said: 
You feel maseddi' sin' ("in a state ofone sin"') with your kapolo, but 
it's also because ofassociation (assiwolongpolongeng). For instance, 
the wood merchant who lives with Daeng P's brother has to behave 
well, for his deeds are the deeds ofDaeng P's brother. 
When people are thrown together into association, they either develop a single 
siri' or else they become enemies. Consider my discussion of siri' with a sailor on a 
trip he made back to Luwu: 
You really feel sin' when you are away. Ifyou are in Luwu, you may 
know ofsomeone, but you do not go around together. But when you 
meet in a distant country, you feel that as ToLuwu you are mamesa' 
sin'. I asked what it meant to ''feel sin'" when he was far away. What 
did it mean for his behavior? He said that you are sUlTounded by 
ToLaing, they are looking at you, and they will judge Luwu and your 
ToMatoa by your behavior. 
I asked what it meant to be one sin' with other men from Luwu, 
whom he had not known before. He said the guys from South 
Sulawesi always stick together in fights, so people from other suku­
bangsa (ethnic groups) are afraid ofthem. Many suku-bangsa don't 
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have siri: so each person is alone. They don't have a chance against 
the guys from South Sulawesi. 
It is my strong impression that being "one siri" is a constant potential rather 
than a constant state. The feeling is activated, sometimes in a very ad hoc 
manner, by a challenge from the Other. Far away from home, always surrounded 
by ToLaing, the sailor has a heightened awareness of the oneness of his siri' with 
his ToMatoa and with people of Luwu. 
The Other that prompts people to join together in siri' is not fixed; it is 
whomever challenges. The people with whom one unites in siri' are also not fixed; 
they can be whomever joins one against the offending Other. The following 
incident from fieldnotes illustrates these observations: 
This morning about lOAM there was a noise ofstrong voices. Opu D 
and Tante P and I went to the front porch to see what was happening, 
and AA drifted in from the neighbor's to the scene ofaction, which 
was right in front ofour house on the main road. There was a bemo 
(a small passenger van) and D's younger sibling N. N was shouting. I 
saw him gesticulate at the driver and say something about mud and 
water, and he made more gestures. I saw AA come up, take his hand, 
and tum him away, and then AA spoke a few words to the driver. The 
driver immediately went over to N, right hand extended and left hand 
on right elbow (a deferential gesture). The driver grasped N's hand 
and touched his forehead with it. He minta maaf (asked forgiveness) 
and N accepted it. Then the driver got into his bemo and drove off, 
and AA and N discussed it some more, and then N laughed. Then N 
came over to me and said in Indonesian, "Minta maaf, kena air," 
(Ind., "I apologize, I was struck by water. "), and then he left and the 
crowd dispersed. 
[TheJreport ofAA a few minutes later was that N was going along 
on his motorcycle with his child in front and his wife in back. Seeing 
an oncoming bemo, he flashed his lights to show that there were 
puddles and the bemo should slow down; but the bemo just barrelled 
on through, splashing the child. N put his child and wife over to the 
side and halted the bemo and began yelling at the driver. A small 
group assembled. He hit the driver through the window and then, 
because the guy was sort of leaning down, put his foot in or near the 
driver's face, and said "Kau tidak melawan?" (Ind., "You're not going 
to fight?") and the driver said no. And so, N said later, he couldn't 
fight him because it would be like fighting a woman. N was still very 
hot when AA came up, whereupon the driver started making excuses, 
like he didn't see him and didn't know there was water and so on. AA 
immediately saw the danger and said, "Kau tidak merasa salah?" 
(Ind., "You don't feel at faUlt?"). "Saya merasa salah" (Ind., "I feel at 
fault"), answered the driver. "Kalau begitu, minta maar' (Ind., "If it's 
like that, ask forgiveness"). So that's what the driver immediately did. 
Then the driver asked whether he could be considered free to go and 
was given permission by AA and N Then N had to ask forgiveness 
fromAA (really from Opu) because he had caused a commotion right 
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in front ofthe house, and from me, because I am AA's and AM's 
sibling. 
AA says that the siri' that N felt was for everyoneuthe whole 
populace was ripakasiri' by the driver's behavior. Ifthe driver had 
been local, people would have considered it a matter between Nand 
his immediate rapu; but since the driver was a Bugis from the south 
everyone got together because they were all in it together. The paradox 
was that N was guarding Opu's sin.' (because Opu guards theirs), but 
he did it by making a fuss in front ofthe house, which is strictly an 
offense to Opu's siri', so he had to ask forgiveness from the house's 
high residents. 
AA said that ofcourse if the driver had been foolish enough to 
fight, he would have been killed easily, because everyone would have 
entered the fray to strike him. I asked if that wasn't unfair, a mob 
attacking one person. He said no, not at all, quite the contrary, 
everyone would feel siri' not to enter in, because when one person is 
guarding our siri~ how shameful not to help. Just like Kahar (the 
rebellion against Java, the civil war ofthe 1950s), when Kahar was 
ripakasiri' by the government; he was fighting to defend the siri' ofall 
people ofSouth Sulawes~ manyfelt, and so lots ofpeople felt it would 
be shameful not to join him. 
The boundaries between those fused in siri' and those opposed in siri' also 
shift with the actions of individuals. As mentioned, a person who begins as a 
complete stranger, by definition a ToLaing, can become, through 
assiwolongpolongeng, of one's siri' with a group of people who are of one siri'. In 
this process, people of distinct siri' become one (si-temmak-temmak). I myself 
experienced this process of losing my status as a ToLaing and becoming maseddi 
siri' with the people I stayed with. This process is not equivalent to "establishing 
rapport" or "being accepted" in any sense immediately comprehensible to 
Occidental humanism. A person cannot live in a household and remain a 
ToLaing because it would be intolerable for the household. 
How would one act as a ToLaing in someone else's household? One would 
behave as though one's actions reflected only on oneself, not on the household 
members. When Americans living temporarily in Javanese households do this, 
they often feel quite righteous, because they conceptualize the worth of the "self' 
(theirs specifically) as located in its autonomy and exercise of individual freedom. 
But people in Java and South Sulawesi do not care much for individual freedom 
(they translate it into Indonesian as kebebasan, being untied and unconnected), 
and they have only a slight conception of equality and democracy. They have a 
strong notion, however, of what neighbors will say. And they have a strong notion 
of how people with siri'-that is, people who properly speaking are humans rather 
than just wild animals-behave. Autonomy characterizes the way animals act-they 
do not think about how their actions reflect on their ancestors, and they 
apparently have no siri', for they are not vulnerable to the feelings and wishes of 
others. As one lady remarked to me while feeding her chickens, chickens are just 
the opposite of humans; when they are young, they follow their elder, but when 
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they ar~ adults, each goes its own way. "Not so for us humans! The more you are 
an adult, the more you stick with your kapolo!" she said. 
People who are not bound by sirl' are opposed in siri'. There is no neutral 
ground, and there are no alternatives. At the same time, the boundaries between 
"us" and "them," between people fused and people opposed in sirl', constantly 
shift with context and with individuals' behavior. So, for instance, two followers of 
the same ToMatoa are joined in siri' when the ToMatoa holds a ceremony and 
the followers work in it. (Even that is an optical illusion, of course. They are 
joined in support of the ToMatoa's siri', not of each others'. If in certain contexts 
they work together, it is because they both follow the same high-noble core.) But 
if the followers are in the village and the ToMatoa is not present, they regard 
each other as ToLaing. They say to their children, "Makaretutuko ake deng 
ToLaingf' "Watch yourself if there are ToLaing!" And they mean, precisely, 
fellow villagers and fellow members of the same high noble's kapolo. 
The reverse process, in which people who should be of one siri' offend each 
other and become ToLaing to each other, is also a constant potential and 
common event. In those instances, for example when two brothers pakasiri' each 
other (cause each other to have siri'), they become ToLaing to each other until 
and unless someone higher than both and trusted by both (a ToMatoa, whether 
the elder of a kapolo or a respected older relative) is able to settle the matter in a 
way that saves face for both. Of course, sometimes a reconciliation is impossible. 
To put it another way, a person is as likely to be ripakasiri' by someone with 
whom he or she is acquainted as by a stranger-perhaps more likely. 
In such circumstances, the ToMatoa is critical in preventing bloodshed, 
because it is an offense for his followers to fight in his presence. Here is a story, 
retold from my fieldnotes, illustrating the function of the high-status ToMatoa, 
the Opu Pa'Bicara. I retell the story in its entirety, changing the name of the 
murdered man and leaving out the name of the killer, so as not to pakasiri' their 
kin. Those who are named and alive acted honorably. The story was told to me by 
Andi Anthon and the Pak Yusof, who is in the kapolo of the Opu Pa'Bicara and 
whose house is right next door to the Opu Pa'Bicara's. We were discussing 
madness and people's reactions to it. 
There was a second cousin ofOpu's (a follower) about three years 
back. He was making a nuisance ofhimself, taking people's cars and 
demanding money and such. People said he was sinting-sinting (Ind., 
"mildly crazy,""highly eccentricIt). One night he appeared at Pak 
Yuso!'s in a chauffeured car, carrying all his weapons with him. "That 
uncle showed lack ofrespect, for sure,"AA interjected. 
The man entered Pak Yuso!'s house and said, "Idon't regret 
it-only, for my wife and children, II and he gave all his weapons to Pak 
Yusof. Meanwhile Pak Yusof had gotten out his own weapons, 
because the man looked dangerous and was known to be slightly 
crazy. When the weapons were surrendered, Pak Yusofput them in a 
room and locked the door. 
The man opened his shirt and said repeatedly, "Hot, hot, fan, fan, II 
and Pak Yusoffanned him. The man was weeping and burning with 
heat and said, "Call Opu." AA, from the adjacent house, had seen the 
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man approaching, and had gone to report it to his father, the Opu. He 
had then taken offhis sarong and shirt, and wearing only shorts (for 
maximum mobility) had returned to the scene prepared to fight. Yusof 
said to him, "Quick, go get Opu." And the man called to AA, "Come 
here, my child, go call Opu. 1l AA saw that the man no longer had 
weapons, so he went back to get Opu. 
Opu arrived and very slowly (so as not to make any sudden 
movements) approached the man and Pak Yusof. Like an unruly 
monster (Ind., raksasa) the man jumped onto Opu, weeping and 
embracing him, and kept saying "Lieutenant Ismail, Lieutenant 
Ismail. II Opu said that they would [IX it, or something like that, not 
recognizing that the man had already killed Lieutenant Ismail. 
I1ley went out to the car, and the driver revealed that the 
Lieutenant was already dead, something ofa rude shock, his head 
blown offwith a gun. 
Pak Yusof loaded the man in the car and took him to the jail or 
the police station or something. I1le armed soldiers there all ran away 
from this man who had no weapons, because they thought he was 
invulnerable (Ind. kebal). So Pak Yusofsaid to the man, "You will 
stay here, won't you, " and the man saidyes. 
Then Pak Yusofwent back to the house to askAA to go with him 
to Bua, where the man's wife and children were. (AA interjected that 
only later did he realize what his function was to be.) As they 
approached Bua, there was a lot ofshouting, because that is where 
Ismail had been killed. All ofIsmail's family were there, and they 
yelled "Halt!" to the car, because this was a matter ofsiri'. The 
madman was a closer relative ofOpu's than ofthe others, but Ismail 
was in Opu's kapolo too. So the car was stopped and Ismail's relatives 







"Get out. II So they got out and the car was searched. The dead
 
man's relatives thought the killer might be in the car, protected by his 
relatives. The two had to stand in front ofthe headlight beams and it 
was scary, but Pak Yusofwas calm andAAfollowed. (He interjected.) 
"If the talk was just a little off, it would have been fatal," Pak Yusof 
commented. 
IlListen, "Pak Yusofsaid when the car had been searched. "This is 
my family too, and ifthe government doesn't take care ofit, then we 
will all together fight to the death! Because this is siri'I"These words 
calmed them a bit, but they were weeping with frustration because 
they wanted an enemy, and Pak Yusof was not one. They wanted to 
go to the madman's house, about two kilometers away, andpull it 
down, probably killing his wife and children who were in it. 
IlIfyou want to get the wife and children," Pak Yusof told them, 
Hthat will enter the siri' ofthe kapolo ofAndiAnthon. And ifyou want 
to get his kapolo, you might as well start with him, as he is right here. 
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And ifyou want to attack him, I will fight right now by his side." 
Helpless again, they wept in frustration. 
So Pak Yusof remained there as a sort ofhostage and AA took the 
car and went to the house of the man. The wife and children had shut 
it up and barricaded it as much as they could. They said, "Who is 
there?" He answered, "Andi Anthon." So they opened a window. He 
got them out and into the car, and they went back and picked up Pak 
Yusof, and then they sped offinto town. 
In this story Pak Yusof presents himself, with Andi Anthon's collaboration, as 
a powerful and calm man who is used to dealing with sid' and violence and who 
can command even madmen, who will obey. Pak Yusofwas the main narrator, 
with Andi Anthon, whose status was higher but whose generation was junior, 
interjecting and nodding "yes" at crucial points. It was told for my benefit in order 
to illustrate several points about siri', Pak Yusof and Andi Anthon present Yusof 
as powerful, experienced, and commanding, but also as wise enough not to try to 
handle this tense and potentially explosive situation by himself. He makes a point 
of showing Andi Anthon, the son of the ToMatoa whom all parties 
acknowledged, whose presence effectively guaranteed Pak Yusofs own safety 
and that of the madman's immediate family. To fight in their ToMatoa's presence 
(or in the presence of his son, the same thing) would have offended the ToMatoa. 
In the days of the akkarungeng, when there was fighting, the Datu sent a delegate 
with a red umbrella, symbol of the Datu. At its appearance all fighting had to 
stop. I was told a number "Of stories about fighting and about the sudden 
appearance of a high noble or a red umbrella, obliging the warring parties to 
cease and desist. In such cases, the narrative continues, "They wept! They had no 
place for their siri'!" Grown men are not supposed to cry, except in one 
circumstance-when their siri' is offended but the situation prevents showing 
themselves ready to die in its defense. 
A person who dies because of his siri' mate rigollah mate risantange, "dies a 
death of palm sugar and coconut cream." Dying for siri' is the sweetest death, the 
only death worth dying. To be killed or to die for any other reason is foolish and a 
waste. 
There is a sense in which the whole system of etiquette, or better, manners 
and mores, is about submission (politeness), attack (rudeness), and defense 
against attack. It is a side of social life for which a cockfight can provide an image 
and teach a moral. 
The Cockfight as a Moral Tale 
Cockfighting, an activity popular throughout the Malay archipelago for many 
centuries, is now banned in South Sulawesi. Knowing, though, that cockfighting is 
a cultural system, I inquired, though not too vigorously, about it. My fieldnotes 
include this discussion of cockfighting with the Opu Pa'Bicara and his son Andi 
Anthon: 
I told AndiAnthon something about cockfights in Balh what I had 
garnered from CG's article, and he was amazed to hear that the 
Balinese have cockfights but then don't themselves break into fights. 
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He said that cockfights were allowed only in front ofthe palace, 
because people could be controlled there. Otherplaces, they were 
likely to get into fights. AA said that he thought that one thing you 
learn in a cockfight is to control yourself, and that is a very important 
lesson. He gave me the "refined" word for it, the stative verb 
maperreng and the noun form aperre-perreng. and provided this 
saying: "Nareka nacau perrekik padata urane, nacau waranitokik." 
This means, "If we are defeated in our steadiness as males, our 
bravery is defeated too. "But he said that the main point of 
cockfighting is a training in manhood. Cocks cannot live together 
without determining who is best! Further, ifone is defeated it says 
"kraakt' and doesn't complain again, doesn't hit the opponent in the 
back or anything. 
[On another occasion1the Opu Pa 'Bicara said that a man who 
was a real stud in the old days was called a pakkawacampa, a man 
who cockfights. What you did in cockfights epitomized how you dealt 
with siri'-how you treated your opponent, how you dealt with nobles, 
how you reacted to winning and losing. People can forget themselves if 
their cock is defeated. 
Cockfights apparently taught several moral lessons. Most striking, perhaps, is 
that cocks, like men, cannot live together without settling who is best. Equally 
striking a lesson is that the defeated cock defers to its superior, accepts its fate, 
and does not fight back, the implication being that human beings ought to do 
likewise.! Most people who live outside South Sulawesi, and many Buginese and 
Makassarese themselves, tend to identify sirl' (especially in the modern age in 
cities, where people are not certain who, if anyone, deserves their deference) only 
as readiness to fight at the slightest opportunity. A middle-aged middle-ranking 
noble remarked: 
Nowadays everything is chaotic because there are so few respected 
ToMatoa. So the young people in the cities think siri' is all about being 
brave and ready to fight. In the old days, you had to have siri'. Ifyou 
did, you were sure to be brave. Now people thinkyou have to be brave, 
and call that "siri "'. 
This man's view is that siri' is coming to signify merely a willingness to fight 
and the impulse to demand deference, not the willingness to defer to a superior. 
But the two are aspects of the same thing, and old-style nobles take as much pride 
in one as in the other. 
When Andi K (a noble son ofthe Opu Pa 'Bicara) was here and we 
were talking about siri: he told this story about himself. It was quite a 
few years ago, when Andi K lived in Jakarta. He and his friends were 
high bureaucrats and hob-nobbed with ministers often. They were at 
the airport. Word suddenly came that the ruler ofBone (an important 
South Sulawesi former kingdom) was at the airport. Andi K said to his 
friends, who were Javanese, "Hey, don't laugh at me." And he went to 
the roler and made a sembahyang (a deferential gesture) that showed 
great respect. The roler allowed him to carry his bags. He had zillions 
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ofthem, and they were really heavy! We all laughed heartily at the 
incident. (What we found so funny was the double incongruity ofa 
high noble weighed down with bags like a porter; and a modem 
educated bureaucrat dropping everything to defer to an embodiment 
ofthe old regime.) Then they all explained, with great pride, that if 
Andi K had not acted like that, he would have felt that he had no siri'. 
He would have felt that his feeling ofbeing human had disappeared, 
because siri' is what differentiates humans from animals. 
Siri' is about attack and defense, but it is also about holding steady 
(apperrengeng). The conversation about the cockfight highlights the importance of 
steadiness, of holding one's own in the skirmishes for status that compose 
everyday life. I turn now to the strategies and tactics used in etiquette, but will 
return at the article's end to siri' as the capacity to hold steady due to the fact that 
one is aware of one's place. 
Siri' and the Contest for Place 
What counts as attack and as injury or (as ToLuwu put it) penetration? Let us 
take the point of view of the attacker, and speak as though the attacker intended 
to penetrate and injure. Obviously, piercing soft body flesh with bullets or knives 
counts as penetration and attack, a type of injury that is far from uncommon in 
South Sulawesi. The newspaper in Ujung Pandang, its capital city, reports a 
killing due to siri' almost weekly. (Although no killing due to sirl' occurred in the 
villages I frequented during fieldwork, I did observe a number of very tense 
incidents involving sirl' whose natural end, if uninterrupted, would have been the 
death of one or both parties.) Even to expose a weapon in another's presence 
counts as an attack. And so it is, as they say, "not polite" to expose a weapon in 
the presence of a superior. "Not polite" means "not deferential"; "not deferential" 
means "attacking." 
Words can also be weapons. The clearest form of words used as attacking 
missiles is the insult. The clearest form of insult is to cast aspersions on another 
person's ancestry, to state or imply that the person's origins were low. Even to 
hint such an insult raises the level of tension in an interaction to a very marked 
degree. It puts everyone on guard. 
To pronounce the personal name of a person can count as a hostile act, for it 
places him as inferior to oneself. To speak the name of someone clearly 
inferior-a child whose status is similar to one's own, or an adult whose status is 
decidedly inferior to one's own-is acceptable and, in many circumstances, 
appropriate; but to utter the name of a peer or a senior (by either status or 
generation) constitutes a challenge. 
Body stance is another potential weapon. The "polite" parts of the body, used 
for deferential interaction, are the head, the right hand, and the front. And so one 
can insult by turning one's back, or by exposing the sale of one's foot, or by using 
one's left hand in dealing with another person. Or an attacker could approach 
another's head too closely, stand tall directly in front of someone who is sitting, or 
step directly in front of the person without bending. Those are very extreme 
forms of inSUlt, however, and are seldom used. A more subtle and more common 
November 1989 SoutheastAsia Papers 33 
Opposition and Solidarity Errington 
way of indicating lack of deference, a testing form of attack, is for the attacker 
simply to spread out casually, stretching or spreading his knees (when sitting in a 
chair), looking straight at the opponent with chin tilted up and shoulders thrown 
back and open or getting up abruptly without asking permission. From this 
description it can be inferred that the most deferential body stance, the one used 
by inferiors with very high-status people on formal occasions, requires that the 
elbows and knees be kept close to the body, the head slightly bowed, the eyes 
lowered, the shoulders stooped, the soles of the feet hidden. 
If the body speaks a language in Luwu, it is public and social not private and 
idiosyncratic. The meaning of body language in Luwu is very different from the 
sort described in books on the subject that are available in the United States on 
supermarket bookracks. Those volumes instruct the reader that a person's fear 
and self-doubts will be discernible from the position of the knees, the hunch of 
the back, and so on. To "read" the body in America is to read an interior psyche 
with a unique history expressing itself in the medium of the body. 
Body language in Luwu, by contrast, is entirely public in its code, a code 
instilled in children as etiquette and displayed in ceremony as social form. It is 
also public in its interpretation. Because one is trained from childhood to read 
the body stances of other people and to control and minutely adjust one's own, 
"reading" body language is far from a subversive or shrewdly insightful act. Finally 
and most profoundly, it is public in the sense that one's body stance does not 
express one's interiority, whether unconscious or intentional. Rather, it registers 
the status of the person to whom it is oriented. And so it is that one can aggress 
against another person by adjusting one's body, in major or minor ways, so as to 
register degrees of attitude ranging from deference to contempt. 
Another weapon available to an attacker is penetration by insight. A person 
can be "read," as ToLuwu put it; that is, personal inclinations, desires, impulses, 
and reactions can be revealed unintentionally to an observer, who pays careful 
attention to the person's face and body stance. The fact that the body is a public 
system of signs that can be read locks the observer and the observed into an 
intensely reciprocal system of communication. The attentive observer is hyper­
aware of minute inflections of facial expression, voice, and body stance, which 
may reveal reactions the observed wishes to conceal. The observed tries to 
maintain self-control over every gesture and to remain completely impassive and 
without affect, especially in situations of duress. 
Needless to say, the higher one's status, the higher the stakes. A high 
ToMatoa is studied carefully by his followers, who take their cues for their own 
reactions from the reactions of their leader. The ToMatoa must not allow himself 
to reveal even slight annoyance at something that he does not want his followers 
to be furious about, for the ToMatoa's slightest reaction will be many times 
magnified by his faithful bodyguard. Thus if a high leader allows himself 
impulsively to express an emotion, the result may be bloodshed. The public 
expression by leaders of personal emotion attains, in this system of signs, the 
status of an irresponsible self-indulgence. A person who habitually indulged 
himself in that way would not be able to become a ToMatoa in the first place. He 
would be (correctly) viewed as impulsive and erratic, and therefore as a danger to 
his followers rather than their protector. 
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A corollary assumption holds that the need to make wishes verbally explicit 
reveals a leader to be ineffective and impotent. It shows that other people are 
paying the leader so little attention that he or she must resort to overt commands 
and rebukes, which are analogous to force and therefore bear an inverse relation 
to the exercise of authority. Incidentally, this is one thing that makes it very 
difficult for women, who are the primary caretakers of children, to attain much 
spiritual potency. For example, Opu Senga, the Opu Pa'Bicara's older sister, was 
known for her "clean sour! and calm demeanor. Once I was discussing Opu 
Senga's faultless reputation with the wife of a high administrative official posted 
to Luwu, a lady who, being moderen and maju (modern and progressive), was far 
from awed by the alleged virtues of the ancien regime. She expressed the very 
reasonable opinion, one that was in fact shared by ToLuwu, that few women 
could achieve the Opu Senga's calm state, because most of them have children. 
Children, as yet not fully trained in llreading,ll are impossible to control without 
being given explicit directions. Whatever moso (sting of authority) that a woman 
might have developed dissolves as she fusses about and instructs a recalcitrant 
child. It is not accidental that women of the very highest status do not take care of 
little children. The Opu Pa'Bicara's wife, for instance, had many administrative 
duties concerning the kapolo: she settled disputes among the women, 
administered the cooking activities for ceremonies, and so on. Members of the 
household (lower relatives) had cared for her five children's physical needs when 
they were younger. 
Since it is clear that people in Luwu recognize that they are shedders of signs 
that will be interpreted by others, and that they therefore must control the signs 
they shed, it is worth comparing briefly the sorts of llselvesll that ToLuwu 
constitute for themselves with the sort of "selr! that Erving Goffman postulates in 
The Presentation ofSelfin Everyday Life (1959) and other works. Like ToLuwu, 
Goffman's postulated persons are aware that they are shedding signs-lipresenting 
the selr! for public scrutiny and appraisal. But Goffman's characters are inhabited 
by a sort of homunculus that manipulates their exteriors. The consciousness of an 
interior identity that is different from an exterior presented self pervades 
Goffman's work. Thus his postulated social actors appear always somewhat 
schizoid (their manipulating inner self seems different from the manipulated 
visible shell), and always somewhat fraudulent. ToLuwu are somewhat aware of 
an analogous possibility, but only marginally. In general, their view is that 
outward visible behavior is a direct, albeit diluted, expression of the interior state; 
because they imagine a continuity between inner and outer rather than a gap, the 
schizoid break between interior experience and outward behavior does not 
usually arise. They are aware that utter fraud can take place-a lower person 
going to another district and passing himself off as higher-but in general they 
think that it would be too difficult to act as though one had a clean soul-showing 
patience, refraining from anger, and the like-if one did not. 
Regardless of status, everyone is subject to penetration/attack within the set 
of understandings I have just outlined, though the stakes are higher for higher 
people and they work more at keeping themselves steady. (Indeed, the mark or 
sign of lower people is their alleged inability to control themselves.) The purpose 
of an llattackll on another's siri', the injury sought, is to challenge the other person 
to defend his social place, in the hope of dislodging him from it and putting him in 
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a lower place, thus elevating the attacker's place with respect to the attacked. To 
stay steadily in one's place in spite of continual attacks is considered both moral 
and brave. It is no coincidence that one of the very highest-status names that can 
be given to a high noble translates as something like "cannot be dislodged." The 
understandings within which contests for place happen are shared by all; but the 
appropriate response to a challenge differs, depending on a person's place. 
ToMatoa have the reputation of being impassive, slow to anger, judicious, and 
calmer than their followers. When I asked how I could recognize a person of high 
status, I was continually told things like "they never become angry," "a full stem of 
rice bows over low," and "they walk with eyes cast down, looking neither right nor 
left." A person with a truly "clean soul" does not go around looking for a fight. 
High nobles with large followings strike both ToLuwu and visiting anthropologists 
as calm and controlled, and this is, in their view, the way it should be. 
One old village gentleman, discoursing on siri', commented on the even­
tempered steadiness of his ToMatoa, contrasting it with the hot-tempered 
adamance he himself shared with other lower nobles. "It's like this," he said. "It's 
as if I have one rupiah, and Opu has a thousand rupiahs. I have to be very careful 
how I spend mine, because it's all I have. That's why I have to be on guard if I 
think someone else wants it. But Opu! He has so much, he doesn't have to 
worry!" 
The implication here is that Opu has siri' to spare, and can afford to be 
generous. Though a striking metaphor, it is nonetheless not the way high nobles 
see it. They feel that they are more rather than less vulnerable to insult relative to 
lower people. Since their places are so high, very slight and minor lacks of 
deference directed toward them constitute insult. The same behavior directed 
toward a person of lower place would be appropriate and acceptable. As a 
consequence, very high nobles must be extremely aware of everything that 
happens or is about to happen, reacting immediately to disrespect so as to quell it 
before it escalates. Better still, their high status and the potency of their presence 
should be so overwhelming that no one dares or wishes to do anything that would 
constitute disrespect. 
Most of what can be interpreted as insult is not a legal matter in any sense. 
Whether or not a bit of behavior is to count as an insult depends on whether one 
of the affected parties chooses to see it as such. Whether a party sees it as such in 
turn depends on the status he or she in effect claims by insisting on a particular 
interpretation of that behavior. The less obvious the difference in status between 
two people, the more obscure to both of them which is higher, and consequently 
the more like a contest their interaction will be. When the difference in status 
between two people is greater, the difference and the direction of the difference 
is clearer to both of them, and consequently there will be less tendency for their 
interaction to take on the character of a contest. 
A consequence of all this is that, viewed sociologically, competition exists 
between status-peers, while alliances form between high and low. But no status is 
immune to attack: people of every status have status-peers, as well as inferiors 
who may well challenge and test them. Since everyone has peers, everyone is, on 
some occasions, engaged in defending his place against those peers. No one has 
siri' to waste, contrary to what the old gentleman told me. 
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People of different statuses and followings do, however, exhibit different 
habitual attitudinal stances, as the same man noted. One of the several reasons 
for this observed difference is, I think, quite simply that high nobles with many 
followers are literally better shielded from attack. A high noble with followers has 
bodyguards who accompany their leader on occasions when the high noble is a 
guest at the ceremonies of rivals. These bodyguards shield their leader not only 
from physical attack, which is unlikely, but also from slights to the high noble's 
status communicated through insufficient deference shown in seating or service. 
The point of having a bodyguard is to demonstrate potency and a large following 
such that the host does not dare to treat one with anything but appropriate 
deference. Members of a bodyguard defend their leader's siri', their leader's 
place. Because bodyguards are extremely adamant and quick to react at the 
slightest presumed slight, they must be calmed by their leader. The wise leader 
will show caution care and coolness rather than hot and dangerous outbursts, 
until a determination has been made as to whether an insult really occurred and, 
if so, whether the host is ready to make a public ceremonial apology. In this way 
leaders of large followings acquire the reputation for calm coolness, a sign of high 
status and potency. 
High nobles who have few followers are not so fortunate. Those high nobles 
are relatively unshielded by others and tend to be correspondingly more anxious, 
more adamant, and quicker to react defensively about how they are treated. They 
are notorious for making nuisances of themselves by overreacting to slights. My 
own observation was that they "overreact" only in the sense that a high noble 
should not be so touchy (he or she should be calm), but not that they are 
imagining slights that did not happen. The host, knowing that one of his guests is 
of high status but has few followers, may well be careless in seating and serving 
him. The slighted noble, seeing his status-peer who is the ToMatoa of a large 
bodyguard treated better than himself, becomes miffed because the ToMatoa's 
deferential treatment by the host makes a visible statement that the ToMatoa is 
more important and higher than his slighted status-peer. The slighted noble 
reacts hotly, thereby depleting his moso and confirming everyone's view that he is 
unsuitable to be a ToMatoa and is not really as high as the other ToMatoa. Being 
a high noble without followers is a hard life.2 
The women who attend a ceremony go with their associated men, separating 
into the women's section only when the whole group of men and women has 
arrived. The women do not carry weapons-that is the function of their associated 
men-but the group's internal organization is just like the men's; it consists of a 
high leader and a following who protects her and whom she keeps in calm order 
by mediating their disputed and cautioning them if they act incorrectly. The 
leader of the women's group is usually the sister or wife of the men's ToMatoa. 
Her follower group, too, looks out for slights; she, too, has a reputation for calm 
coolness. If a truly serious insult occurs, dealing with it is handed over to the men, 
for their function is to be, as a whole, the bodyguard of the women. The 
groupings form guarding peripheries to the navel-centers their leaders define. 
Lower nobles may be in the groupings that shield higher nobles. Or they may 
go to a ceremony in groups that are loosely associated with the high noble, even if 
they do not actually form the high noble's immediate bodyguard. It not 
uncommonly happens that lower nobles, hearing that their ToMatoa is going to 
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be at a wedding in village X, go to the wedding in a group, announcing loudly that 
they are the people of Opu Such-and-Such, who has yet to show up. They may 
well have no idea who is getting married. When Opu Such-and-Such does show 
up, he will be pleased that his extended following has put in an appearance to 
support him. For their part, they are proud to attend the ceremonies where their 
ToMatoa is an honored guest, and will recount in the future the fact that they are 
faithful and valued followers of that esteemed and potent Opu, and that never 
has a ceremony gone by where they were not there to serve and protect him, for 
their ancestors have been allied with his ancestors since time immemorial, and so 
on. 
Commoners, traditionally, were involved in nobles' ceremonies mainly in 
service capacities, not as guests. Now that commoners may have bureaucratic 
posts in the government or may be rather wealthy as business people, they not 
uncommonly attend nobles' ceremonies as guests. Since commoners almost 
inevitably do not have follower-kin to act as an entourage, this may lead to some 
embarrassment: no one wants to go unshielded as a guest to a ceremony. 
Bureaucrats bring their office workers with them as an entourage, but this tactic 
works best only for high bureaucrats. After all, the office workers may be in the 
entourage of some higher noble to whom they owe a more important allegiance. 
Entourages, in short, shield their leaders from both weapons and slights. 
Everyone strives to make an appearance at potentially tense occasions either with 
or in an entourage. No one goes alone if there is any way to avoid it. 
Bodyguards are not the only shielding periphery that can prevent penetration 
of a human center. The system of titles and names forms a complex shield against 
the insult of being addressed by one's personal name. Commoners practice 
teknonymy, a naming system by which a person is addressed as the father, mother 
or grandparent of someone. In that way, the name of the junior-generation child 
is uttered, but not that of the more senior-generation parent or grandparent. 
Childless people are given teknonyms based on their siblings' children or 
grandchildren. Nobles have status-titles by which they are addressed. A person 
who utters aloud the name of a noble of much higher status will be struck with 
mabusung. An effect of these practices is that nobles' names are densely shielded 
by a bodyguard of titles that prevent their names from being used as weapons by 
being uttered aloud. 
A final shield, already mentioned, is the cultivation of flatness of affect and 
the appearance of no affect. Nobles council their children: "Ajak nabacako taut' 
(Bug., "Don't let people read you!"). Reading, of course, is usually not a private 
activity and is never an entirely silent one. The term baca might therefore be 
translated as "utter," "pronounce," or "recite" as well as "read." The gist of this 
warning is: do not expose yourself such that people can gossip about you! 
It may come as no surprise that, from the lowest pedicab driver to the highest 
noble, Bugis-Makassarese are preoccupied with being salamat. Salamat means 
"safe," and one of the more important ways that one stays safe is by protecting 
oneself from penetration. They are concerned, in other words, with 
invulnerability. It should also be clear by now that people of different ranks and 
followings are safe from penetration in differing degrees, since the protecting 
layers of peripheries around a given human center become thinner and thinner as 
we descend the scale of status. 
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Commoners, who have no entourage of bodyguards to protect them from 
weapons or insults, are shielded at least by teknonyms, but no one who says their 
names aloud suffers mabusung. Like nobles, commoners do not indulge 
themselves in moodiness, and they consider the expression of wrath to be 
dangerous. Yet they do not cultivate flatness of affect nearly to the extent that 
high nobles do, with the result that their feelings and views are much more "open" 
to inspection and assessment. 
High nobles with followers are shielded from attacks. Defended by others, 
they are able to be steady. They also actively cultivate steadiness. Their aim is to 
be neither defending nor attacking-to be neither "defensive" nor "aggressive" nor 
a combination thereof, but to be utterly calm. They want to be the still center that 
holds steady against attacks and expands without effort. 
Etiquette is not, as we put it, "mere"; it is a contest to the death, 
metaphorically and sometimes literally. The contest exemplified in etiquette is 
the same one exemplified in wars and ceremonies. It is a contest for place for, 
although place is believed to be largely inherited, it is made visible only in its 
demonstration. 
A Wall Someone Else Builds 
Protective layerings of people, title, and flatness of affect shield the sacred navel­
centers defined by high nobles. The house follows a similar pattern: an elaborated 
series of layerings around a center post and center spirit that protects the house's 
inhabitants. These layerings serve to deflect the hostile missiles from the Other 
that might otherwise succeed in penetrating. 
These layered walls are crucial to a person's safety and status. Yet their 
existence, as Clifford Geertz points out for Java, seems paradoxical, because they 
are erected by other people: 
Politeness is something one directs toward others; one surrounds the 
other with a wall ofbehavioral (lahir) formality which protects the 
stability ofhis inner life feeling, but it is, paradoxically, always a wall 
someone else builds, at least in part. (Geertz 1960: 255) 
The seeming paradox arises not from an internal contradiction in the way that 
ToLuwu understand the world to be but because of the way that English-speaking 
Occidentals tend to attribute motives. Translation from one world's Ifrhetoric of 
motives" to that of another creates the illusion of paradox. I want to discuss this 
problem briefly, and then return to the notions of motives and energies that form 
the analogue of a psychology in Luwu. 
The rhetorical device I employed in explicating attacking and shielding was an 
attribution of intention to the attacker. I tried originally to write the section 
without attributing intention, but I found it very awkward, for the simple facts 
about etiquette that I was trying to convey were lost in circumlocutions. The 
attribution of intention is built into our common-sense psychology and our 
rhetoric for describing action. We habitually think of individuals as bounded 
entities, and we think of their sources of energy, their impulses and motives, as 
originating within themselves, whether inside their physical bodies or their 
psyches. And so we tend to understand their behavior as an externalized 
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expression of internal energies. Sometimes those energies or impulses are seen as 
physical/biological, sometimes as conscious and intentional, sometimes as 
unconscious and unintentional; but their origin is always believed to be internal. 
We often speak as though utterances are externalized thoughts and as though 
violence is externalized aggression. The notion of a private psychology locates an 
impulse in the interior experience of a (bounded) individual, which becomes 
public when it leaves the mind as speech, the body as emotion or behavior. 
These common-sense understandings and the language that almost inevitably 
casts persons as agents, intentional or unintentional, make it difficult to describe 
"etiquettell in Luwu without violating its meaning. That one utters respectful titles 
and holds one's body respectfully is not viewed in Luwu as an expression of one's 
interiority, as the externalization of an inner impulse. Onlookers do not interpret 
one's body stance as an expression of one's psychological history of personality 
characteristics. Body stance and utterances (especially the forms of speech 
indicating politeness or familiarity) are supposed to reflect the status of the 
person to whom they are directed. 
In a perfect world, a world in which everyone knew his social place and 
registered it appropriately, the crystalline geometry of high and low statuses 
would be visible in every interaction, and the world would be still and eventless. 
Bodies would be transparent registers of relative status-humble to those above, 
straight and dignified to those below. There would be no challenges, for people 
would defer to those above them. No one would be dislodged because they would 
be in their places, and their rights would be acknowledged by all. With no 
challenges, the social world would be without events. 
Needless to say, humans are not transparent registers of each others' relative 
status. Too many things get in the way. For one, there is ignorance: people do not 
have their precise degrees of status stamped on their foreheads. The social 
system is not a legal and bureaucratic one, in which people hold social places as 
sinecures; people must continually negotiate and demonstrate their status. 
Further, there is self-interest, a tendency to give oneself the benefit of the doubt. 
A person who has siri' will not show deference to anyone gratuitously-that is, 
without first satisfying himself that the other person is worthy of respect. Only 
those of very low status, or pitiably lacking in siri', would be polite (deferential) to 
anyone they met, on the assumption that the unknown person is higher. And so 
ToLuwu do not consider an initial aggressive rudeness (as we in Euro-America 
interpret it) to be a fault. 
Just as it is not rude to test an unknown person, by the same token it is not 
considered pushy to resist that testing with dignity. Quite the contrary: what is 
shameful-obtuse, a flaw, an exhibition of lack of consciousness-is not the initial 
expansion and testing of another person, but the refusal to retreat and defer in 
the face of evidence that the other person is worthy of respect. Such a person "has 
no siri'," no more than a person who retreats too quickly. 
The impression that people continually expand into or withdraw from the 
space occupied by another is actually a rather accurate one. ToLuwu are habitual 
and sensitive readers of the signs others emit; the reading is so ingrained that it is 
not conscious. They continually monitor others and adjust their own behavior 
accordingly. When one shows weakness, the other begins to expand into the 
opening just revealed; this motion can be read as rudeness or aggressiveness. The 
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mistake would be to imagine that that stance proceeds from bad intentions, or 
others' bad intentions toward oneself (if one is aggressed against). Stance is 
impersonal, in a deep sense. One is therefore not justified in being annoyed if 
people continually expand into one's space. They must expand; if they are too 
quick to defer to someone unproven, they are exhibiting a lack of siri'. (Even this 
way of putting it makes it sound too intentional.) 
Here is a real contradiction. If both persons in an interaction are adjusting to 
each other, there will be an endless oscillation, a continual instability. Therefore, 
in each social interaction, one person is more reactive, the other person is more 
steady. The test is: Who is the steadiest? Who causes the other to react, while 
herself remaining impassive and in control? 
Assuming for a moment that the person addressed is of higher status, the 
burden of proof, as it were is on the higher one. By heil stance and demeanor, 
she evokes, or rather controls, the reactions of the lower person. If the higher one 
is relaxed, loose, unconscious, silly, then the lower one will react with greater 
expansiveness and less deference, for the lower one is monitoring the other 
unconsciously (and sometimes consciously). If the higher one is dignified, steady, 
and by slight inflections of facial expression and voice shows that she is aware of 
everything going on and will tolerate no expansion, then the lower one will stay in 
her (lower) place. Defeat comes from being reactive, from giving up control to 
the other person, from allowing the other person's stance and demeanor to 
control one's own. That is part of the meaning of the saying, "If we are defeated in 
our steadiness as males, our bravery is also defeated." And that is why the Bugis· 
Makassarese and the Javanese alike constitute their social interactions in such a 
way that a person evokes the reactions of the people around him. "A central 
concept in the Javanese traditional view of life is the direct relationship between 
the state of a person's inner self and his capacity to control the environment," 
writes Soedjatmoko (quoted in Anderson 1972:13). One who has control over 
one's inner and therefore outer or visible self exhibits steadiness, thereby evoking 
respect and deference; one who has little inner control inspires rudeness and 
negligence on the part of others. 
The impersonality of the reactive tendency to expand when another person 
shows weakness, thereby inviting lack of deference, remained obscure to me for 
some time. One reason for my confusion was that I had spoken to the Opu 
Pa'Bicara and to Andi Anthon about the subject in Indonesian. They had 
explained that wise leaders stay calm and caution their followers against rash 
action in the event that the leaders are treated with negligence at a ceremony. 
Only if the insult was dengan sengaja (Ind., intentional), they said, should the 
leader allow himself to acknowledge the discourtesy by demanding an apology. At 
some point I realized that this Indonesian phrase was getting in the way of my 
understanding, because intention has nothing to do with it. From fieldnotes: 
Now everyone says, "Tidak dengan sengaja, II it wasn't deliberate, 
when someone offends someone else. Opu seems to say this to calm 
his followers, and follows it by saying that we must not make a 
disturbance in people's houses. Ifwe are ripakasiri', there are ways for 
it to be remedied (a public ceremony ofapology). 
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But this "not deliberately" is increasingly seeming to me rather 
vague. Because what could "deliberately" mean? What counts for 
being ripakasiri' is beingpublicly humiliated. No one cares about 
anyone's deep motives for humiliating them. 
The point is, even ifsomeone did not really intentionally humiliate 
you at a ceremony, nonetheless if it happened then it means that the 
person did not think you were important enough to be extremely 
careful of. For instance, it is very unlikely indeed that protocol would 
be lax for the Datu, and be excused later because it was 
"unintentional." That would be outrageous and senseless. The point is 
not whether someone intended anything or not-who cares? In any 
case one suspects the worst with good reason, because his siri' is 
opposed to one's own. The point is, he didn't think you important 
enough to treat with care. 
I suggested this thought to Opu and AA, who said, but ofcourse. 
All this sengaja stuff is new, and is said only when speaking 
Indonesian. It really has nothing to do with anything exceptpeople's 
actions. Ifsomeone who offendedyou is willing to make an apology, 
then in retrospect it appears unintentional and all right. (Because, 
Opu said, we have to have pity on people and give them a chance to 
see that they were mistaken and make it right.) But ifthey won't 
apologize, then they wanted a fight, and it was "intentional." 
The fact is, humans are fallible. They make errors of judgment all the time 
about the strength and adamance of the people who are "guests" (by definition 
ToLaing) at their ceremonies. They press whatever advantage they think they 
see; if the other person accepts it, the host has won the interaction and a new 
status quo has been established between them. If the other person resists, and is 
able to make good his resistance, then the host must retreat and "apologize." 
"Apology" is a ceremony to prevent bloodshed, when one person has 
miscalculated the strength of the other and has successfully been called on it. And 
so a constant aposteriori judgment goes on in everyday life. The person who wins 
the cockfight of status is the person who ought to have won it. He is the one 
whose potent presence dominated the weaker one, forcing the weak one to go 
'1craak" and retreat. 
Not unrelated to all this is a strong tendency, in court texts throughout 
Southeast Asia, to assume that whoever succeeded, say, in winning a kingdom or 
leading a kapolo, is the one who ought to have succeeded. This stance toward the 
past is not simply a rationalizing or manipulative rewriting of it by the people who 
gain power. Even less is it the cynical stance implied in the statement "might 
makes right," a statement that makes sense as a "cynical" statement only in the 
context of a secular politics and secular theory of the state. In a sacred politics, 
the a posteriori judgment makes not a cynical statement but an epistemological 
one: how can anyone know who should have succeeded, except by seeing who in 
fact did? 
These conceptions imply a psychology, but it is a psychology whose rhetoric 
and attribution of motives are almost entirely public. If a person was rude to 
someone who accepted the rudeness or was unable to do anything about it, 
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people attribute it to the weakness of the attacked. This harms the standing of the 
attacked, who is shown to have been vulnerable to attack. The possibility of being 
treated familiarly-of being attacked-by people who are unaware of one's status 
is one of the most salient reasons for high people not to go out into public without 
a protecting retinue, whose function is both to signal the person's high status and 
to defend it if necessary. In such a rhetoric and psychology, the person with a 
status to protect is highly vulnerable, because that person is the one who is seen 
as responsible for other people's reactions to him (or her). 
One might well ask whether ToLuwu do not recognize that the attacker 
sometimes has a willful desire to disparage the higher person, a desire whose 
source comes from within himself rather than being evoked by the higher 
person's blameless presence? The answer is complex. In general, the answer is 
that the motives of the attacker go unmentioned. O~rtainly, onlookers never use a 
language of explanation that legitimizes the rude person on grounds of a private 
interiority. They do not say, "I wonder why Joe was so obnoxious to Professor 
Smith. Perhaps he is feeling low because his wife left him (an explanation in terms 
of the attacker's present psychological state) or maybe he has an unresolved 
Oedipal complex (past psychological history) or he just got up on the wrong side 
of the bed this morning (inexplicable psychological state)...or maybe it was 
something he ate (a materialist explanation)...", and let it go at that. The attacker 
is assumed always to be expanding, as it were, into the space created by the chink 
in another's armored stance. The responsibility for the attack lies with the chink, 
not within the attacker. Thus people's social places-their standing and ultimately 
their status-are deeply vulnerable. A person who lets down his or her guard, who 
loses alert consciousness when confronting other people, in effect invites their 
attack. The attacker, without forethought of the consequences or intentional 
malice toward the person whose presence was weak, expands into the weaker 
person's social space and "wins" the interaction. 
It is considered cowardly always to retreat from possible confrontation. 
People assume that the habitual retreater is simply impotent, afraid to test his 
mettle. At the same time, it is a mistake to cultivate associations or put oneself 
into circumstances that positively invite people to be rude. From fieldnotes: 
It has been my feeling that the Javanese are more defensive in caring 
for their status, and the Buginese more aggressive. I have been looking 
around for proofs. WI< (an anthropologist who worked in Java) said 
once that when one ofhis friends, a young man, got married, WI< 
asked him what was different now. The man said he thinks ofhis 
dignity now and doesn't spend time with little children. I wondered if 
this applied to the Buginese, who seem better at controllingpeople and 
less timorous asserting their status aggressively. 
I asked x: who was amazed at my ignorance. He said ofcourse 
little children cannot be controlled, because "tae pa naisseng 
bettuang" (Tae, "They don't yet recognize meaning," that is, behave 
appropriately, have siri', etc.). Suppose you spend time with little kids 
flying kites, he said. Then one day you are with the Camat (Mayor) 
and you are out on the street, and a little kid comes by and yells, "Hey, 
hey, x: see you latert'-well, the little child isn't condemned. Rather, it 
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is clear that you lack moso such that little kids feel free to come up to 
you even when you are with the Camat. Furthermore, since they are so 
hard to control, ifyou try to control them you will always be scolding 
and angry. Buginese men feel they lose their grip on things as well as 
their moso if they are continually angry and fussing. "It's as though our 
grip on things has disappeared, ifwe are always fussy/angry. It uses up 
our energies, "he said. 
Children are hopelessly unruly, so excessive familiarity with them must be 
avoided by adults to maintain their dignity. Children cannot be controlled, 
because "they don't yet know meaning;" adults with sid' do "know meaning," 
which makes them vulnerable to interaction. In that interaction, one person 
dominates, controlling the situation and the other person, while the other one 
reacts. The question is, who will dominate the situation by his presence, forcing 
the other one to go "kraak!" and, defeated, acknowledge superiority? 
Let us return to the "wallsII that surround a human center. I began my 
investigation of etiquette with barriers. Like a house's walls, the titles and 
followers that surround a high noble form a sort of second skin, a barrier, a 
protection against invasion. The practical usefulness of these layerings is readily 
admitted by anyone in Luwu. 
Yet this sort of thinking about humans, as for houses, seems backward to 
ToLuwu. The question that they have is not whether layers help protect a vital 
center-clearly they do-but why and how some vital centers, but not others, are 
able to attract protecting barriers to themselves. Those barriers are human 
bodyguards, but also include the deferential speech, the titles humbly uttered by 
those lower. Those "walls, built by someone else," are not expressions of the 
builders' intentions but are evoked by the centered, steady person. The higher 
person does not express but elicits the barriers that protect him. That person's 
power and influence are more analogous to a magnet than to a thrusting weapon. 
The diabolical paradox is that in Luwu, the "self' must continually be 
demonstrated in order to exist. For the same reason, it is constituted by other 
people. We can take the term "constituted" in a weak sense and a strong sense. In 
the weak sense, other people constitute one's place, who one is, by making it 
visible. As a middle-noble follower said to me proudly, "Opu needs us, too. We 
make visible who Opu is," But there is also a strong sense of how the reactions of 
other people constitute who one is in Luwu: ultimately, there is no other criterion 
of where a place is-how close it is to the navel-center of the world-than whether 
it has a periphery, and how big that periphery is. 
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Although it is conducted at the level of etiquette and implicates the processes we 
might want to call "psychological," the competition between peers in Luwu is not 
a private matter but a public activity. It gives form to social life, and the politics of 
the former states were shaped by it. In this lecture I want to explore some of the 
consequences for the meaning and conduct of the pre-independence polities of 
South Sulawesi by comparing the stance of siri' among several other insular 
Southeast Asian societies. 
Competition as the Effort to Maintain Pari~ 
"Commoners" in Luwu and in other hierarchical polities of South Sulawesi are all 
peers in status, by definition. They are people who live within societies whose 
nobles are hierarchically ranked and organized; at the same time, they themselves 
are not internally ranked according to the nobles' criteria (claims of white blood, 
titles, or differential social places). To say that these commoners are all status­
peers according to nobles' criteria is not to say that they are never competitive 
with each other, or do not try to differentiate themselves from each other 
regarding prestige, however prestige may be construed locally. Quite the 
contrary. In Luwu, I observed the competition between commoners only from a 
distance, as nobles were the focus of my study. But fortunately we have Chabot's 
very informative ethnographic account of Makassarese commoners entitled (in 
translation) Land, Status, and Sex in South Celebes. Makassar is the pre­
independence name for the city that was the center of the hierarchical polity of 
Goa, whose ruler was called a Karaeng rather than a Datu. With Luwu and Bone, 
Goa was one of the major polities of South Sulawesi. (Makassar is now called 
Ujung Pandang, and it is the capital of the administrative district of South 
Sulawesi.) Chabot's ethnography, published in 1950, is based on fieldwork done 
before World War II and Indonesian independence. At the time of Chabot's 
observations, the polity of Goa was administered indirectly by the Dutch and still 
maintained a Karaeng, or ruler. Much of the internal administration of the polity 
remained intact, including regulation of the use of signs of status by the Karaeng 
and court. The right to regulate such matters was eliminated, of course, with the 
advent of independence and "demokrasV' 
Commoners in Makassar, Chabot informs us, continually strive (using the 
ethnographic present for Chabot's book) to outdo each other in terms of 
standing. I was struck by some of the points Chabot makes about upward striving 
and about siri' because they resonate with what I had seen in Luwu among peers. 
This striving is expressed, among other things, in acquiring wealth (land, livestock, 
and "ornaments," Chabot's term for objects inherited from ancestors, called 
arajang and mana' in Luwu), in defeating others during fighting or skirmishing, in 
outdoing them in each personal confrontation, and in adopting outward forms of 
higher people (Chabot [1950] 1960:110). 
In a different part of the book, Chabot suggests that such striving is prompted 
by challenge and counter-challenge between peers. He indicates very clearly that 
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challenge and counter-challenge are cast and perceived by Makassarese in terms 
of affronts to siri'. 
Vertical mobility occurs by means of opposition relationships. Men between 
fifteen and forty years, especially the younger ones among them, must face each 
other in a perpetual relationship of challenge and outdoing. Each challenge and 
outdoing demands a reaction. The person who does not react (that is to say, the 
one who does not participate in what is regarded as important in his culture has 
little social standing. The feeling of someone who is outdone is indicated by siri'. 
Someone is siri' when his social standing is impaired and when another person 
knows this. As Chabot puts it: 
A man is inclined to regard immediately as outdoing any accidental . 
event at an encounter, or a lucky word on his part, by which he raises 
himselfabove the other person, at least in his own eyes. The other, 
when he hears this, is also siri '. 
The reaction may consist ofa counter-challenge, a returned insult, 
by which the original challenger in his tum becomes siri'. It is never 
possible to determine precisely who Ilbegan." The mutual opposition is 
sometimes explained by an event from the past that is regarded as of 
great importance, for instance, a murder. But with that the question 
concerning the origin ofthe mutual opposition is merely put off. 
There exists the possibility that the outdone person will respond by 
stabbing. The consequence ofoutdoing can therefore never be 
foreseen. It remains charged with real danger. Many stabbing brawls 
in South Celebes are proOfofthat. 
One ofthe most spectacular challenges is the theft ofcattle, 
horses, or buffalo. Its purpose is, in the first instance, to show one's 
courage (kaporeanna); only in a few cases are economic motives at 
the bottom ofthis. Sometimes a warning is uttered beforehand: HI am 
coming" (that is to say, tlto stealyour buffalo"). Stealing cattle is done 
to find a reason for a brawl. A successful buffalo theft is considered a 
triumph and at the same time a challenge. ([1950] 1960: 290-91) 
Chabot's account describes commoners. Yet everything in his characterization 
of the dynamic of striving among them seems to me equally apt for characterizing 
the dynamic between peers at any level, including the highest nobles, in South 
Sulawesi. Peers strive to outdo or best one another, using whatever medium is 
accessible: house structure and ornamentation, the size of ceremonies, the 
magnificent names they give their children, the largeness of their followings, their 
wealth, their bravery in the face of overwhelming odds, marriage to a person of 
high standing, appropriating the claim to a title such as Andi (possible only in the 
uncontrolled city of Ujung Pandang), or whatever. 
Even slight success by a peer that excels what that peer had done or done 
before is perceived as a challenge to one's own dignity and standing. Each success 
must then be met with a similar success, in effect a counter-challenge. Who 
"began" is not really at issue, for the competition is so intrinsic to being peers. 
There never was a starting point at which the relationship was stable, without 
tension. 
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To fail to take a peer's success as a challenge to oneself, and therefore to 
make no effort to meet it or best it, indicates that one accepts the other person's 
superiority. In short, peers construe any excellence or success by another peer as 
an attack on their siri'. If they did not react to meet that attack, therefore, they 
would show themselves to be lacking in siri'. A peer of any level must continually 
challenge and counter-challenge in order to maintain parity, or else be left 
behind. 
Some societies in island Southeast Asia that have no principle of 
institutionalized hierarchy consist exclusively of status-peers. The Ilongot tribe of 
Luzon (Philippines), described most fully in the work of R. Rosaldo (1980) and 
M.Z. Rosaldo (1980), represent such a society. In a striking argument that links 
local social dynamics to local ways of construing emotions, M.Z. Rosaldo has 
argued that the nongot insist that they are all "the same,t' all "peers." She suggests 
that it is the Ilongot preoccupation with maintaining parity among themselves 
that in fact generates competition among them. When one person does 
something outstanding, nongot say, other Ilongot become envious, and envy stirs 
liget (anger, excitement, energy). When a woman's yam crop is especially large, or 
when a man takes a head, or when a hunter kills a large amount of game, other 
Ilongot feel1iget stirred within them. They see that someone else is excelling, 
standing out as better or more accomplished than themselves. They find it 
intolerable for someone to stand out: "Are we not all Ilongot? Are we not all the 
same?" they ask. The liget of those who have been superseded prompts them to 
go out and accomplish great deeds themselves, in order that they remain peers of 
the one who excelled. "'Without liget to move our hearts,' Ilongots have told me, 
'there would be no human life.' It is envy, they explain, that stimulates industry 
and spurs people on to labor..." (M.Z. Rosaldo, 1980:47). Competition and 
energy are thus generated in the Ilongot effort to restore and maintain parity. 
Like Luwu peers, nongot peers compete fiercely, in order not to be left behind. 
Although the dynamic of challenge and counter-challenge in order to 
maintain parity could be said to characterize the interaction of peers, regardless 
of who the peers might be (members of a hill tribe in central Luzon, commoners 
in Makassar, or nobles of similar status in Luwu), the social outcomes of their 
strivings are rather different. In those societies which have institutionalized rank 
in some form, the oppositional striving can be said to have a direction, and that 
direction is "up". The same cannot be said of the Ilongot. In Ilongot, there is 
virtually no social up or down. As the Ilongot put it, "We are all the same." Only 
one level of parity exists. 
If we picture the inflationary and expansive tendencies of social striving as a 
sort of souffle that rises in the oven of challenge, we could say that the pan 
constituted by Ilongot society is like a cookie sheet: it has no sides. The 
ingredients for rising are there; in the heart of challenge the souffle rises 
magnificently. But with no way to consolidate, reify, or permanently mark its 
gains, it collapses once again to its former level flatness. Societies with 
institutionalized ranking systems, by contrast, provide markers of standing that 
give sides to the pan; a person's rise in standing in such a society attaches itself to 
some marker and clings to it, never again to fall to its former level. 
Again, Chabot provides some very interesting observations on this matter as it 
pertains to the commoners of Makassar. He describes how commoners in 
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Makassar strive to differentiate themselves from one another. Commoners do not 
have white blood in differing degrees. They consequently lack claims to what 
Chabot calls (in Dutch) stand, which only the nobility have. (Chabot's stand is 
essentially what I have termed "status" or "social place," on'O.) From the point of 
view of nobles looking at their own society, then, commoners in South Sulawesi 
are all "the same," or, as they sometimes put it in Indonesian, "lever' (rata-rata). 
Nobles would regard any differences in degrees of prestige among commoners as 
trivial. To commoners, however, the differences in prestige among themselves are 
far from trivial. While commoners cannot compete for "status," they do strive to 
outdo each other in terms of what Chabot calls (in Dutch) aanzren, or 
"standing.liThe differentiation in standing among commoners is brought about 
through women. The social worth of a woman (which is to say the standing of her 
family) is measured by the bridewealth given at her marriage. A woman cannot 
be given less bridewealth than what was given for her mother. Moreover, a 
woman may not marry a man of lesser standing than herself. 
This arrangement constructs a vertical direction and a means of measuring 
one's rise within it. Thus, Chabot writes, if we imagine Makassarese society as a 
ladder, women-or rather the bridewealth given for them-are the ladder's rungs. 
He points out that if female hypogamy were allowed, then the rungs of the ladder 
would no longer hold. It would be impossible to measure advancement by the 
offer or receipt of a brideprice of a certain amount. This set of arrangements, in 
short, provides the sides to the souffle pan, the marks of advancement to which 
the upward-striving ingredients can cling and never again fall below. People hope 
that in the next generation a yet higher mark, a larger brideprice, will be reached. 
A little reflection will make it clear that in such a system of measuring 
standing, it is in the interest of both the bride's family and the groom's family for 
the bridewealth to be as large as possible. Since the bride's social standing is 
measured by her bridewealth, her family's interest in a large bridewealth is clear. 
But recall that female hypogamy is not allowed. The obverse is that male 
hypergamy is also prohibited; a man may not marry a woman higher than 
himself.4 Since the groom is therefore assumed to be at least as high as the bride, 
and since the measure of the bride's standing is the bridewealth she receives, the 
groom's standing, too, is measured by the brideweaIth. 
The Polity Regulated Inflation 
This set of circumstances encouraged inflation. The minimum bridewealth was 
fIxed by what was given for the bride's mother, so there could be no falling back, 
no loss of the gains in standing made in the previous generation. At the same 
time, it was in both parties' interest to make the bridewealth larger than it was in 
the previous generation. "It is therefore comprehensible," Chabot writes, "that the 
sunrang (bridewealth) has a tendency to rise" ([1950] 1960:116). 
This tendency to inflation could not help but pose a problem to those people 
who were higher in standing or status than commoners. Since the lower tended 
continually to become higher, the bridewealth for commoners could eventually 
equal that paid for the lowest rank of nobles. Lower nobles, in turn, needed to 
inflate the bridewealth paid among themselves in order to differentiate 
themselves from commoners. And so it went, on up through the system. If the top 
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of the system refused to inflate and remained stable, one could imagine everyone 
eventually reaching parity with the top. That could not be allowed to happen, and 
was not. As Chabot puts it: 
In his kingdom, the prince is the highest. He, and with him his 
kinsmen ofthe same blood, should therefore have the highest sunrang 
(bridewealth) within that kingdom. As a result he is concerned that 
the sunrang in his region be clearly established according to rank and 
status, and known to everyone, so that his subjects will not payor 
receive a highersunrang than he himself. Hence, one repeatedly 
encounters prescriptions concerning the amount ofthe sunrang in 
lontar [palm leafmanuscripts}. Nature, however, seems to be stronger 
than IUles. There always arises, some time after the amount has been 
officially established, the tendency to surpass the prescribed limits. 
Rules are only too gladly forgotten. As time goes one, more and more 
people seem to have paid and received a Sunrang that was higher than 
they were permitted. Consequently, a new sunrang edict must be 
issued periodically. ([1950] 1960:116) 
Scholarship on Southeast Asia has often and correctly called the ruler of the 
realm "the fount of status." Not only did the ruler have the most of whatever 
attributes and items acted as signs of status in the realm, but one of the ruler's 
functions was to distribute those signs, in the form of titles, favors, official 
positions, and to generate embodied rank by producing offspring of his own high 
rank. He was indeed the source and fount of status. But it will be clear from the 
passages quoted from Chabot that the ruler was not only the fount of status but 
also its guarantor. Because of the inflationary tendency to which any medium or 
criterion of status was subject, a tendency ultimately traceable to competition 
between peers, the ruler had to guarantee that signs of status throughout the 
system had some meaning. This he did by issuing edicts that fixed the value of 
signs. 
The value of the system of signs as a whole was fixed by establishing signs as a 
range stretching from "high" to "low." Humans attached themselves to the system 
of signs by using and displaying signs in a way that corresponded with their 
alleged degree of white blood; each level of social rank was constituted precisely 
in the privilege to display and use a certain degree or level of the signs of status. 
Thus clothing colors, for instance, were ranged from high to low by edict, and only 
high people were allowed to wear colors designated "highll; house structures and 
decorations, similarly, were sorted into a hierarchy of possible attributes and 
elaborations so that houses could be used to signify different degrees of rank 
(unlike clothing colors, this range is still roughly observed). Bridewealth was 
measured in quantity of gold, and, as Chabot tells us, the amount and therefore 
the range of payments was fixed by edict. And, of course, humans not only used 
signs of status but embodied them, knOWing full well that they were and are 
shedders of signs that will be interpreted by others; humans were themselves 
signs of status. 
Almost any medium through which humans interacted, and thereby signalled 
their social place, entered the system, from the gross divisions visible in the color 
of clothing or the accoutrements of interaction at ceremonies (such as number of 
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serving plates and place of seating) to the delicate and fluctuating fine-tuning of 
status relations visible in body stance, gesture, and speech. Few media were 
neutral in this system of signs. 
The system was a perfectly Saussurian one in which the value of a particular 
content depended entirely on its placement within the whole system. "Meaning" 
here means purely that a particular sign of status was located below some signs 
and above others. Because the meaning of signs depended on their placement, 
their placement within a range had to be fixed and guaranteed (backed by 
sanctions) if any individual sign were to signify, to make sense, to be meaningfuL 
Hence this sort of system required a stabilizer in two respects. First, the range of 
signs had to be defined and the place of any particular sign (e.g., the wearing of 
green clothing, the meaning of three tipe-tipe on a house front) had to be fixed 
within it. This could be done by edict and tradition. Second-and this required 
constant monitoring-the use of signs had to be regulated so that only high people 
wore llhighfl clothing colors, were served with a f1highfl number of plates, put a 
f1highfl number of tipe-tipe on their houses, and so forth. Maintaining the 
separation of signs, both in their range of values and in their use, was necessary if 
the system of signs was to remain vertical, culminating in the ruler. The presence 
of the ruler, then, stabilized the system of signs by giving it a ceiling in both theory 
and practice. The sign "the ruler,f1 who fixed the value of signs and guaranteed 
their correct usage, gave the system the meaning it had by providing a fIXed point 
to which all other signs referred. 
Without the guarantee that the separation would be maintained, vertical 
ranking in the akkarungeng would have, over the course of years, ceased to exist, 
becoming instead a state of level peerdom. The souffle pan would have no sides 
and would be indistinguishable from a cookie sheet; the kingdom would begin to 
look like a hill tribe. Such a collapse of hierarchy in a hierarchical polity would be 
the collapse of order itself; this specter of chaos that haunts this sort of hierarchy 
results in the sensibility I mention in Lecture One, which insists that everything 
should be in its place. A hierarchy without a ceiling is more or less what I 
encountered during fieldwork in 1976, not so much in Luwu-where the presence 
of the Opu Pa'Bicara and the absence of much in the way of government offices, 
business, or other non-agricultural and non-kinship-based sources of wealth and 
status made the illusion that we were living in a modified version of certain 
aspects of the old regime temporarily plausible-but in other areas. People all 
over South Sulawesi, after all, retain a hierarchical sensibility, and they continue 
to aspire to achieve the signs of high status from the old regime, such as marrying 
white blood, having high nobles as protectors, having wealth, and so on. Yet while 
people still aspire to exhibit and achieve such signs of status, the signs no longer 
form a system with a definite range and guarantee of their meaningfulness (i.e., 
placement) because the fount and guarantor of the system of signs, the ruler (of 
each of the South Sulawesi polities), has been eliminated. 
What is incorrectly called "feodalismefl (it was hierarchy, not feudalism) has 
been replaced by what is just as incorrectly called "demokrasi." The elimination of 
"feodalisme" has meant the elimination of ceilings on the level of signs of status 
which people of any given level may aspire to exhibit. In some cases, the 
elimination of ceilings is relatively harmless. People say that there is an "inflasi 
Andill in the cities, an inflation of people who give themselves the title f1Andi.f1 
Indeed, I don't believe I have ever met a Buginese or Makassarese in Jakarta or 
the United States who did not introduce himself as f1Andi Such-and-Such"; it has 
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become the equivalent of "Mr." or "Mrs.," with an ethnic identity attached. "Datu," 
similarly, is beginning to be used (but only by very, very high nobles) in Ujung 
Pandang and Bone. Once I received a letter from a woman who had been the 
ruler of a small kingdom south of Luwu. The return address was "ex-Datu So-and­
So," and I thought to myself, "The 'ex' is where it's at!" These days quite a few 
people can be "Datu," but only real ones can be "ex." In some cases, the 
elimination of ceilings results in an inflation so extreme it brings about hardship. 
In Tana Toraja, the mountainous northern part of South Sulawesi, prestige 
continues to be measured by the number of buffalo slaughtered at one's funeral. 
Under the old regime, the local political structure set the number permitted to 
each social level. Now, tens of buffalo may be slaughtered at funerals, sometimes 
with ruinous consequences for the children of the deceased. In other cases, the 
change to "demokrasi" simply indicates a change in the means by which signs of 
standing can be acquired, or it means the invention of new forms that 
demonstrate new sorts of standing. Most obviously and profoundly, it marks the 
beginnings of a shift to monetization. The impact of this shift can be seen in 
Ujung Pandang on the occasion of weddings. 
A wedding used to be one of the occasions at which a noble's influence and 
following were exhibited to his superiors (among others), for hundreds of 
followers gathered to work in the ceremony. The ruler's attention was drawn to 
someone who was striving upward and succeeded in acquiring and maintaining a 
large following, a following whose extent was made visible at weddings and other 
ceremonies. A ruler would be politically very unwise to ignore a person with a 
large following when the ruler distributed appointments, titles, and honors. 
People who sought honors from above, then, also had to look down to their 
inferiors and followers, attending to their needs in order not to alienate and lose 
them. The fount of honors and prestige was from above, but the groundswell of 
influence and power on which those honors were predicated (in effect if not in 
theory) came from below. A following could not, and cannot, be bought. It is very 
common now in Ujung Pandang for persons who in former times would have 
been relatively low nobles and who therefore would not have had many followers, 
to attain position of some importance in the present government or military, 
and/or to be rather rich. How to exhibit one's standing at one's child's wedding 
without any followers to speak of becomes a problem for these people. Such 
persons tend to have a small wedding in their homes, announcing to visiting 
anthropologists that it is maju and moderen (progressive and modern) to regard 
weddings as privadi (private affairs). This private wedding is then followed by an 
enormous and expensive llresepsi" in a hired hall with hundreds of guests. (High 
nobles living in the city and separated from their rural base of followers, whom 
they have neglected for the last twenty years, experience a similar dilemma, and 
often adopt the same solution.) A hall can be hired; workers assisting in one's 
kitchen for a ceremony cannot. 
The advent of "demokrasi," then, does not mean that everyone is now equal 
but rather that no one wants to acknowledge that anyone else is better than 
himself. In other words, people (especially in cities) tend to regard everyone they 
meet as an inferior whose dignity can be encroached upon or, at best, a peer with 
whom they are in competition. In the absence of very overwhelming evidence to 
the contrary, they acknowledge no superiors. "Demokrasill is a removal of layered 
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ceilings. Each person above onself acted as a ceiling, a hard object against which 
one could bump one's head during one's expansion "up" and "out." This fact was 
well understood by at least some people in Luwu, as this conversation taken from 
fieldnotes attests: 
I told Opu ofmy feeling that everyone is continually expanding and 
going up with their siri', and the only reason it doesn't get out of 
bounds is that it comes up against the Datu, like bumping into a 
ceiling. Opu said it was everso true, and gave this example. It seems 
that people are offended ifsomeone oftheir own status reprimands 
their children: who are they to reprimand them, after all? But with 
people ofclearly higherstatus who are their ToMatoa, they may 
instruct their child, IlIari pattette uluta iate," "Here, finally, is the one 
who may rap our heads." 
The Polity Regulated Encroachment 
To say that the ruler regulated inflation by being the guarantor against 
encroachment on the privileges of each level from the level below is to take the 
perspective of someone above looking down. Another perspective would be to 
look across at peers. From this point of view, the ruler guaranteed that peers did 
not encroach upon each other's place. To understand this, and to understand the 
perspective of the person looking Ilacross" at the deeds of peers, it is necessary to 
recognize that the ranking system of politics in places like Luwu or Goa prior to 
Indonesian independence was not merely vertical but also hierarchical, in 
Dumont's sense. In such a system, the rank "above" another also encompasses the 
one below it; to "risell is not merely to go "up,1l but also to expand by incorporating 
as inferiors the people who are presently one's peer. Rising and expanding are 
the same act. 
In my discussion of siri', I wrote that one's only choice when dealing with 
peers is to absorb them as inferiors or else be absorbed by them. A person who 
uses signs of status from the level above himself is trying to absorb his peers as his 
inferiors. Such an act poses a challenge to those peers, and they will resist it. They 
regard the expander as no better than themselves. To allow themselves to be 
absorbed by him into a relationship of inferiority, as though he could become 
their patron and protector, is out of the question. They will interpret his slight and 
temporary rise as a challenge. 
From this point of view, the ruler's control of the use of the system of signs, 
such that each level of persons would use them appropriately according to their 
status, also offered an implicit guarantee that the dignity and worth of persons in 
each level would be maintained against the aggressive ambitions of their peers. I 
am certain, as was Chabot, that people of any given level who tried to use the 
signs of status appropriate to the level above themselves wished less to imitate 
their superiors than to vanquish their peers. 
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"Law" 
The ruler (as an institution and presence) was the fount of status and its ceiling. 
As the ceiling of status, the ruler fixed the range and content of its signs. That 
part was easy, since it was effected by edict and tradition. As the ceiling of status, 
the ruler was also the ultimate regulator of the use of its signs. That part was 
more difficult, for it required constant vigilance and ultimately the threat of force. 
It was also entirely necessary. Without regulation of the use of signs of status, the 
distinct levels, whose separation constituted a vertical range, would be conflated. 
Verticality itself, culminating in the ruler, would be obscured. Therefore, 
controlling the use of signs of status was necessarily one of the primary concerns 
of the polity's top-center. In a well-run polity, retribution against those trying to 
use signs of status inappropriate to their level-wearing clothes of an 
inappropriate color, or giving one's child a name too grand-would have been 
swift. 
How was this system of law constituted? Edicts set the rules specifying the 
signs that each level of rank was privileged to use. In Luwu, for instance, the ruler 
was to be served with twelve plates; nobles of the highest rank were to be served 
with eight plates; those of the next with four; next, two; and finally, one. Such 
edicts, clearly, can delineate only the most gross differences in rank. 
Leaders at each level administered the edicts by checking people at the lower 
levels over whom the leader, as social center, had authority. The leaders of a 
following could "reprimand" a follower who seized some privilege beyond his 
station. When I was in Luwu, I saw several instances that demonstrated how this 
would have happened in the old regime but now does not. 
One incident involved the naming of an infant. One of the Opu Pa'Bicara's 
followers was a middle-level noble who had married a woman who, many 
whispered, was hardly a noble at all. His first wife had been lower than himself, 
but higher (by general consensus) than the present one. The second wife 
apparently felt herself to be in competition with the first one, and wanted her 
children not to be viewed as lower than their half-siblings by the first wife. She 
gave her new baby a name that everyone considered scandalously inappropriate, 
since it implied a very high status. 
It would have been an enormous triumph, a vindication of her assertion of her 
claims, had her acknowledged high-status elders (the central-core leaders of the 
kapolo) smiled approvingly when informed of this name, in effect accepting it. 
Instead, they remained completely impassive, neither approving nor 
reprimanding. This left the matter in a sort of limbo. One can be sure that, as the 
child grows up, its peers and its mother's peers will not call it by the name she 
gave it, for people would choke on uttering an exalted name for a peer. It will 
probably be called by a nickname, and its exalted name will be ignored by all but 
its mother, who will always rankle and complain that people don't address her 
child properly. 
I suspect that she would not have dared to test her status in such a way in the 
old regime. But if she had done so, a messenger would have been sent from the 
kapolo's high core bearing another name direct from the Opu to replace the one 
its parents gave it. If the name sent by the Opu were a good one, acknowledging 
low nobility, it would have been a gesture of both reprimand and incorporation. 
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The woman and her husband would have felt both humbled (for they would know 
that they were wrong) and grateful (for they could have been dealt with more 
severely but were not). If the Opu wanted to reprimand them severely, he would 
have sent the name of a commoner. That would have been humiliating and 
humbling, for it would have denied the father's status. 
The authority and the force that backed the right of the high core of a 
grouping to reprimand its followers emanated ultimately from the ruler. So, for 
instance, in the old polity, having a title and post appointed by the ruler was a 
clear confirmation to his followers and peers of a leader's claimed status. Within 
the kapolo, the same effect occurred with more minor posts. A leader could (and 
still does) send title and names to newly married followers (names change upon 
marriage) that would indicate and confirm their status. As one woman said to me, 
"l know I am truly a Daeng [because] Opu sent me my name." Or the leader could 
(and still does) entrust a follower with an important function, allow the follower 
to accompany him on an important trip, and so on. These acts by the higher 
person continue to validate the status of a person on a lower level, especially with 
respect to his peers. Within that person's own circle of peers and immediate 
inferiors (such as junior kinspeople), he could and can speak with authority, for 
his elder's validation of the follower's status makes visible to his peers who he is. 
At the same time, the charters and titles sent from above would be of little use 
if the person who tried to exert influence, especially in matters like settling 
disputes or reprimanding, did not have a loyal following of people who would 
guard fervently his privileges and sirl' and right to reprimand people like 
themselves. Although authority was given from above, the force that backed the 
reprimand was exerted from below; it consisted of the adamant bodyguard of 
loyal followers who obeyed their navel-center and executed his orders. These 
people were precisely the ones who were subject to their navel-center's authority. 
In the course of things, not all polities were always well run. Retribution was 
not always swift. There could not help but be, in systems such as this, many 
failures of administration. The high center of a political grouping, whether kapolo 
or akkarungeng, sometimes failed to act quickly enough, with the result that an 
inflationary encroachment became a fait accompli, more dangerous politically to 
correct late than to allow to stand. Perhaps a high center wavered uncertainly, or 
had neglected to bind its followers to it strongly, or lacked the strong backing 
from the authority in the level above itself that it had presumed. The result could 
be that a lower leader became strong enough to challenge the higher one. 
Southeast Asian history is filled with such incidents; indeed, the bulk of political 
history of indigenous hierarchical Southeast Asia consists of just such events. The 
status and standing of everyone in the polity was constantly subject to 
retrospective assessment, depending on how much a person was able to get away 
with claiming without being reprimanded. 
In the large schemes of social regulation, which embraced not only offenses 
against the use of signs of status but also hundreds of other crimes, status 
specificity was part and parcel of the codification. The magnitude of a fine 
depended on the rank of both offender and offended. The fine for a person of the 
fifth rank (if we say the ruler was of the first rank) offending a peer by stealing his 
cattle, for instance, was considerably less than if that same person stole cattle 
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from a person of the second rank. Offending a person of higher status was, in 
short, a greater offense than offending a person of lower status. 
In this, as in several other respects, the law of the polities of South Sulawesi 
strongly resembled the indigenous law of the Ifugao, a hill people of Northern 
Luzon (Philippines) studied by R.F. Barton ([1919] 1969). The injured party in a 
large number of offenses, including insult, adultery, and other less touchy matters, 
could demand compensation or fines from the offenders. The fines were graded 
by social level. At the time Barton studied them, !fugao had only two levels: 
kadangyan, a type of wealthy Big Man who obtained the right to be called a 
kadangyan by performing a series of public feasts; and free persons or 
commoners. A kadangyan obtaining compensation from another kadangyan 
demanded, by custom, a greater fine than a free person would from another free 
person. When a kadangyan injured a free person or vice versa, the fine often was 
negotiated to be halfway between the fines appropriate to each category. 
!fugao had no hegemonic legal or political authority, but people did keep 
track of their myriad kin, who acted as a mutual-aid society in times of difficulty. 
In order to obtain satisfaction for an injury, people gathered together their kin 
and threatened, through a mediating negotiator, the offender and his or her kin. 
(Incidentally, the negotiating strength of a poor free person against a rich 
kadangyan with many kinspeople was his simple desperation, a lack of investment 
in his own life. Because he cared naught for life, he could threaten to kill, and be 
believed, even if he knew he would incur a retributive death from his victim's 
surviving kin.) 
The negotiation can be subtle and nearly endless; Barton's book is instructive 
and vivid in conveying what matters are subject to debate in a case that appears 
on the surface to be straightforward. Offenses between groupings of kin, who are 
always mutually suspicious, had to be settled with either fines or violence. The 
threat of violent retribution by overwhelming numbers of adamant supporters!kin 
greatly aided the injured party in its quest to obtain satisfaction. But if the feuders 
preferred blood revenge to compensation, little could be done to prevent it, for 
no one had hegemonic power-or even pretensions to it. 
Like !fugao "law," the law of Luwu largely consisted of the codification of 
fines. Like !fugao law, those fines took status into account. And like !fugao law, 
the threat of violence by myriad supporterslkin was a potent argument in 
obtaining satisfaction, especially between near-peers. But unlike !fugao 
kadangyan, Luwu's ruler, like those of other polities we designate as "states" or 
"chiefdoms," had pretensions, at least, to hegemonic power. The reason that 
Luwu's system of fines appears at first glance to be analogous to a system of law 
rather than a guide to controlled feuding was that Luwu's codification and its 
enforcement had a single point of view, that of the ruler. It was as though one of 
the feuding parties in Ifugao became larger than the others, commanding more 
loyal force. The ruler had a modicum of hegemony, always somewhat unstable 
and subject to erosion and it is as though this nearly hegemonic force adopted for 
itself the function of setting the range of fines as well as enforcing them, and 
made offenses against itself the most serious ones. 
In Luwu, a powerful center was one that could mobilize the support and 
ultimately the force necessary to regulate and control signs of status. Power 
effected peace, a state in which the ruler was relatively unchallenged in his 
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authority to give value to the system of signs and to regulate their use. Peace 
meant hegemony over the system of signs. 
Morality 
The dynamic that impelled expansion at each level of status was the competition 
between peers, which automatically resulted in, among other things, an 
inflationary tendency. Controlling that tendency was, of course, a considerable 
concern for the people of the upper levels. As I have mentioned, I share Chabot's 
opinion that people of a given level who tried to use signs of status appropriate to \ 
levels above themselves wished less to imitate their superiors than to vanquish 
their peers; but appropriating signs of status from above was only one of many 
alternatives used by peers to challenge each other. 
One of the most direct challenges, and therefore one most fraught with 
danger, concerns relations between the sexes. Chabot points out that lithe male 
striving to rise in social standing is touched at the core through impairment of a 
female relative lt ([1950] 1960: 293). He explains the great importance of 
maintaining a female relative's honor in this way: 
A woman may not lose any standing. Her position is a fixed point for 
the men who are constantly outdoing each other. An impainnent of 
her standing immediately calls for the most violent reaction, namely, 
the death ofthe challenger. Wizoever does not react is "matesin'" 
(literally, dead in siri'), that is to say, "socially dead. lt This is expressed 
by saying that such a person is no longer "ofuse," or that he is 
generally despised. Killing is used because what has happened is felt to 
be so bad that no other reaction is considered possible. 
Although some were more clearly damaging than others, almost any medium 
of challenge would do. As Chabot points out in a passage I quoted before, 
anything may be construed as a challenge, from "a lucky word (on the challenger's 
part), by which he raises himself above the other person, at least in his own eyes," 
to the theft of a buffalo, which is "considered a triumph and at the same time a 
challenge" ([1950] 1960: 290-91). The content of a challenge is, in fact, a matter of 
indifference. The content and occasion of insults constantly shifts. As I pointed 
out in "Opposition and Solidarity," the insult of being offended lies in being 
offended, not so much in the particular means by which the offense was 
accomplished. 
I was at first puzzled in Luwu by the shifting content of what people 
considered offensive. My original perception-that almost anything, given the 
correct context, could make someone feel ripakasiri'-proved correct. My 
puzzlement at the multiplicity of the content of offensive acts was due to several 
unconscious assumptions I had made about practices or acts that I categorized as 
analogues of law and morality as I knew them. My assumptions about legality, 
morality, and etiquette, of course, are derived ultimately, if vaguely, from the 
scripturalist religious traditions of the Middle East: Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam. In these religions, morality is closely associated with a notion of explicit 
rules, abstracted from particular contexts and universally applicable within the 
community of believers-a form of "everyone equal before the Law." Moreover, in 
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these religions, a person follows the rules in order to avoid trouble. And so I 
initially assumed that people in Luwu, too, wished to avoid provoking each 
other's siri', and that they followed rules as one observes the traffic regulations on 
Interstate SO-if one wants to avoid collision, one sticks to the right side of the 
road. I was doubly mistaken in all this. 
First, there are few explicit rules in Luwu's status system, and virtually none 
that apply to everyone regardless of status. Context is everything; offenses are 
person-specific, not universal. The point of attacking and defending siri' is that 
people are unequal. Sid' offenses are specific to person, which is to say, specific 
to their claimed standings or ranks. After all, challenges are directed at a person's 
dignity, which in South Sulawesi cannot be disjoined from standing. Since offenses 
are graded by the relative rank of the people involved, what is an offense to one is 
not an offense to another. What would be perfectly acceptable between peers in 
the fifth rank would be a mortal insult if a third rank person did it to someone of 
the second rank. Similarly, the same act done by the person of the second rank to 
the one in the fifth rank would be acceptable, even kindly (for instance, to utter 
the other person's name out loud). All this means that whether or not an action is 
offensive depends almost purely upon the two parties' assessments of whether or 
not they have a chance, when confronting the other person, of obtaining 
satisfaction. (In this, siri' offenses are parallel in structure to their codification in 
law, but, of course, what I have described here takes place on a much finer scale 
than the gross divisions demarcated by law.) The characteristic antagonism 
between peers comes about because of the obscurity of the difference (in titles, 
number of followers, etc.) between them. The nearer two people are in standing 
and status (the more nearly they approach being peers), the less visible are the 
differences between them, the more likely that each considers himself to be 
marginally higher than the other, the closer the show of force that either party 
can mobilize to threaten the other, and the more good reason each has to be 
suspicious that the other wishes to vanquish him. 
The second way in which I was mistaken was in assuming that people want to 
avoid trouble. On the contrary, the demonstration of masculinity and sirl' (as it 
pertains to men) requires and promotes a relish in aggressive testing, a constant 
impulse to challenge and risk offending to the furthest extent to which they are 
capable, without being crushed by the other person's retribution. The question is 
not whether to challenge, but how much offense one can get away with. 
Interactions, then, especially between peers, are a constant dance of expansion 
and retraction. A person begins with a slight challenge-a slightly disrespectful 
gesture, say, that tests the reaction of the other person. If the other person 
accepts it, offering no resistance, the first one expands further, escalating the 
disrespect in increments until it is checked. If, however, the other person's 
reaction is immediate and firm, showing that not even a slight presumption will be 
tolerated, the testing gesture disappears. The tester retreats, until another 
opportunity to strike presents itself. An this challenge and counter-challenge 
happens so automatically and so subtly that most of it occurs below the level of 
explicit awareness; it lies in the realm of sensibilities. 
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Delicate Sensibilities 
When a person is being attacked, no rules are being broken. It is not one's legal 
rights that are under attack, but one's self or social dignity. Any attack, however 
slight, implicates the self. What is at stake in interaction is one's dignity, one's 
place, one's social worth-to put it concisely, one's siri'. 
As I have pointed out before in a variety of ways and contexts, there are no 
alternatives when confronting peers other than defending oneself from 
encroachment or expanding. aggressively into them. One could say that there are 
no equals; one person must be superior, one inferior. One could also say that 
there is little notion of a private psychology as we conceptualize it; since a direct 
reading of invisible interior worth can be made by observers of outward visible 
behavior, there can be no withdrawal when one is engaged in social interaction. 
There is no island of interior "privacy" onto which one can step to rest, out of the 
swirling stream of social life. There is no dark interior grotto where one can stand 
sheltered from the burning light of the social day. A person who tries to retreat 
from competition and challenge is merely a coward, impotent; people do not 
excuse it by saying things like "still waters run deep." To fail to participate is not to 
opt for privacy but to announce to the world that one has no siri', that one is 
socially dead. 
In some of the more "level" (as contrasted with "hierarchicar!) societies of 
island Southeast Asia, virtually everyone is a peer in status.s In such societies, 
encroachment is a constant theme and feuding a pervasive fact of life, for among 
peers, authority is hardly granted. When it is-say, in negotiations conducted in 
order to settle a dispute-it is only by the temporary willingness of the involved 
parties to submit to a go-between, who will try to arrange fines and compensation 
as an alternative to killing when a deep offense has been committed. A judgment 
made without the agreement of both parties could not be enforced. 
If encroachment (or its threat) by peers implicates the self-worth and social 
dignity of each, as it patently does, then local ways of construing the emotions and 
the "self' cannot be irrelevant to accounts of law and morality. In Luwu, 
reciprocal encroachment is cast in terms of siri'. Other societies in island 
Southeast Asia cast experience in other terms, use varying expressions and 
connotations to describe the nature of social relations, and construe the emotions 
in locally particular ways. Yet local ways of understanding Ufeeling" figure 
prominently in a number of ethnographies whose main subjects are social 
structure or law. It is striking how many of these societies construe fine feeling, a 
delicate sensibility, to be an exquisite sensitivity to the feelings of the other person 
regarding that other person's dignity and standing. Schlegel, for instance, begins 
Tiruray Justice (1970), a book about hill people of Mindanao, with an explication 
offedew. Fedew is something like interior feeling, and it can be "hurt" if it is 
offended. It is offended by another person's disregard of its "standing," tindig. 
Tiruray IIjustice" is a matter of feuding and fines, retribution for offended fedew. 
Crucial to Dentan's (1968) description of the negrito Semai, whom he calls "a 
nonviolent people of Malaya,'! is an account of the state ofpunan. A person is 
punan when his or her request is refused; in short, it is a state of (more or less) 
frustrated desire. The punan person may ask for compensation, or may endure 
the punan with an "unhappy heart" and avoid the offender. Obversely, it is tabu to 
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persusah another, which is to say, to persist in making requests that the other 
person does not want to grant. The Tausug, an aggressive coastal people of the 
southern Philippines, have been studied by Thomas Kiefer (1972). Their 
sensibilities are remarkably like those of the Buginese, but they call their dignity 
sipug rather than siri'. An important feature of their social organization consists of 
men who form bands of shifting size and personnel whose main function is to 
feud, defending their sipug or attacking that of others. Hildred Geertz (1961:Ch 
III, part 3) traces the Javanese child's development of "emotions," which turn out 
to be names for states of more and more refined sensibilities concerning other 
people's status. 
1.	 I am told by someone who has seen many cockfights that this last is untrue; a 
defeated cock is likely to rise up from a state of near death to get in its last 
peck. The assertion that defeated cocks remain so is apparently a bit of 
wishful thinking concerning ToLaing, whom one wishes to be So utterly 
defeated that they cannot make a comeback. 
2.	 Another type of high noble with no following of his own may nonetheless be 
accompanied and protected in ceremonies. A hypothetical case would be a 
high noble named Opu T, brought from another district in order to marry a 
high-noble woman, part of the high-noble core of a large kapolo. Opu T is 
sufficiently high to marry the woman, but having no independent following, is 
no threat to his wife's brothers. Such a man would go to ceremonies as an 
honored member of the navel-core of the kapolo, protected by its bodyguard. 
3.	 In this passage I use the feminine pronoun in order to emphasize that the 
sorts of interactions I describe here characterize the social relations of both 
sexes. 
4.	 In fact, the obscurity of people's status and standing was such that social 
mobility in the form of a man marrying a higher woman was not uncommon. 
When both families acknowledged the discrepancy, the brideprice was 
supposed to be twice or triple (depending upon the discrepancy in status) 
what it would usually be. This form of marriage in Luwu is called ngalli dara', 
"to buy blood" 
5.	 "Levell! societies, like the hierarchical ones of this area, actually have people 
who are junior or senior to each other as well as peers. In the most level of 
these societies, the incipient structure of "vertical" difference is the distinction 
between senior and junior generational layers, which are demarcated in the 
type of kinship terminology most prevalent in the area. In such societies, 
elders usually have the privilege of giving advice to their juniors without 
causing offense to the latter. Their advice need not be followed, and they have 
no means except public opinion to persuade. The authority of such seniors is 
weak and unelaborated, when compared with the authority of people in 
hierarchical societies who are senior in rank (not just by generation). 
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Polity or "kingdom," from the root arung lord or noble 
(Arabic) "the respected deceased" 
To read, to interpret, to interpret and then gossip about 
what one has seen, to utter aloud. Baca-baca is to say 
spells. 
A small passenger van that runs between villages or 
towns 
Ruler. This word (or its cognate ratu) is used throughout 
the Austronesian-speaking world to mean a ruler or 
leader. In Luwu, only the ruler was known as the datu; in 
Buginese polities to the south, the children of the ruler 
could also be addressed and known as "Datu Such-and­
Such." 
Often translated as pamili (family) in contrast to ToLaing 
(which see). A kapolo may be a few people or an 
enormous collection of followers. The core of a kapolo 
consists of the most prominent member's siblings and 
other close relatives, especially of lower status than him­
or herself. 
(Indonesian and used in many local languages) A palm 
leaf manuscript. For many years Buginese lontara' have 
been written on paper. 
(prefix) This is the stative prefix to a predicate, meaning 
"in a state of' such and such, e.g., a ToMatoa is a person 
(to) in a state of being (rna) old (toa); or "masiri'i!"--"he 
or she (final i) is in a state of being (rna) embarrassed or 
ashamed (siri'). Its use is often parallel with that of the 
Indonesian prefix ber-. 
The state of being afflicted on account of getting out of 
place, that is, offending the order of the cosmos, 
particularly by offending a person or thing whose social 
place is higher or more potent than one's own (see 
Lecture One). 
The sting of a snake; the potent 'bite" of authority of a 
noble leader 
Place, whether spatial or social, e.g., naisseng onrona, "He 
or she knows his place," or Iga monro? "where does he or 
she dwell?" 
(prefix to "verb" root) This usually forms a causative, as 
inpakasiri' (to cause someone to be shamed) and 
pakunusumange' (to cause someone'ssiri' to return). Its 
use in Tae and Buginese often parallels the Indonesian 
prefix memper-. 
See siri'. 
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pusaka A Javanese word now part of Indonesian as well, 
meaning royal regalia and objects inherited from the 
ancestors; overlaps with both arajang and mana' in South 
Sulawesi languages. 
raja (Indonesian) ruler. See datu. 
raksasa (Indonesian) monster 
rapu A "clump" or "stand" of stems growing from a common 
root or source, said of coconut trees, banana trees, and 
human siblings. A kapolo is composed of numerous rapu. 
ripakasiri, See siri'. 
salama' 
or salamat Safe, secure, healthy, well 
siri' Honor, shame, amourpropre, human dignity, which 
distinguishes humans from animals. Ripakasiri' is to be 
shamed; pakasiri' is to shame. 
tau Person. When combined with a modifier, it is 
pronounced "toh," as in ToLuwu, ToLaing, etc. 
ToLaing Stranger, non-kinsperson, other person or people. See 
tau. 
ToLuwu Person or people of Luwu. See tau. 
ToMatoa Respected elder(s). See tau. 
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John Emigh 
Some years ago, with I Made Bandem, I published a translation of a topeng 
pajegan (solo masked dance-drama) performed by I Nyoman Kakul at the village 
of Tusan, Bali on February 6th, 1975 (Kakul 1979). Juxtaposed to that translation 
was a detailed description of Kakul's performance and a consideration of some of 
the underlying aesthetics of topeng (Emigh 1979). I was Kakul's student at the 
time I taped his performance, on leave from my position as a director and teacher 
of Western theatre. In the years that followed, I have performed Balinese and 
Western texts using topeng techniques and have continued to teach and direct for 
the Western stage (see Snow 1986, Reeder 1979). What follows is an attempt to 
look at Kakul's performance once again, from other vantage points these 
activities have provided. As a performer, director, and teacher of acting and 
dramatic theory, I am concerned not only with understanding what is involved in 
Kakul's performance-though that task has difficulties enough-but also with ways 
in which his practice of topeng relates to and is distinct from modern and post­
modern experimentation within Western theatre. Ultimately, I want to know 
what topeng has to teach me as a Western performer, teacher and scholar, and 
what I am positioned (and not positioned) to learn. This approach to these 
questions is written in the hope that my concerns are not unique. It is expanded 
from notes used at the University of Hawai'i in 1985. There, I was able to make 
certain points through demonstration; here, I shall have to refer the interested 
reader back to the earlier, more descriptive essay on Kakul's performance and to 
the transcription and translation of that performance already mentioned.1 
To make a dent in the agenda proposed, I shall need to take a somewhat 
lengthy detour into theatrical theory. Just before I started to study with Kakul, 
Richard Schechner published an article, IIDrama-Script-Theatre-Performance," in 
which he tried to isolate the various "domains" of activity involved in generating 
and sustaining theatrical performance. Schechner suggests a "taxonomical model" 
to be used as a tool in describing the interactions among "domains" that 
characterize specific theatrical forms and, in the process, makes some interesting 
observations about the ways in which contemporary productions in the West 
seem to delight in exposing "creases" between the "domains" indicated in his 
model (1988 [1977,1973]:68-105). Such structural models have their dangers. 
They may provide complex ways of saying simple things. Worse, the models 
themselves may become reified, the map treated as though it were the territory 
itself. Still, I have found Schechner's model useful in trying to understand how 
Balinese topeng works as a theatri~ genre and, more particularly, how Kakul's 
performance at Tusan acquires its force and form. Schechner's essay has just 
been republished; it seems timely to take it up again in order to point out some 
important aspects of the processes involved in Kakul's performance that might 
otherwise go unnoticed. As a structural model designed to indicate "domains" 
operative in all theatrical performance, it may also provide a useful starting place 
for discussing ways in which topeng performances are both similar to, and 
significantly different from, avant-garde Western theatre since Brecht and 
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Artaud. Artaud's own well known enthusiasm for Balinese performance and the 
recent renewal of interest in Asian theatre in general and Balinese theatre in 
particular add appeal to this task. 
Drama-Script-Theatre-Performance 
Schechner's model consists of a series of concentric spheres, with "drama" 
depicted as "the smallest, most intense circle" and "performance" as "the 
broadest, most ill-defined disk." In general terms, a "drama" might take the form 
of "a written text, score, scenario, instruction, plan or map" which may be 
transported "from time to time and place to place" and incorporated within the 
"script" for a particular presentation. This "script may then be manifested in 
"concrete and immediate" terms withi~ the larger sphere of "theatre," and that 
which is shown and enacted there be eqcompassed within the domain of 
"performance"-"the whole constellation of events, most of them passing 
unnoticed, that takes place in/among both performers and audience from the 
time the first spectator enters...the precinct where the theatre takes place to the 
time the last spectator leaves" (1988 [1977,1973]:72). 
(After Schechner: 1977 [1973]:39) 
Schechner summarizes the identities of his domains as they apply to the most 
familiar Western procedures: "Drama is what the writer writes; the script is the 
interior map of a particular production; the theatre is the specific set of gestures 
performed by the performers in any given performance; the performance is the 
whole event, including audience and performers." He further notes that, outside 
these spheres of activity, embracing the circumscribed "domain" of performance, 
is "the domain of everyday life" (1988:85). 
In applying Schechner's model, some theatrical forms may be understood to 
define and protect the l'boundaries" that demarcate these domains more than 
others. The integrity of any given "domain" may be reinforced and movement to 
the next "domain" consequently made more difficult. Thus, t.he "dramatic works" 
of, say, Shakespeare, Ibsen, or Shepard, may be bound, sold;- read, and taught in 
"dramatic literature" classes with varying degrees of success, almost as though 
they were novels in dialogue form (supplemented by brief descriptions of settings 
and actions). Then again, at the next ''boundary,t' a director such as Max 
Reinhardt might work out an elaborate mise-en-scene, complete with inflections 
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and nuances of gesture, prior to even meeting his actors. The theatrical "domain" 
may be sealed off by "closing" rehearsals to the public while working out the 
details of theatrical presentation prior to "opening" the work to an audience. The 
"boundary" between the "domains" of performance and everyday life is also 
subject to relative degrees of openness or closure. The proscenium arch, the 
darkened theatre and illuminated stage, the use of elaborate costumes and 
makeup, or of "extra-daily" movement, are all ways of reinforcing the sense of a 
separate domain for theatre in order to then communicate across its 
"boundaries"-of establishing and controlling "aesthetic distance." In common 
usage, many performance genres are even referred to as "pure entertainment," 
indicating a supposed disjunction between the events performed and the life that 
surrounds the performance. 
Recently, there has been a tendency to play with all of these "boundaries," 
opening them up or exposing them as artificial. The works of such "dramatists" as 
Robert Wilson, Richard Foreman, or Lee Breuer demand innovative strategies 
from their editors due to the elaborate interplay between the domains of "script" 
and "theatre," while the recycling and "deconstructionll of Arthur Miller's The 
Crucible in The Wooster Group's LSD plays with the "boundaryll between 
"drama" and "script," creating legal as well as aesthetic dilemmas (Savran 1985). 
Indeed, the role of the director in interpreting or confronting the dramatic text is 
probably the most hotly debated theoretical issue in theatre of recent decades 
(see Pavis 1982, Hornby 1977, Grotowski 1969, Blau 1982). These issues are now 
echoed in questions concerning the reader or viewer's role being asked by 
semioticians and critics attracted to hermeneutic circlings; every reader and 
spectator becomes a director before the circles are exhausted. Ensemble 
rehearsal procedures, the phenomenon of "open rehearsals," the use of 
lIenvironmental" stagings by, for example, Schechner, Grotowski and Harold 
Prince, and the radical re-examination of the physical and mental relationship of 
the spectator to the performed action involved in the work of John Cage, Allan 
Kaprow and various performance artists all act to subvert the integrity of these 
lIboundaries," as do the night club comic's banter with his audience, or Spalding 
Gray's use of intensely personal experience as recyclable dramatic material. 
Schechner's "boundaries" then, are less formidable and static than they may 
appear. Still, they serve to isolate "areas" for the different sets of procedures used 
to generate and sustain performances and, perhaps more importantly, indicate 
the "potential spaces" in which crucial strategic choices as to what game we are 
playing may occur and lIpost-modern" innovations become possible. Schechner's 
"domains" are most usefully conceived of as expanding and contracting "homes" 
for certain kinds of procedures. Experienced diachronically, their limits are 
positioned at strategic spots where ambiguities arise; the need for each new circle 
and category in the model comes from the sense that "something else" is now 
happening-that another bundle of procedures is being used. 
The model acquires its usefulness as a theoretical tool in helping to point out 
what is involved in traveling-as performer, as audience member, or as 
critic-from the home of one set of procedures to the home of another. In this 
regard, Balinese topeng shares many of the techniques and formal concerns of 
"post-modernism,lI for it is in the nature of topeng to keep the "boundariesll 
between the various lIdomains" of performance relatively open. It is closer to the 
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practice of Brecht, Meyerhold, Foreman, or Monty Python's Flying Circus than to 
the seamless model of playwriting and production based on the "laws" of the 
necessary and probable espoused by Aristotle, elaborated by Corneille, re­
invented by Ibsen, and systematized for actors by Stanislavsky. Indeed a fluidity of 
movement from "domain" to "domain" is quintessential to topeng's strategies and 
aesthetic life. It is the nature and the consequences of this dynamic movement 
across the "domains" of performance that I wish to examine in Kakul's topeng 
pajegan performance at Tusan, tracing the audience's perception of Kakul's 
performance across the various domains involved. 
Before charting a path through the experience of performance though, it will 
be useful to apply Schechner's model to the generative process that culminated in 
Kakul's performance of the story of Jelantik at Blambangan as enacted at Tusan 
on February 6, 1975.2 Schechner's use of familiar terms leaves room for 
ambiguity, and I shall have to make adjustments in the definitions of some of 
these terms in order to apply his model to topeng. However, as Kenneth Burke 
noted in explaining the usefulness of his schematic "pentad": "What we want is not 
terms that avoid ambiguity, but terms that clearly reveal the strategic spots at 
which ambiguities necessarily arise...it is in the area of ambiguity that 
transformations take placell (1962 [1945]:xx-xxi). 
At first glance, Schechner's summary definitions of "drama" and "script" may 
seem arbitrary to the point of perversity. Drama, after all, refers etymologically to 
action, and script to that which is written. Why, then should "what the writer 
writes" be called the "drama," and "scriptll be used to designate "the interior map 
of a particular production?" Schechner's concern in this ordering of familiar and 
acknowledgedly loaded terms is to place "drama" at the center of the set of 
procedures that generate and sustain theatrical performance using "scriptingll to 
refer to the process of elaborating the dramatic nucleus to the point where it 
might be given theatrical life. This choice is related to (and perhaps determined 
by) Aristotle's observation that praxis, the ordering of the incidents, constitutes 
the "sour' of a tragedy; it is also consistent with the Sanskritic concept of a 
dramatic incident providing the "kerner' [biji] from which the play must grow 
(Byrski 1984:144). "Drama," then, might be redefined as being not so much "what 
the writer writes" as the sequence of actions, or fable, that is at the core of what 
he has chosen to write about. In common usage, the terms "drama" and "script" 
become synonymous in the West (inviting etymological confusion), since we 
credit the playwright with both conceptualizing the dramatic core and providing 
the dialogue and stage directions that begin to flesh out that core. 
In Schechner's terms, of course, further "scripting" is permissible by the 
director, and, to a lesser degree, by the actors themselves. In topeng pajegan, 
however, there is no playwright to provide a script, no director to devise a mise­
en-scene. There is only the performer, preparing to perform. He begins with the 
babads; one of the stories that these Balinese chronicles contain must form the 
dramatic core from which he proceeds. This dramatic core is anterior to "plot" as 
well as to dialogue-just as, in Greek practice, mythos was anterior even to praxis. 
Homer, Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides could all reshape the dramatic core 
of the Oresteia-Euripides several times-and so could Sartre, O'Neill, and Suzuki 
many centuries later. For my purposes, then, "drama" can be roughly equated 
with the fable or story embedded in one of the babads' flexible texts, while "script" 
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refers to the patterning of words and actions that will be used to convey and give 
specific form to this story in the context of a hypothetical performance. 'Theatre" 
continues to describe the "script" as manifest within performance-its "immediate 
and concrete" expression by the performers. In using this set of definitions (just as 
in common usage), not all performative actions will be equally "dramatic." 
Happenings, musical revues, and religious rituals, for example, are all "scripted" 
and performed, but contain varying amounts of "dramatic" content, and some 
parts of a theatricalized "script" may be less "dramatic" than others-they deal less 
directly with an llintense, heated up centerll provided by the story matter. 
From Drama to Script 
On the day before leaving for Tusan, Kakul sat on his porch, a well-worn 
notebook in his hand. The notebook contained selected babad stories [cariteras] 
transcribed from palm leaf manuscripts [lontars] along with genealogical charts, 
useful passages from the Mahabharata and Ramayana, favorite songs in Middle 
Javanese from the gambuh theatre (in which Kakul also excelled), and mantras in 
Javanized Sanskrit that would be useful for the ritual blessings conferred at the 
end of the performance-all written in Balinese characters. Kakul would peruse 
the notebook, lean back and close his eyes, glance at the book again, frown, turn 
a few pages, hum a bit, smile, nod his head, and stare fixedly into space as though 
lost in an unknown world. Sometimes, he would seem to be napping, and then his 
hands would begin to move slowly and gracefully, following the rhythms of 
unheard music. Hours passed in this manner. 
Many potentiallldramasll were inscribed in Kakul's notebook. He was 
concentrating on one of these-the story of Jelantik's mission to Blambangan and 
of his death while saving his King's honor and his father's soul. This story had 
been fIXed as the dramatic core of the performance to be held in Tusan. The 
village had historical associations with Jelantik's descendants. Moreover, the 
origins of topeng in Bali have been traced by Balinese scholars to the celebrating 
of Jelantik's deeds by one of his descendants (named Tusan), using masks . 
brought from Java as booty from this same expedition (Bandem and Rembang 
1976). Kakul already knew the story and had performed it before on several 
occasions. Indeed, he already knew a great deal of the notebook's contents by 
heart. His concentration was not on learning the story, but rather on the story's 
transformation from "drama" to "script." This transformation was taking place 
through a process that combines procedures of selection and embellishment. In 
the version of the babad abridged in DeZoete and Spies's Dance and Drama in 
Bali (1973 [1938]:303), the "kingdoms" of Pasurahan and Blambangan are equally 
involved in the insult to Dalem Waturenggong, and both are punished. The 
decisive battle is fought after Jelantik's death by another minister, Patih Ularan, 
who brings the head of the Dalem of Pasurahan back to his own King. Dalem 
Waturenggong is so upset by his minister's over-zealous pursuit of his mission that 
he banishes Ularan and his heirs from Gelgel. The version Kakul performs 
condenses these actions eliminating many of the complications and concentrating 
on Jelantik; his role is made far more decisive and the restoration of his King's 
honor less equivocal. 
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Some of Kakul's choices may have been determined by his own sources for 
the caritera, others by aesthetic concerns, and still others by factors peculiar to 
the occasion for which he was preparing. For example, many brahmans would be 
in the audience, some of whom were well known and greatly respected by Kakul. 
Apart from its associations with Tusan and with the history of topeng itself, the 
story of lelantik's martyrdom would be particularly appropriate for such an 
audience because of its ethical and metaphysical implications; he would have to 
make sure to bring these out. At the same time, it would be fun to tease these 
high priests a bit, and appropriate moments would have to be found for this sort 
of mischief. 
While crystallizing the "drama" of lelantik's martyrdom, Kakul also 
embellishes and supplements this dramatic core. This "script-building" is well 
described by Levi-Strauss' suggestive term: it is an act of bricolage (1966:16-33). 
Bits and pieces from many sources are available to Kakul in embellishing the 
story. Perusing his notebook, he might consider words and sentiments from the 
Javanized Hindu epics, or songs of praise and grandeur from the Middle 
Javanese kidung literature, to be spoken in their appropriate historical and 
literary languages.4 Various topics of current interest and vernacular modes of 
speech would also be considered, including idiosyncratic speech patterns specific 
to the Klungkung area where Tusan is located. Familiar bits of comic business 
would be mentally run through and assigned a place or rejected as inappropriate. 
Gradually, a tentative "map" for the performance is arrived at, and the sequence 
of masks to be used is set in mind, along with the appropriate dances. Kakul does 
not have to rehearse these theatricalizing elements. He can count on his 
knowledge of topeng conventions, his kinesthetic training, and the personal 
precedents he has established in his own practice of topeng to do much of the 
work of rehearsals. He does not know how skilled the gamelan musicians at 
Tusan will be, nor how extensive their repertory beyond the most customary 
pieces required for a topeng performance. He will have to be flexible. For now, 
his preparation consists of deciding how the material might be parceled out 
among his masks, what particular emphases might be given to the story on this 
occasion, what supplementary material might be appropriate, what special dance 
movements he might introduce, and what opportunities might be present for 
jokes and topical comments. The Ilscript" arrived at in this manner is always 
incomplete. 
Roland Barthes' distinctions between a "work" and a ''Text'' are apposite here: 
The work is a fragment ofsubstance, occupying apart ofthe space of 
books (in a library for example), the Text is a methodological field. 
...The work can beheld in the hand, the Text is held in language. ...The 
Text is experienced only in an activity ofproduction• ... The work closes 
on a signified.... The Text, on the contrary, practices the infinite 
deferment ofthe signified, is dilatory....Like language, it is stlUctured 
but off-centered, without closure. The Text...decants the work...from 
its consumption and gathers it up as play, activity, production, 
practice....The Text is bound to jouissance, that is, to a pleasure 
without separation....The Text is that space where no language has a 
hold over any other, where languages circulate (1977:156-164). 
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The topeng "script" that Kakul creates is, on every count, singularly Text-like 
and work-resistant. It will remain flexible and never be written down, and Kakul 
might alter it substantially if the audience reception is right or the weather 
wrong-adding or subtracting or redistributing material. Still, "scripting" his 
dramatic material in this manner will allow Kakul to perform with confidence and 
a clear sense of direction. 
From Script to Theatre 
The "script" becomes animate in the immediate and concrete "domain" of the 
"theatre.1I The suspended ordering of all the considered possibilities and chosen 
intentions that constitute the "script" must find its life in the movement of muscle 
and bone, the clanging ofwooden hammers against metal bars, the sounding of 
archaic and contemporary speech, and the display of painted wood and gilded 
cloth that, for the audience, is topeng. A Balinese spectator does not go to see 
this or that drama performed; the caritera chosen is rarely announced and may 
not be determined until the arrival of the performers (see DeZoete and Spies 
1973 [1938]:937-40). Schechner rightly points out that, while in the West-at least 
since the Renaissance-the tendency has been to throw emphasis onto the drama 
and script, in the East the tendency has been to emphasize theatre and 
performance: Aristotle's despised "spectaclell (1988 [1977,1973]:73). 
Balinese theatre is a good case in point. Topeng is not lacking in verbal 
complexity or dramatic content, and the various stories have their separate 
appeals; but I have never heard a Balinese say that he is off to see a particular 
story. Rather, he will say he is off to see a particular form of theatre, or perhaps a 
well known performer or group, or even, simply, "the dancing." Topeng is 
distinguished from the many other forms of Balinese dance and theatre by the 
entire constellation of the masks worn, the instruments, tunings and melodies 
used, the costumes displayed, the movements executed, and the modes of story 
telling deployed. Audience expectations and criteria for excellence are targeted 
first and last to this theatrical domain. 
In my earlier essay and translation, I have already tried to give a sense of the 
theatrical life of Kakul's performance (1979). Such an attempt is doomed to be 
reductive and illustrates the difference between "script" and "theatre" as 
IIdomainsll of activity. Leaving aside the thorny problems of translating Balinese 
into English, the process of moving from performance to taped recording, to 
transcription, to translation is a movement away from theatre and back toward 
script-now reconstituted as a performance text-a sort of pseudo-work.s In this 
process, no matter how many notes and directions are appended, or how many 
typefaces and photographs are used, the theatrical elements of the production 
are the first elements to be glossed over or altogether lost. 
In performance, it is possible to obscure the process of theatricalization-to 
attempt to make the theatrical domain transparent, so that the audience 
perceives activities given shape there as directly representative of happenings in 
the everyday world.6 The "fourth wall" of the naturalistic stage is one such 
theatrical device that works to de-emphasize its own theatrical presence by first 
isolating the theatrical space and then recreating within that space a vision of the 
world as experienced outside the domains of theatre and performance-throwing 
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attention back onto the scripted drama or forward onto social concerns that may 
be thematically represented. In topeng, however, the "otherness" of the theatrical 
domain is boldly and flamboyantly declared. The gamelan melodies, the 
"unnaturar l postures and movements of the dance (kinesthetically implanted 
through an arduous process of direct manipulation), the sounding of archaic 
language, and the guttural sounds that give this language significance, are all 
indicative of the theatrical "otherness" of the world as reconstituted in topeng. 
In this splendidly realized theatrical domain, the music that Kakul held in his 
mind while fashioning his "script" is sounded-imperfect, but shimmering and 
vitally present. The masks are animated. The costumes are adjusted and 
displayed. The dances acquire specific life as Kakul's bare feet move along the 
consecrated earth and his hands and body unite with the masks he wears to create 
a highly theatricalized illusion of characters. Words are now chanted, or sung, or 
spoken, in a manner appropriate to the linguistic context and the eccentricities of 
a mask. At times, as in the introductory dances, orpengelembar, these theatrical 
elements dominate, and the "scripting" all but disappears in the display of 
character and the synesthesia of music and motion. At other times, as in the 
narration of the two Penasars, the scripting becomes the predominant element of 
the performance, directing attention back onto the dramatic center. Sometimes, 
as in the moments in which the principal figures of the drama appear, or in the 
reflexive jokes and parodies offered by Si Mata Mata, scripting and 
theatricalization exist in a mutual exchange; first one and then the other are held 
at the center of the audience's attention. 
From Theatre to Performance 
The theatrical display of topeng is nested within the larger domain of 
"performance" in such a way as to encourage precisely this sort of inter-play. 
Contextualized by the occasion which its appearance helps to celebrate-a 
wedding, an odalan7ion-this theatrical display is both a generator and a recipient 
of the festive excitement and weight of significance attending the larger occasion. 
As the space that will hold the theatrical life is being consecrated, the 
audience gathers to form a truncated oval, providing a space which is set apart by 
soft and flexible boundaries. The musicians, whose efforts will herald and support 
the events within this theatrical world, sit among this audience, facing the curtain 
which is at the sacred [kaja] end. The performer enters from the direction of the 
sacred mountains and the realm of the ancestors and gods, into the perfonnance 
oval demarcated by the audience's imperfect ring. Beyond the audience is the sea, 
the direction of the secular and the profane [kelod]. As the curtain shakes, and 
the performer tantalizingly or triumphantly makes his entrance to the sound of 
cymbals and drums, he is entering into a space specifically set off as somewhere 
between the divine and the demonic, and defined by the audience's presence.s 
Compare this convention with the use of the curtain, common until very 
recently in Western proscenium theatre. On the proscenium stage, the curtain is 
raised or drawn to reveal a world apart-often one representing a different 
historical time or geographical place-and the audience is invited to vicariously 
identify with the characters portrayed as living in that world. In the Balinese 
convention, the curtain is at the rear of the playing space. There is nothing to 
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reveal but the architecture and scenery that have always been there--and the 
actor's changing table, which has been in view during his preparations and can 
frequently be glimpsed during entrances. No matter where or when the story 
takes place, the action is thrust into the present moment of performance to 
realize its theatrical form. 
Thus, although the Dutch colonists brought illusionistic scene painting to 
Indonesia and Balinese artists, internationally acclaimed for their technical skills, 
have seen such painting used in Java and elsewhere, the only scenery that I have 
ever seen painted for a Balinese theatrical presentation is a replica of the gateway 
to a Balinese temple-the "natural" site for a performance. Representations of 
past times or distant lands would be inappropriate, even though the actions 
depicted in the dramas take place putatively in India, Majapahit, or ancient Bali. 
By moving out of the dual world of ancestral space and theatrical preparation, 
through the curtain and into the immediate space defined by the audience, the 
actor-as character-can directly address the audience in their own time, in their 
own space, no matter where or when the "drama" is taking place. Such 
"anachronistic" play abounds in topeng-both as a strategy for humor and as an 
integral part of its "meaning." 
What a chase those noblemen in the orchestra gave me! Now I'm 
worn out!Already too tired to give you a show! Mind you, I don't 
mean to criticize. Not justyet. It's my first time here. My first time 
dancing with these musicians. Their first time playing with me. And 
I'm old fashioned. Just like an old dog!...Beh! Moving on! (Kakul 
1979:38). 
Thus, also as the over-annuated coquette, Desak Made Rai, he teases a priest in 
the audience: 
Oh, those brahmans over there are laughing at me. And that one tried 
to pinch me! I wonder ifhe'll do that when we're alone (1979:45). 
And thus, he jests about his right to speak as he wishes after mistakenly 
addressing Jelantik as though he were divine: 
"But my holy Lord...I mean my noble Lord! I got mixed up. Well, 
anyways I'm out here alone, so I can say whatever I want! Ha, Ha, 
Hal" (1979:44). 
These are all instances of "metacommentary" (see Bateson 1972, Geertz 
1980)-throwing the emphasis onto the act of performing by recognizing the 
presence of the audience and his fellow performers. An even more significant 
instance of the potential primacy of the "domain" of performance is the Sidha 
Karya ritual that ends the performance; but in this instance the play is no longer 
essentially between the "domains" of theatre and performance (though both of 
these domains are involved), but between the "domains" of performance and of 
life itself-in its secular and sacred aspects: "Now the Holy Presence arrives. Now 
Sidha Karya appears. Coming now, into this world" (1979:46). 
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Beyond Performance 
As Schechner notes, beyond the domains of performance, across an indistinct 
boundary, is the domain of everyday life-what Victor Turner refers to as 
societas-the activities of which surround, occasion, inform and, in turn, may be 
informed and affected by those events set within "liminar t or "liminoid" circles of 
performance (Turner 1969, 1982). Further, beyond this domain of everyday life, 
at least for the Balinese audience, lies the domain of the macrocosmos-the realm 
of the ancestors, the deities, and of enduring values. One adds these outer realms 
to Schechner's circles within circles at the risk of calling to mind the childhood 
joke of listing one's address by giving name, street and number, state, country, the 
world, the universe. In the child's joke, though, the last two designations are true 
enough, but superfluous to delivering the mail and, therefore, are listed either out 
of naivete or silliness. In Balinese performance, these outer domains are 
operative addresses; characters, audience members, and performers, may be 
understood to move imaginatively, metaphorically, or actually into or out of these 
domains.9 Thus, for the discussion that follows, Schechner's diagram might be 
redrawn as follows, adding the outer circles and showing his "boundaries" to be 
less hermetic and formidable than they first appear: 
Held outdoors, on ground which is only temporarily set apart for theatrical 
use, the circumstances that surround Balinese performances encourage an active 
interplay between the domains of performance and everyday life. Audience 
members come and go on the physical periphery of the performance, joining 
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friends, buying food, flirting, or chatting. In another essay, Schechner has 
characterized this behavior, typical of traditional theatre throughout much of the 
world, as "selective inattention" (1988 [1977J:196-206). The performer, too, may 
tend to matters of the "real world" while performing: matter-of-factly adjusting a 
costume piece or chasing away a stray dog. Events and concerns from the 
"domain" of everyday life allusively play into the content of the "script" and clash 
with the splendidly set apart world of theatrical conventions. Thus, the Penasar 
Cenikan, or junior storyteller, interrupts highblown rhetoric about the demands 
of dharma in order to render a scene in everyday images: 
"BehJ1t's a leech as big as a roofing mat! Aduh! There's the leech all 
curled up. And hairy, too! Beh! MUll, mun, mun! That big!' (Kakul 
1979:42). 
Cucul's talk of prosaic concerns-after Jelantik's martyrdom and before Sidha 
Karya's divine intervention-is even more startling: 
'~duh! Such a crowd ofpeople gathered in the palace courtyard. All 
ofthem so happy!And here I am, so sad and miserable... My wife has 
gone and left met' (1979:45), 
while Si Mata Mata's parody of Indonesian nationalism takes this form of play 
still further. 
The play between the "domain" of performance and the events of everyday 
life that surround and occasion performance can be complex in topeng, and often 
results in humor. Ron Jenkins reports acting in a performance held in his 
teacher's family temple in which his teacher's extramarital affairs were broadly 
satirized in front of his wife, family, and friends, with the teacher himself as the 
leading performer (1979:54). Such allusions add spice to a Balinese performance 
and may serve a therapeutic function. Elizabeth Young makes a case for this 
humor being socially corrective; by ridiculing inappropriate behavior, the 
argument goes, proper social behavior is taught and reinforced (1980:196-239, 
see Goodlad, 1971). Young presents the argument well, and I am willing to 
believe that there are instances of humor in topeng that function along these 
lines. There is little doubt that Balinese performances can be given a conservative 
turn. Hildred Geertz has recently recounted a chilling tale of a topeng 
performance commissioned by princely patrons in league with the Dutch in 1947, 
during the Indonesian war for independence, in order to whip up a crowd to beat 
rebellious brahmans (1988); Fredrik deBoer has shown how jokes in Balinese 
shadow plays (wayang !allit) can be used to buttress the traditional social order 
(1987). Still, the humor involved in 5i Mata Mata's parody of Indonesian 
nationalism or Cucul's devaluing of history strikes me as having a somewhat 
different, more mischievous, and perhaps more profound function. 
James Boon, in his recent article, "Folly, Bali, and Anthropology, or Satire 
Across Cultures" (1984:160), is similarly distrusting of moral exegesis. Citing 
Northrop Frye and using the translation and description of Kakul's performance 
as an example, Boon makes a case for topeng (along with all of anthropological 
literature) being a species of Menippean satire: "A literary and performative 
genre based on multiple voices and viewpoints, plural languages, obsessive 
quotation, pastiche, etymology, blather, and always imbued with a flavor of 
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fragmented parody:' where "culture, histories, and languages theatrically, 
parodically, and apocalyptically converge" (159). 
Boon sees this process of setting world against world in an "exegesis-resistant" 
display of folly as fundamentally subversive (161). In the end, though, the 
inclusiveness of topeng, indicated by its range of humor as well as its penchant for 
having peasants and courtiers mingle with demonic and celestial beings, may be 
more important than its subversive or conservative turns. The performances 
function to create a vision of the world rendered whole-with all of its seemingly 
mismatched pieces in place.10 Perhaps the virtual sanctity accorded the topeng 
pajegan performer by references to his taksu and by delegating to him the duty of 
performing the future-oriented ritual that ends a performance is earned through 
this capacity. 
Kakul's performance as Sidha Karya, lithe priest of dharma" who intercedes 
for the villagers in their relations with divine forces and receives the offering on 
behalf of the gods, is the most striking instance of this playing between the 
"domain" of performance and life outside of that "domain." The offering he 
receives has been blessed by a brahman priest during Kakul's performance, and 
his acceptance of it and sharing of its coins with screaming and laughing children 
culminates the playing with boundaries by theatrically joining the IIdomain" of 
everyday life with the Balinese macrocosmos of spiritual force and presence. 
Kakul becomes identified with his role, and, though trance is not directly 
involved, the tradition of visitation that also embraces the ritual use of the rangda 
and barong ket masks once more provides a context in which sacred play can 
occur (Emigh 1979:32-35). 
The ritual awakening and blessing of the masks that precede and follow the 
topeng pajegan performance, the consecration of the ground, the placement of 
the curtain at the sacred end of the performing space, the "dramaticll depiction of 
heroic ancestors, the use of languages associated with the gods and ancestors, the 
interpolation of religious maxims and texts into the "script," the public ritual that 
ends the topeng pajegan performance, and the use of the spiritual term "taksu" to 
refer to a performer's presence together indicate the accessibility of the 
macrocosmic world of spiritual force and energy to the topeng performer and his 
audience. Taken all in all, the domains of topeng recreate and celebrate the 
Balinese cosmos, giving form to force. The aim is not so much to imitate the 
surfaces of life as experienced-though such imitation has its place in topeng (and 
that place is in the bondres [comic characters])-but, rather, to render and restore 
a vision of life that is essentially whole, blending experience with cultural 
knowledge, and what has been seen and reported with all that might well be 
imagined. The movement is inclusive and all-encompassing; the neo-classical 
unities of place, time, tone, and action can have no place in this more ambitious 
effort to recreate, celebrate, and contain a vision of life in all its disconsonant and 
ultimately sacred variety. 
The Dynamics of a Topeng Performance 
Schechner's model can be applied diachronically to Kakul's performance in an 
experiential as well as a generative fashion. That is, it can be used to trace the 
audience's attention as it is focused on the procedures and concerns appropriate 
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to first one and then another of one of the various "domains" involved in the 
entire performance process. Tracing this progress, a pattern emerges that may be 
indicative of a genius peculiar to topeng as a theatrical form, or, perhaps, to 
Kakul's own use of the topeng pajegan tradition.ll The audience can be seen as 
carried through the entire performance model, circle by circle, as though moving 
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As Kakul says his mantras and asks his masks to waken that they might dance, 
the ground is consecrated with holy water, the gamelan music begins to play, and 
the audience assembles-joking, socializing, slowly taking up places around the 
performance oval. The movement is between the Ildomains" of the macrocosmos 
and of everyday life on the one hand, and between performance and life outside 
performance-both sacred and profane-on the other. The opening dances of the 
pengelembar harness the music to a theatrical display of virtuosity and brilliance. 
The play is between theatre and performance, with rudimentary scripting 
involved in the performer's choice of masks and choreography. The telling of the 
story, or caritera, begins with the Penasar Kelihan's virtuosic display of an 
unintelligible language, becomes more complex in its scripting, and eventually 
closes in on the dramatic center. The oscillations between narration and dance, 
between the rival modes of visitation and illusion, and between Kakul in his 
persona as performer and in his role as character, keep all four domains of 
performative activity in a heated interaction at the temporal center of the 
performance-with first one and then another of these domains being brought 
into focus. The appearance of Jelantik himself occurs at the exact center-framed 
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by the appearances of the two Penasars, and (excluding Sidha Karya), with six 
masks before and another six after. It should be noted that, as the drama heats up 
and the principal characters from the past are summoned to dance, the 
references to the "domain of performance" become fewer and fewer. With the 
bondres succession of comic characters-each with its retlexive view to add and 
jokes to tell-the emphasis on the dramatic center lessens, with a corresponding 
increase in attention lavished on the "domains" of theatre and performance. 
Finally, the Sidha Karya ritual, while it is certainly llscriptedll and theatricalized, 
emphasizes once again an interchange between the "domains" of performance 
and of the sacred and secular life outside that performance. 
The entire event begins with a private ritual that separates the actions of 
performance from the flow of everyday life (though reminders of that life may be 
seen within and round the audience's space); it ends with a public ritual that 
rejoins the concerns of performance with those of that life. Throughout the 
course of the performance, a priest on a platform removed from the performative 
focus, but still in view of the audience, prepares the offering for Sidha Karya. 
Entrances of figures from the past through the curtain at the kaja end of the 
performance space are marked by cymbal clashes and drum rolls that emphasize 
the movement between sacred and secular worlds. The performance may be 
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What this chart cannot show is that the emphasis on the divine has its 
counterbalance. Along the way, in each of the major sections of the performance, 
there is a movement toward humanization and containment. The startling, 
hypertense, and virtuosic figure of the red-faced palih yields place to the familiar, 
somewhat incompetent figure of the old courtier who is free to physically contact 
the audience. The Penasar Kelihan, with all of his boasting and vainglorious 
touting of the ancestral ethos, is followed by the Penasar Cenikan, with his far 
more common sense view of events. The outrageous Si Mata Mata gives way first 
to an aging coquette, and then to a simple peasant left outside the rush of history. 
Even Sidha Karya moves from a display and celebration of divine power to the 
sharing of the gods' offering with a small child and, in the process, his language 
moves from archipelago Sanskrit to the Indonesian of the schoolroom before the 
audience disperses with his blessing and the performing oval once more becomes, 
unequivocally, a part of "this earth." This movement toward the quotidian and 
human affirms an essential sanity to the Balinese cosmos, or, at least, of Kakul's 
inspired play with the confluence of extraordinary and familiar events contained 
by that cosmos, in all its variety. 
The overall movement from everyday life to artistic activity to ritual and back 
to the concerns of the quotidian world is a familiar one in Balinese life. The task 
of teaching me my first sentence in Indonesian happened to fall to a tailor (and 
aficionado of Balinese theatre) who spoke a little English. He decided that the 
task was an important one, pondered many options, and then decided to teach 
me to say: "Seni ini adala anak dan alam, " or "Art is the child of nature." The 
inter-relationships between art and life-in both its secular and sacred aspects-is 
a recurring theme on the island. A circular progression from nature to art to 
offering and back again to nature is played out in many variations. 
Rice is made into cakes, then colored and stacked high, and decorated and 
profusely adorned with ornamentation. These works of elaborate artifice are 
given as offerings to the gods, who enjoy their essence, and are then returned to 
the people, who enjoy the cakes as food. The performer draws from his 
observations of the life around him, as well as fro"1 familiar historical annals and, 
using all of this material, he constructs intricate systems of sound and movement, 
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redeployed through the conventions of his art. To paraphrase an English 
professor who once tried to instruct us in the beauties of Spenser's epic poetry: 
topeng is not like life, but watching a topeng performance is a lot like living. This 
artistic refiguring and intertwining of the many worlds embraced by the Balinese 
imagination is then offered to the invited gods and ancestors for their pleasure. It 
is also (like the gaily decorated offering cakes) consumed by the earthly 
audience-an audience equally appreciative of a beautiful movement or a good 
joke. In the end, the needs and hopes of this audience are the focus of the 
performer's intercession with the gods who have shared in the enjoyment of his 
refashioning of nature as art, as offering, and as delicious entertainment. 
Of Limins and Liminoids 
In From Ritual to Theatre (1982) Victor Turner attempts to point out some of the 
differences between performances held in pre-industrial cultures and those found 
in post-industrial settings. Going back to his observation that ritual performances 
traditionally take place during liminal times-in the margins and thresholds of 
social experience-he makes a case for post-industrial performance being not 
truly liminal, but rather (apologizing for the neologism) "liminoid"-resembling 
without being identical to liminal phenomena. Liminal phenomena are collective 
and occur at times of renewal or crisis, whereas liminoid works (or plays) may be 
produced at any time by an individual or a group and are often sold as a 
commodity. Whereas in liminal activities emphasis is characteristically placed on 
anonymity and communitas, in liminoid performances stress is given to the 
individual innovator-"the unique person who dares and opts to create" (43). An 
obligation to follow set forms is characteristic of liminal rites, whereas an 
emphasis on choice and experimentation is central to liminoid art. The liminoid 
artist "is privileged to make free with his social heritage in a way impossible to 
members of cultures in which the liminal is to a large extent the sacrosanct" (52). 
Finally, while liminal activities of pre-industrial societies invert and play with 
the social status quo, they rarely subvert it. "Reversal underlines to the members 
of a community that chaos is the alternative to cosmos, so they'd better stick to 
cosmos, i.e., the traditional order of culture, though they can for a brief while 
have a whale of a good time being chaotic" (41). Liminoid "entertainments" in 
industrial societies, on the other hand, are characteristically subversive: 
"satirizing, lampooning, burlesquing, or subtly putting down the central values of 
the basic, work-sphere society, or at least of selected sectors of that society." (41). 
Noting the differences between Turner's categories in this context should make it 
clear that the topeng pajegan performed by I Nyoman Kakul at Tusan has 
attributes of both liminal and liminoid phenomena. The performance-or at least 
a performance-is required by a communal need. The piece begins and ends with 
more or less prescribed rituals, and many elements within the piece are 
determined by traditional structures. But Kakul is brought to Tusan as a 
renowned artist and the script created and performed is his own, for which he 
receives full credit from an admiring audience. Indeed, now that more 
information is becoming available about topeng pajegan, and other transcriptions 
are available (Young 1982, see note 11 below), the mastery of Kakul's individual 
80 Southeast Asia Papers Number 32 
Emigh The Domains of Topeng 
handling of those potentialities within the form becomes more striking. 
Moreover, the inversions and subversions involved in the scripting are sufficiently 
complex that two intelligent, informed writers can have opposite opinions about 
whether the pieces act to subvert or reaffirm societal values. Topeng-Turner 
might have been delighted to learn-exists in a limin between the liminal and the 
liminoid! And this is precisely its appeal to theatre artists in the West, myself 
included. It has an immediacy of impact, range of signification, and purposiveness 
within social mechanisms that are missing in most of the theatre available to us; 
yet it is not so alien as to be outside our ken or to lack appeal as a theatrical 
model. 
Topengl Modern and Post-Modern Theatre 
As Schechner points out, the opening up of "creases" between the domains of 
performance and the playing back and forth across these creases has become 
common practice in Western contemporary theatre. A list of practitioners 
involved in this tendency would be an impressive one, with Brecht and Artaud as 
a somewhat unlikely set of parents and with progeny ranging from Richard 
Foreman to Monty Python's Flying Circus and including Peter Schumann, Jean 
Genet, Lee Breuer, Robert Wilson, Peter Brook, Peter Weiss, Samuel Beckett, 
Jerzy Grotowski, Fred Curchack, the Wooster Group, and Schechner himself. 
The blatant theatricality and reflexivity common to these very different artists has 
been reinforced and sometimes prompted by the concerns and analytical 
methods of semiotic and "de·constructive" studies-particularly those of Roland 
Barthes and Jaques Derrida. This set of concerns and activities has coincided with 
a re-emergence of interest in Bali on the part of the theatrical practitioners and 
theorists. It may be useful to note some striking similarities and essential 
differences between Balinese topeng as performed by Kakul and recent theatrical 
theory and practice in the West. 
Recorded interest by Western theatre practitioners in Balinese performance 
begins with the works of Antonin Artaud. It was the capacity of the Balinese 
performer to project an essentialized vision of life through theatrical means that 
so attracted Artaud. In his famous essay, "On the Balinese Theatre" (1958 
[1938]), he praised the Balinese dancers he had observed in the Dutch Pavilion of 
the Paris Exposition for their "rigorous" sense of fonn, their "evocative power," 
and, most importantly, for their ability to reveal "spiritual states" by means of 
gesture (192). Artaud's other writings, both before and after his encounter with 
Balinese performance, indicate a deep affinity with central concerns of Balinese 
theatrical practice. "The theatre," wrote Artaud, "takes gestures and pushes them 
as far as they will go... It reforges the chain between what is and what is not, 
between the virtuality of the possible and what already exists in materialized 
nature" (192). 
Plato's parable, in which men see shadows on the walls of a cave and must 
judge from those shadows what true "forms" outside of their restricted view are 
distorted and reflected (Jowett 1944 [1892]), looms behind much of Artaud's 
writing, and provides the platform from which he appreciates Balinese 
performance. But Artaud's vision of essential life forms was far darker, more 
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"cruel," than his classical predecessor's-far closer, in some ways, to a Tantric 
adept's worship of Hindu Shakti. Beyond his inverted neo-Platonic "forms," 
Artaud sensed a world of essential "force" that it was the actor's job to 
embody-always trying to move closer to that embodiment and always doomed to 
relative failure. "The actor does not make the same gesture twice, but he makes 
gestures, he moves; and although he brutalizes forms, nevertheless behind them 
and through their destruction he rejoins that which outlives forms and produces 
their continuation...that fragile, fluctuating center which forms never reach" (19). 
Artaud sought a "pure theatrical language" which does without words, a language 
of signs, gestures, and attitudes having an ideographic value" (192). In Balinese 
performance, Artaud thought he had found all of this, and an exemplary set of 
conventionalized gestures which, "in addition to an acute sense of physical 
beauty...always have as their final goal the elucidation of a spiritual state or 
problem" (61). 
Working from this neo-Platonic frame of reference, and having available to 
him only a pastiche of dances and "scenes" from Balinese theatre presented to a 
predominantly Western audience (Pronko 1967:24-26), Artaud naturally drew 
many false conclusions about the specifics of Balinese theatre. In rebellion 
against the primacy of the playwright in Western theatre as he knew it, and only 
being able to view samples of Balinese theatre that emphasized dance, he 
assumed that all theatre in Bali was essentially non-verbal. Looking for "animated 
heiroglyphs", he over-estimated the abstract qualities of Balinese theatre and saw 
"mysterious signs which correspond to some unknown, fabulous, and obscure 
reality" (1958 [1938]:111) where a Balinese audience would see, for example, a 
warrior looking about him or a king commanding his ministers by means of the 
familiar conventions of a popular theatre witnessed, mutatis mutandis, since 
childhood. Not having any way of knowing the signals that can pass between 
dancer and drummer, he believed Balinese theatre to be devoid of improvisation 
or individual initiative-even more immersed in ritualistic tradition than it is. Not 
realizing the strengths and paradoxical freedoms that can be the legacy of 
traditional form, Artaud assumed that theatre in Bali was a director's medium. 
In spite of all the understandable errors in interpreting Balinese performance, 
Artaud's articulation of the principles of Balinese theatre remains an eloquent 
testimony to its beauty and inspirational appeal. He was essentially correct in his 
perception that the Balinese dancer aimed at the "elucidation" of a "spiritual 
state." The impulse toward archetype and the intensity of signification that 
Artaud grasped is surely part of the Balinese aesthetic; but it is a part that is 
counterbalanced by the inclusion of more mundane frames of reference, 
frequently resulting in humor as these epistemologies clash. It is a shame that 
Artaud-who loved the Marx Brothers, but whose own theatrical works and 
projects tended to suffer from an overbearing portentousness-never had the 
opportunity to observe a topeng pajegan performance. The dancing principals 
do, indeed, seem immense and universally significant in their depiction of 
essentialized states sanctioned by the Balinese cosmos; but that sense of size and 
significance is rendered accessible and meaningful to the Balinese by the 
presence of the immediate, specific, parlous, and humorous story-tellers and antic 
clowns that contextualize their appearances. As a tormented alien within his own 
culture as well as a stranger to Balinese performance, Artaud was doomed to 
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miss the dynamic interplay between the mundane and the metaphysical which 
characterizes Balinese life in general and Balinese topeng in particular. It is 
precisely this interplay in topeng that facilitates in Bali what Artaud was to 
describe as "the true purpose of theatre; i.e., to create myths, to express life in its 
immense, universal aspect, and from that life to extract images in which we find 
pleasure in discovering ourselves" (192). 
Artaud's view of Balinese theatre was a Romantic one. Though he admired 
the cosmic reach of Balinese performance-its seeming access to absolute values, 
absolutely stated-he felt his own audience to be cut off from all that was serious 
and enduring in human experience. His theatrical inclinations were to shock and 
startle his audience out of feelings of complacency. Hence, he sought a theatre of 
"cruelty." He envisioned theatre as an instrument for the radical restructuring of 
perception and action: "the sky can still fall on our heads and it is the first job of 
the theatre to teach us that (79)." Artaud exemplifies (though certainly he did not 
originate) the tendency of the modern avante-garde to take the familiar and to 
aggressively estrange or "alienate" it in order to force a reconsideration of what, 
perhaps, has been assumed or gone unnoticed: 
The identifying signature ofavant-garde art, all the way back to 
Bakunin and the anarchist journal L'Avant Garde in 1878, has been 
an unremitting hostility to contemporary civilization. And its most 
obvious aspect has been negative: the rejection ofsocial organization 
and artistic conventions, aesthetic values and materialistic ideals, the 
bourgeoisie, syntactical stlUcture, and logic (Innes 1981:9). 
Artaud sought to shatter the metaphysical smugness of positivism and 
distrusted political mechanisms. For other avant-garde artists, though­
particularly those of the political left-the focus of rebellion has been the system 
of power and prestige enshrined by capitalism. Brecht stated the strategy 
succinctly: "If we play works dealing with our own time as though they were 
historical, then perhaps the circumstances under which [the spectator] himself 
acts will strike him as equally odd; and this is where the critical attitude begins" 
(1964:44). In Peter Weiss's MaratlSade-a play influenced by both Artaud and 
Brecht-the character Marat sums up the avant-garde enterprise in its most 
positive terms with a statement that director Peter Brook had repeated several 
times at the end of his production: "The important thing is to pull ourselves up by 
our own hair, to turn yourself inside out and see the whole world with fresh eyes" 
(Weiss, 1966: 27). 
When employed by a daring performer, the conventions of topeng may also 
function to encourage a "critical attitude." The significance of the quasi-historical 
events depicted may be turned about, inverted, and refracted prismatically by the 
succession of masked characters, each with a different vantage point, a different 
relationship to "history," and his or her own limited epistemology. This is the 
sense in which Boon can call topeng "subversive," and this capacity to refocus 
vision and thought is a substantial indicator of topeng's aesthetic and social 
vitality. To perform their many functions, considerable license is granted to 
masked performers; but this charge carries its dangers as well. Stories are told of 
performers executed by the Dutch and Japanese for their satiric remarks, and of 
Balinese performers killed during the bloody civil war of 1965 in retribution for 
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comments made while performing (Young 1980). Despite this subversive
 
potential, though, the strategies of topeng are essentially the inverse of those of
 
the modernist avant-garde. As Boon notes in reference to Kakul's performance,
 
"all the worlds of topeng are made outside to each other....The tone is less
 
interestedly satiric than disinterestedly parodic" (1984: 164).
 
There is a great deal at stake in this "disinterested" play. Kakul takes elements 
of knowledge and experience that are initially "strange" to each other and weaves 
them into the woof and warp of "normal" experience. Within each unit of the 
performance text that emerges, the movement is toward the quotidian and 
human, toward balance, and toward the containment of disparate forces. Each 
. new unit begins with a new challenge to this capacity to balance and contain-be it 
within the domain of the drama or at the more important interfacing of everyday 
life with the enduring spiritual forces of the Balinese macrocosmos. In each new 
unit of action, and within each of the domains as they become appropriate 
"homes" for aesthetic and social action, the capacity to embrace disparate 
elements within the expanding circle of performance is triumphantly 
demonstrated. The Balinese seem to delight in a kind of spiritual athleticism; the 
more dangerous the force and the more otherworldly the form, the more 
satisfying, therefore, the momentary containment, and the more exhilarating the 
performance. This attitude is significantly different from the impetus for social 
revolution or for psychological (or metaphysical) revelation that is 
characteristically a part of the enterprise of modernism, in which the work of art 
is posited as romantically antagonistic to life as it is usually lived and perceived in 
the "real" world. 
Richard Wallis has traced a Balinese arja performance through its oscillations 
between the abstract and the familiar-the "traditional" and the "rationalized" in 
Geertz's religious and social terms (Wallis 1979, Geertz 1973:170-189). Many of 
the same strategies evident in Kakul's solo performance may be recognized in his 
description of an arja performance of a Mahabharata story involving several 
actors, singers, and dancers: 
Text-based feudal vignettes alternate with the details ofordinary, 
contemporary existence to produce a kind oftelescoping effect. In one 
scene, epic characters may sing in literary languages and posture in 
highly stylized monumentalposes, while at the same time their 
surrounding attendants busily create down-to-earth Balinese 
experiences among themselves. The audience can look from one 
group ofcharacters to the other, adjusting the lens through which it 
views the respective time and geographic frames (Wallis 1979:42). 
Wallis stresses the capacity of traditional Balinese theatrical forms to 
incorporate, play with, and effectively neutralize threatening aspects of 
modernization through this theatrical juggling of traditional and emergent world 
views. He further surmises that, just as family planning projects, schemes for 
national development, a war of suspect morality, and the tastes of tourists may be 
fastened upon today as the subject of a joke or a lecture by a 14th century king's 
irreverent attendant, the arrival of Portuguese and Dutch traders a few hundred 
years ago and, long before that, the coming of priests, traders, and ideas from 
South Asia may have similarly provided fodder for Balinese performances-cross­
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referencing and re-contextualizing the old and the new. Such performances help 
Balinese audiences to clarify and manage their frequently conflicting and 
constantly shifting spheres of social and religious action-each with its own 
demands and-sometimes literally-its own language. The theatrical strategy is 
similar to religious Tantrism in its inclusiveness, and, like the ritual use of Rangda 
and the Barong Ket associated with Tantric traditions (and the final appearance 
of Sidha Karya in a topeng pajegan performance), this strategy aims at the 
containment and inclusion of threatening elements (Emigh 1983). 
By playing with emergent world-views in the context of traditional forms, the 
strategy allows for change as well as conservation. Kathy Foley has discussed the 
conservative potential of this process as exemplified in the wayang cepak puppet 
theatre of Cirebon, Java: "As the historical past pulls backward toward the 
mythical so the dalang [puppeteer] composes his story to pull his audience 
members back into the vortex of history so the present can become a reflection of 
the past" (1986:43). While this capacity to manifest, contain, and celebrate a 
storied past in a liminal present is certainly not unique to Bali, the prominence of 
this conservative strain within Balinese theatre and rhetoric has led some 
observers to postulate that the Balinese conceive of themselves as living in a 
"steady state" (Bateson 1970:384-402, Geertz 1973:334,391). Yet, as Foley's own 
work with the clowns of Sudanese rod puppet theatre (1984) implies, the 
relationship of Indonesian traditional performance to the historical and mythical 
events at the dramatic core can be far more complex. Far from demonstrating a 
"steady.state," Kakul's topeng pajegan performance expends much of its energy 
measuring and remeasuring the distance between the past and present, looked at 
from different vantage points. If I read it correctly, his performance redeploys 
and inverts conservative strategies evident, for example, in New Guinean rituals 
and in traditional performances elsewhere in Indonesia and in Bali itself (Emigh 
1981). His topeng affirms the appeal and validity of opposing world views drawn 
from the past and the present, while demonstrating the performer's exemplary 
capacity to negotiate among them by means of his inspired play. 
The utopia suggested by Kakul's performance is one of a complex set of 
balanced oppositions rather than the denial of new impulses or the supplanting of 
an old order by a newer one (or the showing up of all orders as false) that is 
typically advocated by modernist works. Of course, this utopian attempt at 
maintaining balance can fail-just as revolutions may break down or create 
hierarchies more debilitating than those displaced. Such a failure happened, 
tragically, in 1965, when tens of thousands of Balinese were killed in civil warfare 
following an unsuccessful revolutionary coup from the left (and the unexpected 
eruption of Bali's sacred volcano after an attempt to hurry the ritual calendar for 
political ends). Competing modernist and traditional visions of utopia became 
irreconcilable, and both were doomed to failure. 
The metaphoric concern with balance is paralleled and exemplified by the 
prominent role assigned to the act of balancing within topeng dance itself. Time 
and again in those dances that celebrate the enduring presence of the past in the 
context of the present, a performer will swirl full around, abruptly come to a stop 
with one knee raised, and then hold this balanced posture for two beats (or ten, 
or eighteen). The gamelan players stop the melody momentarily as the dancer 
comes into this arrested pose, contributing to the sense of synesthesia, and 
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accentuating the dancer's balancing feat. It is common in Balinese discourse to 
express a dislike for beingpaling-of losing one's balance, or becoming dizzy, or 
losing track of direction. It is also common to express fear of experiencing lek-or, 
as Geertz interprets the term, acquiring "stage fright" within social gatherings 
(1973:401-403). The sudden turns and balances of the accomplished topeng 
performer (like the movements into and out of trance of the accomplished 
Rangda performer) may be seen as virtuosic displays of superiority over forces 
that act to knock one off balance, create a bewildering loss of direction or make 
one dizzy-paling. The performer's virtuosic mastery of masks that essentialize a 
vast array of social roles and his spirited play with the linguistic conventions 
appropriate to these roles similarly evoke a triumph over the forces that act to 
make one lek. In the microcosm of dance, as in the macrocosms of entire 
performances, and the larger macrocosms that surround performances, the aim is 
balance and containment. 
Balinese topeng, then, is radically different in its essential aims and strategies 
from the avant-garde movements of modernism. In its non-linear, de-centered 
approach to narrative and dramatic structure, however, it at least appears to have 
more in common with post-modern theory and practice in Western theatre. I 
have already noted the similarity of Kakul's inchoate "script" to Roland Barthes' 
post-modern concept of Text. Barthes also set down a rallying cry for post­
modernism: "Let difference surreptitiously replace conflict" (1975: 15). The 
conflict between Patih Jelantik and Dalem Blambangan is not of paramount 
importance to Kakul's performance (though it provides a logical sequence for the 
masks and its conclusion must be told, however briefly). What is of paramount 
importance is the richness of playas the various masks enter into the contexts 
created by this conflict and/or demanded by the conventions of topeng. It is 
precisely the "difference" of the various masks and the various moments of 
performance that matters. What is so particularly appealing about topeng, and 
what seems so strikingly post-modern about it, is the dynamic movement into and 
out of the theatrical world reconstituted in each performance, and the playing 
back and forth between past and present, ancestral language and Balinese 
vernacular, visitation and illusion, character and performer, high caste and low 
caste, female and male, epiphany and parody, the metaphysical and the social, 
the fantastic and the mundane. 
Elinor Fuchs has summarized the advent of a post-modern aesthetic in the 
West: "A radical relativizing has occurred that permits theatre artists and their 
audiences to regard all reality as a bottomless series of illusions in which a central 
point of view-whether of character, actor, or author-has proved to be the chief 
illusion. In this 'dizzying regress' the stage is emptied of what we used to think of 
as reality" (1984a:12). Many post-modernist works take as their "central premise" 
"that the shifting illusions of performance constitute the only reality, and that 
'character' and the human nature it depicts are mere constellations of 
performance attitudes (Fuchs 1984b, unpublished ms). As Boon points out in a 
recent essay, Balinese culture itself has something of this feel: 
Like a thousand 'Popish'parodies, Balinese institutions, rituals, 
dramatic arts, and scribal traditions allude to each other in a 
perpetual reflexivity... Everywhere in Balinese ideals andpractice we 
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must look beyond any allegorical Machinery to the dialectical 
field...from which it emerges... Moreover, in its institutions and 
peiformances, Balinese culture...produces the means ofexposing all of 
its allegorical Machineries, not as disguises (for there is nothing True 
underneath) but as masks. Indeed, everything is masks all the way 
down, and their symbolics never run out (1986:244,258).12 
One of the problems of post-modern theory has been a paucity of positive 
historical examples of deliberately "de-centered" works. The Derridean 
"deconstruction of works intended to be formed around a center of reassuring 
certitude, which is itself beyond the reach of play" (1978:284) has proved useful in 
showing up the often illusory status of the center itself; but modern works that 
deliberately mirror a de-centered world tend to do so with the sense of loss and 
nostalgia evident in the opening lines of Yeats's "Second Coming," written in 
1921: 
Turning and turning in the widening gyre 
The falcon cannot hear the falconer; 
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; 
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world... 
(1956:184-185). 
Even Lacan, who revealed the subjective III" to be a constructed persona 
based on the love of a reflected image, found this theory to be problematical in 
psychiatric practice. It left no whole intact to contain the deconstructed parts. 
Psychiatrist J.D. Reynaud discusses the fragmentation of "personal functions ll in 
modern (or post-modern society): "The industrialized society is a society of 
multiple memberships and belongings and, consequently, one in which personal 
functions differentiate themselves. Each individual occupies various positions, 
belong to different hierarchies or different contexts, and playing as many roles...in 
other words, the unity of the persona becomes a problem" (1983:213-224, 
unpublished trans. by Mark Siegel). When Derrida calls for positive examples of 
a de-centered world he must read Artaud's call for "a kind of organized anarchi' 
out of context (neglecting Artaud's inverted neo-platonism) or lapse into 
Nietzchean rhetoric, calling for "the affirmation of a world of signs without fault, 
without truth, and without origin which is offered to an active interpretation" 
(1978:292). 
This dilemma is not unique to the West. Claude Levi Strauss recently 
summarized the findings of a seminar on identity: "In spite of their distance in 
space and their profoundly heterogeneous cultural contents, none of the societies 
constituting a fortuitous sample seem to take for granted a substantial identity: 
they break it up into a multitude of elements for which, though in different terms 
for each culture, the synthesis is a problem" (1983:10-11, unpublished trans. by 
Mark Siegel). Forging a path and an identity among competing functions, 
hierarchies and contexts-finding a synthesis-can be a problem for the Balinese 
as well; it certainly is for Jelantik, and for many of the other masks in Kakul's 
performance. Still, the Balinese seem to view the issues in less tragic terms. Putu 
Wijaya, a Balinese himself and a noted Indonesian novelist and playwright, has, in 
discussing his own characters, described their need to be "acrobats of the every 
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day" in order to survive (quoted in Zarrilli 1987:155). Kakul's topeng 
performance provides a modest example of a de-centered text existing joyously, 
playfully, and boisterously within a larger cultural field that itself delights in the 
reciprocal counterbalancing of its many "machineries." Unlike Derrida's 
envisioned "world of signs," though, the masks of topeng are not "without fault, 
truth, or origin." They essentialize faults and truths (some of these truths in direct 
opposition to each other, and some of these lIfaults" divinely empowered). They 
allude to a multiplicity of "origins" through the rituals and rhetoric of visitation, 
through layering of historical references, and through the use of highly 
conventional traditional codes. The multiplicity of the "origins" deployed and 
alluded to in the gestural and spoken language of a topeng performance may 
itself be a de-centering device, yet the frequent allusions to a "macrocosmic" 
world dominated by divinities and ancestors protects topeng from the infinite 
regress into the self that marks so many post-mOdern works and which has led 
some critics with modernist tastes to dismiss the entire movement as retried 
solipcism (e.g. Shattuck 1985). 
In Kakul's performance, he asserts that both the macrocosmos [buwana 
agung] and the microcosmos [buwana alit] made in its image "find expression in 
the body of every man." Thus, the hero lelantik proclaims-twice-"I shall become 
the defender of the macrocosmos and the microcosmos, the spiritual order and 
the physical order, an order that finds expression in my own body" (42,39). Within 
the dramatic domain, lelantik successfully defends the order of his quasi­
historical world from the demonic King of Blambangan; but his ordered world is 
more successfully challenged by the existence of Si Mata Mata and other masks 
that bear witness to alternate espistemologies and force a widening of 
perspectives on both macrocosmos and microcosmos. In performance, all these 
views of macrocosmos and microcosmos must find their "expression" in the 
topeng dancer himself. The end result of all of the ritual preparations, kinesthetic 
training, familiarization with masks and types, virtuosic displays of dance, 
sounding of archaic and vernacular languages, reflexive play among characters, 
meta-commentary about the performance, jokes about the audience, and 
offerings for the village's health and happiness that make up a topeng pajegan 
performance is an exemplary human act. The dancer shows himself able to 
embody a range of attributes representative of the entire knowable world and to 
negotiate its possibilities with strength, grace, and humor. 
The techniques that the topeng performer uses to represent his various 
characters-to wear his various masks-are essentially those of the character actor 
and, as such, are not unique to Balinese acting. Long before Lacan or Kohut 
questioned the integrity of the constructed self, the actor's uncanny play with 
identity was seen in the West as a profoundly disturbing indication of the 
instability of character-an ontologically subversive activity-as well as a testament 
to human creativity (Worthen 1984). As Bruce Wilshire has pointed out in Role 
Playing and Identity: The Limits of Theatre as Metaphor, the actor "thematizesll the 
struggles to find a self, "project[ing] his mimetic skill and susceptibility into 
possible modes of being human conjured up through his kinesthetic imaginationll 
(1982:232-234). Freud described the process of this "conjuring" of possible selves 
in a letter written in 1931 to an actress bewildered by her inability to keep a safe 
psychological distance between "her own person" and the "sleazy charactersll she 
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represented on stage: "[It is] not that the actor's own person is eliminated [in 
acting] but, rather, that elements of it-for instance, undeveloped dispositions and 
suppressed wishes-are used for the representations of intended characters and 
these are allowed exposure" (quoted in Shattuck 1985:147). Sam Shepard, 
discussing his methods as a playwright, in effect amends and amplifies Freud's 
statement: lilt isn't a question of having to write about ourselves, but of contacting 
in ourselves the elements-forces and tendencies-that are characters. The voices 
of a lot of external-world characters are inside you" (quoted in Shewey 1985:122). 
The Balinese actor both uses and transcends this amplitude of "the actor's 
own person" in order to give "representations of intended characters" their life in 
the theatrical moment. Working within the flexible limits of tradition, hoping for 
inspiration from his "taksu," the performer must still tap within himself the 
"undeveloped dispositions" that will allow him to embody the potential life of 
each mask. In wearing his many masks, turn and turn about, the topeng pajegan 
performer becomes a living lexicon of a typology of characters that represent the 
range of epistemologies within Balinese society and its encompassing cosmos; the 
effect is to celebrate the variety, difference, and wholeness of a complex and 
ultimately sacred world as it finds expression within his own body. The artist's 
integrity resides in the fullness and clarity of his "exposure" of these different 
"dispositions," these "possible modes of being"-humorous and heroic, demonic 
and godlike, fantastic and mundane. His virtue is in his living proof that these 
differing potentialities exist within each individual human being-that man or 
woman is not only "created in the image of god," but contains within him or her all 
that is divine. In doing this, he embodies the Sanskrit maxim, tat tvam astu-IThou 
art That." 
For most post-modern artists, "That" is suspect. Without a larger field of 
reference, the isolated artist, not the cosmos, becomes the dominant paradigm 
and the reflexive techniques shared with Balinese topeng lead instead to a 
narcissistic fascination with a dubious self. This is not without interest, either as a 
model of human behavior or as activity which we might observe and with which 
we may empathize-as Beckett has reminded us, "It's human; a lobster couldn't do 
it."-but it does create a far different affective field for the domains of 
performance. Caught between mourning a great breaking apart and fooling 
around with all the leftover pieces, the play of post-modern theatre often turns 
agonized-conflicted-infected with the (modernist) self-torture of Artaud's noble, 
but ineffectual, "victims burnt at the stake." Worse, it (sometimes too often) 
becomes frivolous-play without significance or joy. 
Notes 
1.	 I am grateful to the University of Hawai'i for asking me to speak, and, 
especially, to Robert Van Niel, Flo Lamoureux, Judy Ann Van Zile, Truong 
Buu Lam, Roger Long, John and Lauren Marks, James Brandon, Elizabeth 
Wichmann and David Harnish for their hospitality there. Many people have 
contributed to the thinking in this version of my remarks; besides the debts 
noted these pages, I would like to especially thank I Nyoman Wenten, Kathy 
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Foley, Herbert Blau, Hildred Geertz, Mark Siegel, Mick Diener, and Steven 
Lewis for their comments and Ulrike Emigh for her editorial suggestions. 
2.	 Schechner himself takes this approach in giving a history of his own 
production of The Tooth ofCrime, beginning with an account of the 
interactions between himself and the playwright, Sam Shepard (1988 
[1977,1973]:973-84). It should also be noted that in his most recent revision 
(1988) Schechner has drawn his circles with far less sense of regularity and 
clear definition of territory. 
3.	 Claude Levi-Strauss has commented at length on the multiplicity, malleability, 
and ambiguity of mythological "meaning": "There is no real end to 
methodological analysis, no hidden unity to be grasped once the breaking 
down process has been completed. Themes can be split up ad infinitum. Just 
when you think you have disentangled and separated them, you realize they 
are knitting together again in response to the operation of unexpected 
affinities....The unity of the myth is...a phenomenon of the imagination" 
(1969:5-6). 
4.	 See Emigh (1979:22-24). For more on the various literary languages used in 
Balinese performance, see Wallis (1980) and Zurbuchen (1987). 
5.	 The term "pseudo-work" is intended to be consistent with Barthes's 
distinctions between work and Text. Of course, the "texts" that Barthes has in 
mind are themselves written, and the transcribed and translated words of 
Kakul's performance remain "text-like"; but publishing this "performance 
text" at least threatens to convert it into something that might be treated as a 
"work"-separating it from its "field," holding it apart from its "production," 
and threatening to rob it of "jouissance." 
6.	 The notion of "transparency" is suggested by Susanne Langer (1953:60). 
7.	 An odalan is a temple festival held every 210 days, at which the gods and 
ancestors are invited down to be honored and entertained. Each temple has 
its own 210 day cycle. Since there are several thousand temples on the island, 
this created the need for a very active performance schedule. (See Dibia 1986, 
Belo 1966 [1953].) 
8.	 Bandem and DeBoer (1983) use the terms kaja and kelo to provide a system 
of categorizing Balinese dance forms, according to their literal and 
metaphorical place along this sacred/secular axis. 
9.	 The use of a cosmological domain in constituting a dramatic and theatrical 
world has also been noted in Greek and Elizabethan practice (Kitto 1960 
[1956]:231-245, Tillyard 1943). 
10.	 Hildred Geertz offers her example as an anomaly; it is anomalous precisely 
because the world is not rendered whole and the audience's angry 
intervention is solicited instead of the celebration of a blessing upon the 
assembled villagers. The more typical movement toward completion by an 
incorporation of the comic is not unique to Balinese theatre, of course. 
Shakespeare's subplots (and the presence of Falstaff) fulfilled the same 
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function, and so did Greek satyr plays appended to tragic trilogies and
 
Japanese kyogen comedies interspersed among noh dramas.
 
11. Elizabeth Young (1982) has transcribed and translated another topeng 
pajegan, The Tale ofErlangga, as performed by an unnamed artist in 
Sukawati. The script she offers is far more exigetical, and the anonymous 
artist uses the potentialities within topeng pajegan structure in a far less 
complex and imaginative way than Kakul has. Too often, in studying non­
Western performance forms, we act as though the culture generates the script 
and overk>ak the contributions of individual genius. The culture may provide 
the banks of the river; the individual artist is accountable for the force and 
flow of the current. 
12. Boon's metaphor is reminiscent of (and probably based upon) an account 
given by Geertz of an explanation of the Hindu cosmology: "There is an 
Indian story...about an Englishman who, having been told that the world 
rested on a platform which rested on the back of an elephant which rested in 
turn on the back of a turtle, askedmwhat did the turtle rest on? Another 




1958 The Theatre and Its Double. Mary Caroline Richards, trans. New York: 
Grove Press [1st French ed. 1938] 
Bandem, I Made and DeBoer, Fredrik Eugene 
1981 From Kaja to Kelod: Balinese Dance in Transition. Kuala Lumpur: 
Oxford University Press 
Banden, I Made and I Nyoman Rembang 
1976 Pertubangan Topeng-Bali Sebagai Seni Pertunjukan. Denpasar: Proyek 
Penggalian, Penbinaan, Pengembangan Seni KlasiklTradisionil dan 
Kesenian Barn 
Barthes, Roland 
1975 The Pleasure ofthe Text. Richard Miller, trans. New York: Hill and 
Wang 
1977 Image, Music, Text. S. Heath, trans. New York: Hill and Wang 
Bateson, Gregory 
1970 [1963] "Bali: The Value System of a Steady State." In Traditional 
Balinese Culture. Jane Belo, ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 
384-402 
1972 Steps to an Ecology ofthe Mind. New York: Ballantine Books 
Becker, Alton L. 
1979 "Text-building, Epistemology, and Aesthetics in Javanese Shadow 
Theatre." In The Imagination ofReality: Essays in Southeast Asian 
Coherence Systems. A. Yengoyan and A.L. Becker, eds. Norwood, NJ: 
Ablex Publishing Company 
November 1989 SoutheastAsia Papers 91 
The Domains of Topeng Emigh 
Belo, Jane 
1966 [1953] Bali: Temple Festival. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
Monographs of the American Ethnological Society, Vol. 27 
Blau, Herbert 
1982 Blooded Thought: Occasions ofthe Theatre. New York: Performing Arts 
Journal Publications 
Boon, James A. 
1984 "Folly, Bali and Anthropology, or Satire across Cultures." In Text, Play, 
and Story. Proceedings of the American Ethnological Society 
1986 "Symbols, Sylphs, and Siwa: Allegorical Machineries in the Text of 
Balinese Culture." In The Anthropology ofExperience, Victor W. Turner 
and Edward M. Bruner, eds. Urbana and Chicago: University of lllinois 
Press, 239-260 
Burke, Kenneth 
1962 [1945, 1950] A Grammar ofMotives and A Rhetoric ofMotives. 
Cleveland: World Publishing Company 
Byrski, Christopher 
1981 "Sanskrit Drama As an Aggregate of Model Situations." In Sanskrit 
Drama Performance, Rachel Van M. Baumer and James R. Brandon, eds. 
Honolulu: The University Press of Hawai'i 
DeBoer, Fredrik E. 
1987 "Functions of the Comic Attendants (Panasar) in a Balinese Shadow 
Play." In Humor and Comedy in Puppetry: Celebration in Popular Culture, 
Joel and Dina Sherzer, eds. Bolingrew, Ohio: Popular Press, 79-105 
Derrida, Jaques 
1978 Writing and Difference. Alan Bass, trans. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press 
DeZoete, Beryl and Spies, Walter 
1973 [1938] Dance and Drama in Bali. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University 
Press 
Dibia, I Wayan 
1985 "Odalan of Hindu Bali: A Religious Festival, a Social Occasion, and a 
Theatrical Event." Asian Theatre Journal 2:1, 61-66 
Dunn, Deborah 
1983 Topeng Pajegan: The Mask Dance ofBali. PhD dissertation. Union 
Graduate School 
Emigh, John 
1979 "Playing with the Past: Visitation and Illusion in the Mask Theatre of 
BalL" The Drama Review 23:2,11-48 
1981 "Masking and Playing: Observations on Masked Performance in New 
Guinea." The World ofMusic 3:5-25 
1984 "Dealing with the Demonic: Strategies for Containment in Hindu 
Iconography and Performance." Asian Theatre Journal 1:1 
92 Southeast Asia Papers Number 32 
Emigh The Domains ofTopeng 
Foley, Kathy 
1984 "The Clown in the Sundanese Wayang Golek: Democratization of a 
Feudal Ethos." Scenarium 9:88-101 
1986 "At the Graves of the Ancestors: Chronicle Plays in the Wayang Cepak 
Puppet Theatre of Cirebon, Indonesia." In Themes in Drama 8, Historical 
Drama, 1. Redmond, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Fuchs, Elinor 
1983 "Signs of Signs: The Death of Character and the Autopresentational 
Stage," Theatre Communications 5:3 
1985 "Presence and the Revenge of Writing," Peifonning Arts Journal, 26/27 
Geertz, Clifford 
1973 The Interpretation ofCultures. New York: Basic Books 
1980 "Blurred Genres: The Refiguration of American Thought," American 
Scholar, Spring:165-179 
Geertz, Hildred 
1988 "A Theatre of Cruelty: The Contexts of a Topeng Performance." 
Unpublished paper presented at Wesleyan University, March, 1988. To 
appear in State and Society in Bali: Historical, Textual and Anthropological 
Approaches. Hildred Geertz, ed. Leiden: Verhandelingen van let 
Koninklijk Institut voor Taal·, Land-, en Volkenkunde (forthcoming) 
Goodlad, J.S.R. 
1971 The Sociology ofPopular Drama. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield 
Grotowski,Jerzy 
1969 Towards a Poor Theatre. New York: Simon and Schuster 
Hornby, Richard 
1977 Script Into Peifonnance: A Sttucturalist View ofProduction. Austin, 
Texas: University of Texas Press 
Innes, Christopher 
1981 Holy Theatre: Ritual and the Avant Garde. New York: Cambridge 
University Press 
Jenkins, Ron 
1979 "On Becoming a Clown in Bali."The Drama Review 23:2,49-56 
Kakul, I Nyoman 
1979 "Jelantik Goes to Blambangan.1l The Drama Review 23:2, 37-48 
Kitto, H.D.F. 
1960 [1956] Fonn and Meaning in Drama. London and New York: University 
Paperbacks 
Langer, Susanne K. 
1953 Feeling and Fonn. New York: Charles Scribners Sons 
Levi-Strauss, Claude 
1966 [1951] The Savage Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
1969 The Raw and the Cooked. New York: Harper and Row 
1983 L'identite: Seminaire a l'ecole des Hautes-Etudes dirige par Claude Levi­
Strauss. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 
November 1989 SoutheastAsia Papers 93 
The Domains ofTopeng Emigh 
Pavis, Patrice 
1982 Languages ofthe Stage: Essays in the Semiology ofthe Theatre. New 
York: Performing Arts Journal Press 
Pronko, Leonard 
1967 Theatre East and West. Berkeley: University of California Press 
Reeder, Roberta 
1979 "An Encounter of Codes: Little Red Riding Shawl and the Balinese 
Topeng." The Drama Review 23:4,81-92 
Reynaud, J.D. 
1973 "La Personne et l'Evolution de la Societe Industrielle." In Problemes de 
la Personne, Colloque de Recherches de Psychologie Comparative sous la 
Direction d'Ignace Meyeron. Paris: Ed. Mouton & Cie., 213-224 
Savran, David 
1985 "The Wooster Group, Arthur Miller and The Crucible.t' The Drama 
Review 29:2,99-109 
Schechner, Richard 
1973 "Drama, Script, Theatre, and Performance." The Drama Review 17:3, 5­
36. Revised in Schechner 1977:33-62 and in Schechner 1988:68-105 
1977 Essays on Perfonnance Theory: 1970-76. New York: Drama Book 
Specialists 
1988 Perfonnance Theory. New York and London: Routledge, Chapman and 
Hall 
Shattuck, Roger 
1985 The Innocent Eye: On Modem Literature and the Arts. New York: 
Washington Square Press 
Shewey, Don 
1985 Sam Shepard. New York: Dell Publishing 
Snow, Stephen 
1986 "Intercultural Performance: The Balinese American Model." Asian 
Theatre Journal 3:2, 204-232 
Tillyard 
1943 The Elizabethan World Picture. London: Macmillan 
Turner, Victor 
1982 From Ritual to Theatre: The Seriousness ofHuman Play. New York: 
Performing Arts Journal Press 
Wallis, Richard 
1979 "Balinese Theatre: Coping with Old and New." In What is Modem 
Indonesian Culture: Papers Presented to the Conference on Indonesian 
Studies, July 29-August 11976. Gloria Davis, ed. Athens, Ohio: Ohio 
University Center for International Studies, Southeast Asian Series, 52:37­
45 
1980 The Voice As a Mode ofCultural Expression in Bali. PhD dissertation. 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor 
94 Southeast Asia Papers Number 32 
Emigh The Domains o[Topeng 
Weiss, Peter 
1966 The Persecution and Assassination ofJean-Paul Marat As Peifonned by 
the Inmates ofthe Asylum ofCharenton Under the Direction of The Marquis 
de Sade. English verse adaptation by Adrian Mitchell. New York: 
Atheneum 
Wilshire, Bruce 
1982 Role Playing and Identity: The Limits of Theatre as Metaphor. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press 
Worthen, William 
1984 The Idea ofthe Actor. Princeton: Princeton University Press 
Yeats, W.B. 
1956 Complete Poems and Plays. New York: Macmillan 
Young, Elizabeth 
1980 "Topeng in Bali: Change and Continuity in a Traditional Drama 
Genre." PhD dissertation. University of California, San Diego 
Young, Elizabeth, trans. 
1982 The Tale ofErlangga: ''Text Translation of a Village Drama 
Performance in BalL" (performer not named) Bijdragen tot do Taal-, 
Land-en Volkenkunde 138:4, 470-491 
Zarrilli, Philip B. 
1987 "Structure and Subjunctivity: Putu Wijaya's Theatre of Surprise." The 
Drama Review 31:3, 126-159 
Zurbuchen, Mary 
1987 The Language ofBalinese Shadow Theatre. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 
November 1989 Southeast Asia Papers 95 
The Annex orthe Raj:
 





One of the most striking features of the history of Burma in the post-World War 
II era has been the extent to which its leaders have sought to isolate the new 
nation from the rest of the world. While nationalist leaders in most of Britain's 
Asian empire buffered the transition from colonial to independent status through 
membership in the British Commonwealth, the Burmese brusquely rejected the 
British offer to join the Commonwealth, despite the considerable economic, 
military and political advantages that membership provided. The leaders of the 
AFPFL, who struggled to assert the new state's control over rebellious minorities 
and political factions in the decade after independence were, relative to the 
military regime that followed, open to international exchanges and aid and 
continuing foreign investment, including that by Indian businessmen who 
continued to playa major role in the economy.l But under the Ne Win regime, 
which, following a stint as a tlcaretaker'l government, seized power from U Nu and 
the civilian politicians in 1962, Burma steadily reduced its outside contacts and 
commitments and closed in on itself. 
From non-alignment and neutrality, then fashionable among Third World 
leaders, the Burmese moved to outright isolation. A once-booming export 
economy was reduced to a shadow of its former self. As state planners intended, 
foreign investment dried up in the harsh climate generated by military 
dictatorship and the Burmese determination to forge their own path to socialism.2 
Cultural exchanges with other nations dwindled. Scholarly research by foreigners 
was confined to a handful of specialists who maintained personal contacts with 
the military leaders or whose work was in fields like archaeology and the early 
periods of Burmese history that were regarded remote enough from current 
realities to be innocuous. Few places in Burma were accessible even to the most 
stalwart of tourists. Cities like Rangoon, where visitors were allowed, served as 
the pretext for numerous journalists to launch into rather predictable accounts of 
the lack of even the most minimal tlmodern fl facilities in isolated Burma and to 
chronicle the steady deterioration of the famous haunts and imperial monuments 
of the late-lamented Raj. 
Though many Third World nations in the post-colonial era have displayed an 
understandable wariness with regard to contacts with the superpowers as well as 
their former colonial rulers, none has surpassed Burma in its determined retreat 
into isolation. Explanations for this response have varied, but two basic 
suppositions inform much of the speculation on this point. Burma's retreat from 
the world, it is argued, is quite consistent with its longstanding tradition of 
xenophobia and mirrors attempts by earlier rulers to shut their kingdom off from 
the world. The pronounced expansionist tendencies of Burmese dynasties, their 
extensive contacts with both neighboring rulers and those more distant like 
China, as well as Burma's receptivity to outside cultural influences and its active 
participation since early times in the Indian Ocean trading network, all render the 
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xenophobic interpretation highly questionable. This is especially true when 
Burma is compared to China or Japan, which were much more cut off from 
outside influences for longer periods of time than Burma and yet have been 
major forces in the international struggles of the postwar world. As Victor 
Lieberman has shown, from the sixteenth century the contacts of various burmese 
peoples with the merchants and adventurers of the expansive European powers 
were extensive and influential in shaping the history of the region as a whole.3 
In addition to xenophobia, Burma's determined retreat into isolation is 
blamed on the "traumatic" effects of colonization on the Burmese people. Thus, 
the hostility of the Burmese to outsiders and foreign influences is linked to 
political and social turmoil brought on by the collapse of the Burmese export­
oriented economy in the Great Depression and the gradual but perhaps more 
unsettling decline of Burmese culture as exemplified by decay within the Buddhist 
Sangha.4 Once again, however, if Burma's colonial experience is viewed in a 
comparative context, the explanation offered for its retreat from the world is 
problematic. British colonial rule in Burma was a good deal milder and less 
exploitative than French colonization in Algeria or Vietnam, the early decades of 
Belgian control in the Congo, or British conquest and settlement in areas like 
Kenya and Rhodesia. Yet none of the nations that emerged from these other 
colonial contexts has closed in on itself to the extent that Burma has. In fact, 
Algeria, Kenya and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), which suffered the shocks of both 
imperial domination and occupation by European settlers, have been among the 
most engaged of post-colonial societies in international and regional affairs and 
exchanges. 
Despite the fact that colonialism was considerably more benign in Burma than 
in many other areas, an examination of the experience of the Burmese peoples 
under British rule reveals an added dimension of colonization that goes a long 
way to explaining their determination to close themselves off from the world in 
the post-colonial era. Like Kenya and Rhodesia, Burma was twice colonized. But 
unlike them, the second wave was not tens of thousands of European farmers but 
rather well over a million Indians from officials and policemen, to merchants and 
factory and farm laborers. This second colonization was in many ways the more 
traumatic and threatening. The Indians not only migrated, and in many cases 
settled, in unprecedented numbers, but they came to dominate many sectors of 
the colonial economy and administration. Burma's formal annexation to Britain's 
Indian empire across the Bay of Bengal initiated an era of foreign domination in 
which the interests of the Province were consistently subordinated to those of the 
larger empire. Even Burma's nationalist movement developed in the shadow of 
its earlier and much larger counterpart in India, and Burmese nationalist leaders 
soon concluded that their struggle involved the expulsion not only of the British 
but, even more critically, the colonizers' Indian allies and camp followers. At the 
peak of the Indian influx in the early 1920s, there were over a million Indians 
resident in the Province as a whole and these made up over ten percent of the 
population in some areas. It is not surprising then that many Burmese leaders 
feared that their small and historically under-populated land would be 
overwhelmed by migrants from their giant and over-populated neighbor to the 
west. Though the xenophobia of certain Burmese leaders and parties can not 
entirely be dismissed as a factor. Burma's double colonization and the very 
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formidable threat to the Burmese people and culture posed by decades of 
virtually unrestricted migration and Indian sub-imperialism can be seen as one of 
the prime causes of Burma's postwar retreat into isolation. 
Though angry British merchants, clamoring for free access to the markets and 
resources of Burma and myopic, even arrogant, Burmese monarchs did much to 
bring on the conflicts that led to the piecemeal conquest of Burma between 1826 
and 1888,5 all prompted British officials in India to view the region as yet another 
turbulent frontier that must be pacified, if necessary at the cost of annexation. 
The threat of attack or the spread of social unrest from regions ruled by Indian 
princes that bordered on areas to which British control had brought "peace and 
good government" had been a key justification for British expansion within the 
Indian subcontinent from the middle decades of the eighteenth century. By the 
first decades of the nineteenth century, Burma had become, in the mind of 
English East India Company officials, one of these turbulent frontiers. Its step-by­
step reduction was seen as essential to peace and security in the eastern portions 
of the empire. Thus, Burma fell victim to imperialist aggression not so much 
because of calls for international free trade by British merchants, though these 
did much to bring on specific crises, but because it had the misfortune to border 
on Britain's Indian domains and appeared to fit the logic of expansion into the 
turbulent frontier. 
Even the techniques that the British had employed since the mid-eighteenth 
century with regard to truculent Indian princes were applied, with very little 
success, to Burma. Methods of informal control from flattery to gunboat 
diplomacy, which had long been preferred to costly annexations, were first 
attempted. The British sought, again with very little success, to reduce successive 
Burman monarchs to what was in effect the status of subordinate allies akin to 
those they had earlier created through varying forms of "alliances" with the 
princes of India.6 As had been the case in the expansion of the empire within the 
subcontinent, when the Kon-baung rulers understandably spurned British 
attempts to dominate them informally, the British concluded that they had no 
choice but to make war and to annex Burma outright to the Indian empire. 
But the fatal Indian connection that led to Burma's colonization went much 
deeper than the imperatives of the turbulent frontier. The merchants and sea 
captains, who became embroiled in disputes with Kon-baung officials, sailed from 
Calcutta and other Indian ports and many served the East India Company. The 
timber and other raw materials they sought were very often intended for the India 
market or for the use of the Company. Long before the first Anglo-Burman war 
in 1824-1826, British travellers and officials had viewed Burma's potential as a 
colonial possession in terms of India's needs. In 1811, for example, William 
Francklin wrote of the great potential of Burma as a source of raw materials and 
foodstuffs for India and a market outlet for both European and Indian 
manufacturers. He noted the great fertility of the Irrawaddy delta region of lower 
Burma and found that its presence offered "great consolation" in the face of the 
ever-present threat of famine in the heavily populated provinces of Bengal. To 
enhance the insurance against calamity that Burma might provide, Francklin 
urged the British to do all they could to promote the advance of agriculture in the 
region.7 Decades later, Henry Bell argued that if the fertile provinces of southern 
Burma were annexed to the Indian empire they would serve as a formidable 
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buffer to the famines that periodically ravaged the subcontinent.8 Shortly after 
the region was annexed in 1852, East India Company officials at Calcutta set to 
work on schemes to promote migration to the new territories from heavily 
populated districts in eastern and southern India.9 
The armies that conquered Burma in the three Anglo-Burman wars that were 
fought between 1824 and 1886 were made up mainly of Indian troops. Their 
commanding officers were in the pay of the East India Company in the first two 
conflicts and of the Government of India in the final clash. The Kon-baung 
domains were transformed piecemeal into an annex of the British Raj, one of 
many P·rovinces of the vast Indian empire. Though British administrators 
occupied the top posts in the colonial administration and the military and police 
forces, many upper level and most of the intermediate positions were staffed by 
civil servants and officers drawn from various parts of the Indian empire. By the 
1930s, nearly thirty percent of those engaged in public administration were 
Indian, and over forty-five percent of the security forces were made up of Indian 
recruits.10 Throughout the colonial era, internal security in Burma, particularly in 
times of crisis, as well as external defense were dependent on the Indian army.ll 
For the great majority of the Burmese, the Indian presence was magnified by the 
fact that Indian or Anglo-Indian assessors, surveyors, policemen and census 
takers were much more likely to be in daily contact with the peasants and urban 
laborers than higher ranking British officials. Thus, the second or Indian wave of 
colonization was much more apparent to the Burmese than British overlordship 
in the Province. 
The influx of Indian administrative and military personnel foreshadowed the 
reliance of the colonizers on Indian precedents in the governance of the new 
territories. The administrative organization itself was patterned after those which 
had evolved over nearly a century in India. Though the architects of the Boat and 
Gymkhana clubs indulged in decorative nourishes that were decidedly Burmese, 
the great government buildings of Rangoon-the Secretariat, Government House 
and the High Court-were patterned after the "great utilitarian pile[s] of 
Victorian brick"12 that in a motley blend of imagined gothic, Italianate and 
"Moorish" styles dominated nineteenth-century Indian urban centers from 
Bombay to Calcutta. The physical reordering of the Burmese political landscape 
was based on Indian prototypes. Like India, Burma was divided into districts with 
BritIsh District Officers at their heads. Cadastral surveys were undertaken by 
British and Indian engineers trained in Indian engineering colleges. Successive 
Burma censuses were conducted in conjunction with and on the same pattern as 
those in India, complete with detailed breakdowns of caste and religious 
configurations. 
Perhaps most critically for the majority of the Burmese people, from the 
1880s, indigenous residential patterns in the rural areas-which for most of 
southern Burma, at any rate, were based on circles of small hamlets-were 
fundamentally reorganized on the model of the (often imagined) prototypical 
Indian village.13 Central to this transformation was the reduction in the colonial 
period of local Burman notables, who had often been staunch defenders of 
"village" interests in the pre-colonial era, to the status of government 
functionaries or "headmen" on the Indian model. This shift not only rendered 
local administrative arrangements alien and artificial, it turned key intermediaries 
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between the former Burman rulers and the peasant population into enemies of 
the people and prime targets in times of rural unrest.14 
The application of Indian precedents was particularly intense in the relatively 
underpopulated southern districts of Burma. There East India Company officials t 
who were well schooled in the abstract principles of Bentham and the Utilitarian 
philosophers t saw an opportunity to create a political economy that was genuinely 
based on peasant smallholder production. For decades their attempts to create 
such a system had been frustrated in one region of India after another by the 
resistance of entrenched landholding elites and the Indian caste hierarchy. In the 
1850st British revenue officials viewed lower Burma as a tabula rasa, free from 
the deep-seated traditions and complexities that had frustrated their designs in 
India. They applied, with virtually no consideration for Burmese givens, the land 
tenure and revenue system that was then in favor in India, the ryotwari.15 Though 
the architects of Burma's agrarian economy clearly had the interests of the 
ordinary cultivators in mind, the social and economic system they promoted 
ignored or rode roughshod over indigenous social structures and cultural 
arrangements t including Buddhist religious and educational institutions. In the 
decades of rapid expansion and general prosperity of the late-nineteenth century, 
few noticed the toll the alien system was taking on Burmese social and cultural 
life. When the economy turned sour, this deterioration became a major rallying 
call for Burmese leaders who wished to stir up indigenous resistance to the British 
and Indian domination. 
At the same time that the ryotwari was being introduced, the British opened 
Burma to foreign trade and immigration as part of their overall scheme to 
remake Burma as a model of laissez-faire, market-oriented colonialism. Their 
aims meshed nicely with the earlier version of Burma as a key supplier of food for 
India and as an outlet for its surplus population. Much of the spectacular increase 
in export trade from Burma was directed toward India though, in the first decades 
after 1852, a high percentage of the leading export product-rice-went to Great 
Britain and Europe. By the early twentieth century, however, India and Ceylon 
had become the main market for Burma rice, and by the 1930s their share of 
Burma's exported rice crop had reached nearly sixty percent.16 The great post­
conquest expansion of the market economy in Burma also attracted Indian 
investors, mill owners t merchants and moneylenders. It set into motion a massive 
movement of capital that Lenin never dreamed of in his analysis of the workings 
of the capitalist-imperialist world order. Indian entrepreneurs and financiers were 
perhaps the greatest beneficiaries of the annexation of Burma to the Indian Raj. 
Though Europeans controlled the largest banking houses, shipping firms and 
processing plants throughout the colonial era, Indians again dominated at the 
intermediate levels. Very often Indian moneylenders, particularly the Chettiars, 
served as the major source of capital for local traders and moneylenders who 
were predominately Burmese. This meant that Indian, not European, capital 
financed the great expansion of cultivation and rice export that occurred from the 
last decades of the nineteenth century. Burmese who sought to operate large rice 
or timber mills or export firms inevitably came into competition with Indian 
owners t not European mercantile establishments. Burmese rice merchants 
competed with Indians and, to a much lesser extent, Chinese. By the last decades 
of the nineteenth century, Indian moneylenders and speculators had also 
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The movement of Indian entrepreneurs and capital to Burma was paralleled 
by a massive influx of Indian migrant laborers into both the urban centers and 
rural districts of Burma. In keeping with the vision held by British administrators 
in India of Burma as an ideal safety valve for overcrowded and famine·prone 
Indian districts, no restrictions were placed on Indian immigration during virtually 
the whole period of colonial rule. In fact, though earlier officials had expressed 
misgivings, none until James Baxter issued his 1941 Report on Indian Immigration, 
strongly urged meaningful restrictions on Indian entry into Burma. By the early 
decades of the twentieth century, hundreds of thousands of seasonal and 
permanent migrants crossed back and forth over the Bay of Bengal each year. 
Tens of thousands took up permanent residence in Burma. In the peak year of 
1914, the influx of Indians into Burma surpassed those leaving by 143,000; as late 
as 1928, the net migration of Indians into the Province reached 94,000Y~ By the 
late 1920s, there were over a million Indians in all of Burma, over 600,000 
concentrated in the market-oriented districts of lower Burma alone. 
Just as they did in administration, marketing and processing, Indians 
competed with indigenous ethnic groups for positions as dock hands and street 
sweepers, tenants and landless laborers. In some areas in the Irrawaddy delta, 
they also claimed their own smallholdings and established communities that were 
exclusively or preponderantly Indian.19 This meant that at all social levels from 
the upper realms of the civil service to the lowliest coolie, Indians were in 
competition and intense contact with the Burmese. As long as the economy was 
buoyant and steadily expanding, migrants and indigenous peoples managed to 
coexist with surprisingly little friction despite (or perhaps because of) minimal 
social and cultural interchange. When the economic pie began to shrink, 
especially after World War I, Burmese awareness of and hostility toward the 
Indian immigrant community rose sharply. 
In the early 1900s, the closing of the land frontier in most districts of Lower 
Burma and growing external competition for a slowing international demand for 
Burma exports, particularly rice, set the stage for the economic dislocations and 
social tensions that dominated the final decades of British rule. Intensifying 
competition between Indians and Burmese at virtually all occupational levels and 
social strata both fed Burmese nationalism and was exacerbated by it. In the early 
stages of agrarian slowdown, the importance of the India connection was again 
dramatically and perniciously demonstrated. The handful of British officials who 
sought to introduce measures for debt relief, the restriction of land alienation and 
tenancy control in the 1890s and early 1900s were vehemently opposed by both 
powerful Indian landholding and financial groups within Burma and their allies in 
India proper. Though Burmese landlords and moneylenders often also opposed 
agrarian legislation, the financial clout of Indian merchants and moneylenders 
again and again proved decisive in frustrating reform efforts.2o The decision that 
in effect brought an end to the salvage efforts was made by the Governor General 
of India, Lord Minto, not the Governor of Burma, Sir Herbert T. White. And in 
killing what was to be the last land alienation act introduced before the Great 
Depression, Minto acted out of concern for the situation in India not in the 
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interests of the colonized people of Burma. In instructing White to put an end to 
the struggle to enact agrarian reform legislation, Minto emphasized that: 
Even if the Alienation Act k{j reguired in Burma, its introduction 
would cause a certain amount ofuneasiness in otherprovinces [he 
specifically referred to the Punjab and Bihar] where similar 
legislation has been threatened, and it is advisable to avoid anything 
ofthis sort at present.21 
As it turned out, the agrarian legislation campaign was the last chance for the 
British to shore up a crumbling peasant proprietor economy. From the late 1890s, 
smallholder indebtedness, land alienation, rent-racked tenants and rapacious 
landlords became ever more prevalent features of the colonial economy and 
social order in Burma. Relative prosperity and communal coexistence gave way 
to cutthroat competition, increasing communal tensions and, by the late 1920s, 
communal violence. Because Burma had been twice colonized, Burmese 
nationalists had to organize the drive for independence at two levels: the first and 
more studied against the British, the second against the large and powerful Indian 
immigrant community. The mounting importance of the latter struggle goes far 
toward explaining first Burmese ambivalence and later their outright hostility 
toward linking the fate of the Province to an alliance between Burmese parties 
and the much larger and more highly developed Indian Congress Party. The 
Indian "problem" was also at the root of incessant factional squabbles about the 
extent to which Burma should also enjoy the concessions that Gandhi and the 
Congress politicians were wresting from the British overlords-whether Burma 
should march in step with India to independence or forge a separate path.22 
By the late 1920s, the popular struggle for independence among the Burman 
majority had become as much or more anti-Indian than anti-British. This trend is 
manifested not only in the horrific communal riots that erupted in both urban and 
rural Burma in 1931 and again in 1938, but also in the widespread anti-Indian 
assaults that were associated with the series of agrarian uprisings that broke out 
in the early 1930s. By the last years 9f British rule, assaults on the Indian 
community at all social levels had reached epidemic proportions. It is fitting that 
economic grievances and ethnic hostility are often hard to separate, as in the case 
of attacks on Indian moneylenders, in determining motives for communal 
conflict. From the viewpoint of the Burmese peasant or urban worker, the two 
were inseparable.23 The fact that Indian policemen and troops were brought in to 
put down the peasant uprisings and quell the communal riots only served to 
heighten the Burmese awareness of their double colonization and the growing 
threat of Indian dominance. From the early 1930s, the restriction of Indian 
immigration and limitation of Indian economic activities became major rallying 
points for Burmese nationalist leaders at virtually all points of the political 
spectrum. As it became increasingly clear that the days of the British colonizers in 
both India and Burma were numbered, the struggle to reverse the process of 
Indianization in Burma loomed as large, particularly in the popular mind, as the 
drive for independence. Abruptly and brutally, the issue was decided by the 
Japanese invasion of Burma, which brought the death of tens of thousands and 
the flight of hundreds of thousands of Indians, who followed the British in their 
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retreat from Burma, and the severing of economic and migratory links between 
the Province and the subcontinent. 
Burma was, of course, not the only British colony to receive large numbers of 
Indian migrants. But the speed and harshness with which the Indian populations 
of former colonies like Kenya and Uganda were expelled after independence 
suggests just how great a threat India posed in the minds of nationalist leaders in 
areas where the Indian connection had been significant. Because Burma, with a 
pre-colonial population not much greater than either of these areas, absorbed a 
far greater number of Indian migrants and was far more dominated by Indian 
administrators and financiers, the dangers of demographic innundation and 
cultural extinction were all the more pronounced. Until government records and 
personal memoirs from the post-colonial era become available,. it will be difficult 
to judge with any precision how much intluence these fears had on the Burmese 
retreat from the world. But in weighing the lingering legacy of the second and 
infinitely more pervasive wave of colonization, one can do well to remember a 
cartoon that was included in Thein Maung's highly emotional assessment of The 
Indian Immigration Problem in Burma, which was published in the late 1930s. The 
caption reads, "Crowded out by the guests, such is the lot of the Burmese. fI The 
illustration shows a smallish Burmese in traditional garb perched precariously on 
the edge of a long bench. The rest of the bench is occupied by six husky 
foreigners. One is British, one Chinese. The remaining four are clearly Indian. 
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The United States and the Philippines:
 
"Sentimental" Imperialism or Standard Imperialism?
 
Stephen Rosskamm Shalom 
Ever since the late 1960s it has been rare to find any serious observer-and by that 
I mean anyone who doesn't hold a high position in Washington-who thinks that 
United States foreign policy has been idyllic. Commentators from a wide range of 
political perspectives have not been bashful in criticizing U.S. foreign policy. But 
they have by and large shied away from characterizing U.S. policy as "imperialist." 
One of these critics has termed the United States "imperial" but not imperialist,l 
another says we are "almost imperialist,"2 and a recent book on "the American 
Experience in Asia" refers to U.S. policy-makers as "sentimental imperialists."3 I 
will argue here that United States foreign policy, particularly with respect to the 
Philippines, has been imperialism of the standard sort and that to refer to it as 
"sentimental" is to misconstrue the history of U.S.-Philippine interactions in 
particular and to misunderstand the nature of imperialism in general. 
The argument for "sentimental imperialism" does not appear in anyone place. 
It consists of a variety of themes that can be summarized roughly as follows. The 
United States came reluctantly to colonialism; it was not like other colonial 
powers; the annexation of the Philippine Islands was a "great aberration" in its 
anti-colonial tradition. It is true that the U.S. behaved paternalistically toward 
Filipinos, thinking that it knew better than Filipinos themselves what was good for 
them but, unlike other colonial powers, the U.S. did not exploit its colonial 
subjects, and indeed it may have brought them some benefits. In any event, 
however, in 1946 the Philippines was granted its independence and allowed to 
take its rightful place in the great family of nations. The more astute proponents 
of the "sentimental imperialism" view concede that aspects of colonial rule 
continued even after formal independence: the U.S. still treated the Filipinos 
paternalistically, and it intervened in Philippine internal affairs. But the 
intervention was not with the aim of exploitation; Washington tried, albeit with 
little success, to promote uncorrupt and unvenalleaders. Unlike traditional 
imperialists, the U.S. did not seek its own aggrandizement-after all, its economic 
stake in the Philippines has been relatively small and Washington has allowed 
U.S. economic interests in the islands to be threatened and impaired without U.S. 
intervention. U.S. military bases did infringe in some ways on Philippine 
sovereignty, but U.S. officials have accepted renegotiation of these rights on the 
basis of equality. So, yes, there were and continue to be feelings of superiority on 
the part of Americans toward the Philippines and this might properly be labeled 
"imperialism." But it has been an imperialism of good intentions not of greed; it 
has not been the standard kind of imperialism-like that of Britain, France, or the 
Netherlands-but a "sentimental imperialism." 
This, in admittedly oversimplified form, is the "sentimental imperialism" view. 
There are, of course, refinements and elaborations in this argument, but I think I 
have accurately conveyed its essential thrust. The problem with this point of view 
is that it is utterly incorrect. Most histories begin their account of U.S. colonialism 
with the year 1898. But Henry Cabot Lodge was quite accurate when he declared 
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three years earlier that the United States had a "record of conquest, colonization, 
and territorial expansionmunequaled by any people in the nineteenth century."4 
This was not primarily an overseas expansion, but it was expansion nonetheless. 
And Lodge was more right than he knew when he replied to critics of annexing 
the Philippines that if consent of the inhabit~nts be necessary "then our whole 
past record of expansion is a crime."s Moreover, concurrent with this great 
continental expansion, the United States deployed its armed forces overseas 
some ninety-six times before the outbreak of the Spanish-American War.6 So 
1898 is hardly the "great divide" it is sometimes made out to be. 
Turning to 1898, everyone has heard, I am sure, the story of how President 
William McKinley decided to annex the Philippines only after praying to God on 
his knees on the White House floor, an event probably not repeated again in 
American political life until Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger prayed on their 
knees in the White House after Watergate. Now I do not presume to judge 
McKinley's relationship with God, nor do I want to comment on the question of 
whether McKinley really believed God told him to take the Philippines in order 
to "Christianize" a people, the majority of whom were already Christian. But 
consider the fact that the purported heavenly advice included the admonition that 
the United States could not turn the islands over to France or Germany-"our 
commercial rivals in the Orient"-for "that would be bad business and 
discreditable."7 So McKinley may have been following what he regarded as the 
will of God, but if so his God, conveniently, was not blind to commercial 
considerations. 
McKinley told Jacob Schurman, head of the first Philippine Commission, that 
he hadn't wanted to take the Philippines, but that "in the end there was no 
alternative.liS Again, it is not necessary for us to get inside the president's head to 
ascertain whether his reluctance was genuine. If we take McKinley's many public 
comments at face value, we see that he had no doubts at all as to the importance 
of obtaining markets for the exports of U.S. industry nor was he in the least 
ambivalent toward the immense opportunity for such exports provided by China.9 
McKinley was determined to secure a foothold in the Western Pacific as a 
gateway to the China trade; he sought a naval base and coaling station from 
which the United States could compete in the China market with the other Great 
Powers, who were themselves at this time seizing strategic points along the 
Chinese coast. In McKinley's initial view, the port of Manila alone could have 
served as this naval base, but his advisers warned that Manila could not be held 
without holding all of the island of Luzon, and Luzon itself would be vulnerable 
without United States control over the adjacent islands.1o So if, for McKinley, 
there was at first some uncertainty as to whether it was necessary to annex the 
entire archipelago in order to advance U.S. economic interests in China, there 
was never any question that the furtherance of these economic interests was the 
crucial determinant of policy. 
It has been argued, of course, that the China market was a myth; it never 
amounted to anything approaching the ecstatic hopes of the business community. 
This is true, but that does not mean that the expectation of future gain did not 
motivate United States policy at the turn of the century. No one doubts, for 
example, that the Ford Motor Company sought profits when it built the Edsel, 
and the ultimate failure of that automobile is irrelevant in analyzing the motives 
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for its initial production. Likewise, the ultimate failure of the China market to 
develop as anticipated in no way invalidates the claim that it was this anticipation 
that drove much of United States policy in Asia in the early years of the twentieth 
century. Imperialism does not become "sentimental" because anticipated future 
benefit was not realized. 
My remarks thus far should not be taken to mean that I view United States 
foreign policy, or imperialism for that matter, as functions strictly of economic 
factors; rather, I find economic considerations to be the major determinants of 
U.S. policy.ll In this I take strong issue with the prevailing view, expressed for 
example by the prominent diplomat and one-time U.S. ambassador to the 
Philippines, Charles Bohlen, who has written that "our policy is not rooted in any 
national material interest of the United States, as most foreign policies of other 
countries in the past have been.1112 . 
Moreover, in maintaining as I do that economic interests are the major 
determinants of policy, but not the only ones, I do not hold that the other factors 
are always as independent of economic concerns as is sometimes suggested. One 
writer, for example, considers that he has refuted economic explanations of 
European expansionism because, among the other instances he cites, Upper 
Burma was seized by Britain not for investment purposes but in order to protect 
India's frontiers. 13 Given the indisputable British economic stake in India, 
however, this is rather like saying that bankers are not motivated by profits 
because they spend some of their money on vaults instead of lending it out at 
interest. 
The Philippines has, since its initial annexation, played a strategic role for 
United States policy-makers, whether as the gateway to the China trade or as the 
military base from which U.S. interests in the entire Southeast Asian area-and, 
lately, the Persian Gulf as well-could be protected.14 But, insofar as Washington 
has perceived a U.s. economic stake in these regions, the bases, and therefore the 
Philippines, protect an economic interest. So to argue that United States policy in 
the Philippines has been driven by strategic rather than economic concerns is to 
miss the point. 
Nor does the fact that in 1907 Theodore Roosevelt referred to the Philippines 
as our "Achilles' heel" affect the argument. IS That the economic or strategic 
worth of a territory might later undergo reevaluation does not alter our analysis 
of the motives for the original acquisition of the territory. For example, in the 
third quarter of the eighteenth century Britain and Spain judged the Falkland 
Islands to be a strategic asset and they nearly went to war over them; a few years 
later, both nations decided that the islands were more liability than asset and 
quietly withdrew their forces.I6 Did these powers suddenly become sentimental? 
Or was it simply the fact that calculations of benefit will vary in different 
circumstances and different times? The doubts regarding the advantages of 
holding the Philippines in 1907 and later in the 1930s help explain the United 
States' decision to grant the islands independence; there is no need to attribute 
this decision to sentimentality. And just as the cool calculation of American 
interest can explain the steps toward independence, so too does naked interest 
explain the U.S. acquisition of the islands in 1900 and Washington's attitude 
toward Philippine bases in the years since 1946. Sentimentality, like divine 
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intervention, loses its plausibility as an explanatory variable when other, more
 
worldly variables are so clearly operative.
 
Now some may object that this accounting of economic and strategic interests 
overlooks the U.S. accomplishments in the fields of public health and education 
during the period of its colonial rule in the Philippines. But the significance of 
these accomplishments is rather less than is often supposed. 
To begin with, wherever colonial powers have wanted their traders to trade it 
was necessary to assure that the health environment was adequate for these 
traders. Thus, when the United States recognized Cuban independence it 
insisted, through the Platt Amendment, not only on a military base, the right to 
intervene, and restrictions on Cuba's ability to conclude treaties or incur debts, 
but also that the sanitation of the cities be maintained.17 This was not 
sentimentality. 
When the United States acquired the Philippines, the islands already had the 
most extensive system of education in Southeast Asia. I8 (Note that few have used 
this fact as evidence of Spanish benevolence.) The Philippines also had the most 
developed nationalist movement in the region, a movement that was demanding, 
in addition to independence, the establishment of free, public, and secular 
primary education.19 And Philippine nationalists did not just demand these 
things-they fought a war over it. U.S. policy, like the policies of most colonial 
powers in subjugating their colonies, called for a combination of massive 
repression and pacification. Education was the key element of the latter; nothing 
less could serve as the carrot for pacification given the program of the Philippine 
Republic, as even the U.S. military realized; General Douglas MacArthur, for 
example, urged a large expenditure on education "primarily and exclusively" as an 
adjunct to military operations calculated to pacify the people...."20 Needless to 
say, when scholars discussed the possibility of the Soviet Union's using education 
as part of its pacification program in Afghanistan, "sentimental" was not the first 
word that came to mind.21 
Numerous scholars have shown that in gualitative terms U.S. educational 
policy in the Philippines was unsuccessfuL22 Even the quantitative record, 
however, was not unprecedented for a colonial power in Southeast Asia; 
Japanese~ruled Formosa (which started the century well behind the Philippines) 
had about the same fraction of the population in school in 1938 (11.36%) as did 
the Philippines (11.54%); the figure in independent Thailand was not much 
lower (10.65%).23 The other colonies in the region lagged far behind, but there 
are few who use this as evidence ofJapanese benevolence or sentimentality. 
It would actually have been quite astounding if concern for Filipinos had been 
the primary motive of the same U.S. officials who in the United States were so 
conservative, so racist, and so committed to the interests of business; recall that 
when Taft heard reports that thirty Pullman strikers had been killed in 1894 he 
hoped it was true; that Root was the lawyer for the Sugar Trust, the Lead Trust, 
the Whiskey Trust, and the Standard Oil Company, among other worthy clients; 
and that Theodore Roosevelt argued that the "most ultimately righteous of all 
wars is a war with savages, though it is apt to be also the most terrible and 
inhuman," not that this should bother anyone because it was "idle to apply to 
savages the rules of international morality which obtain between stable and 
cultured communities...."24 Lewis H. Douglass' advice to black Americans seems 
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of wider relevance here: only the self-deluded, he wrote, could believe that the 
U.s. government would act more justly ten thousand miles away than it did at 
home.25 
Now some might argue that, although these U.S. officials had rather backward 
social views, within the context ofthese views, they tried to do what they thought 
was best for the Filipino. This argument, however, comes very close to being 
tautological; by the same reasoning, for example, it could be said that Hitler did 
what he thought was best for Jews, within the context of his view that Jews were 
subhuman. But in any event, I think a good test ofwhether actions are 
sentimentally driven is consistency: lying will often be used to hide self-interest, 
only rarely to disguise an excess of sentimentality. 
The biggest lie of the whole U.S. colonial period in the Philippines was that 
the United States tutored the Filipinos in self-government, that Filipinos, in the 
words of a general testifying before the U.S. Senate, had so little notion ofwhat 
independence meant that they probably thought it was something to eat. "They 
have no more idea of what it means than a shepherd dog," he explained. But 
shortly afterward in his testimony, the general stated that the Filipinos "want to 
get rid of the Americans.tl tlThey do?" asked a senator. tlYes, sir,tl replied the 
general. tlThey want us driven out, so that they can have this independence, but 
they do not know what it is."26 Now I don't quote this interchange merely to ask 
who seems to have the intelligence of a shepherd dog here. The point is that 
many have said that U.S. officials, perhaps because oHaulty information, truly 
believed the Filipinos incapable of self-government. But testimony like that I 
have quoted was available for any who cared to learn what Filipinos thought. 
Those with the gleam of Chinese markets in their eyes did not care to learn very 
much. 
Nor was this simply a tum-of-the-century myopia. Consider the following 
scene from the 1945 motion picture Back to Bataan. In a 1941 Philippine 
schoolhouse, the American teacher asks the students what the United States gave 
to the Philippines. "Soda pop!" "Hot dogs!" "Movies!" "Radio!" tlBaseball!" scream 
the pupilS. You might think these were rather sophisticated students, but the 
teacher and the principal correct the erring youngsters by explaining that the real 
American contribution was teaching the Filipinos freedom. At first, however, says 
the teacher with a straight face, the Filipinos did not appreciate freedom for they 
tlresisted the American occupation.tl27 No, it wasn't the Filipinos who failed to 
understand freedom; you don't fight a war at a cost of many thousands of lives28 
for something that you think you can eat. The notion of freedom was not 
exported from the United States.29 
Of course, the main piece of evidence for the claim that Washington's 
colonialism was different from that of other nations is the fact that the United 
States gave the Philippines independence. Whatever U.S. motives may have been 
in 1898, in 1946 the U.S. flag was pulled down voluntarily. 
First of all, however, as I have already noted, deciding that an investment is no 
longer worthwhile does not thereby make the investor sentimental. Texas 
Instruments was not sentimental when it decided to stop making home computers 
and the United States was not sentimental when it decided to end its colonial 
relation to the Philippines. Texas Instruments found it wasn't making money; 
Washington found that possession of the Philippines conflicted with the profits 
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from domestic and Cuban sugar and with the jobs of a heavily-unemployed work 
force. 
The second thing to note about the decision to end colonial rule in the 
Philippines is that, contrary to the standard mythology, the Philippines was not 
the first instance of a colony being voluntarily granted its independence. Britain 
conquered Iraq in World War I and Iraqis assumed-as Filipinos in 1898 had 
assumed-that they were to be granted independence. Britain waffled on the 
question, but the outbreak of a major rebellion in 1920 settled the issue from 
London's point of view; independence was promised for the near future and in 
1932 Iraq joined the League of Nations as an independent country. The same 
pattern was followed in the case of Egypt, which became a League member in 
1937. France seemed to be moving along the same path with regard to Syria and 
Lebanon when World War II took matters out of French hands. And, actually, 
the United States itself had earlier given independence to an occupied territory: 
namely, Cuba-conquered in the Spanish-American War and set free in 1902. 
Now in each one of these instances, there were serious limitations on 
independence; these countries were given "independence with strings;' As 
Benjamin Disraeli had put it in 1863, "a colony does not cease to be a colony 
merely because it becomes independent.,,30 Iraq, by virtue of a 1930 treaty with 
Britain that was to last a quarter century, had to give the British access to two 
military bases, have its armed forces trained by the British, consult with London 
on foreign policy, and promise mutual aid in time ofwar. Egypt, by the terms of a 
1936 treaty, had to permit British troops to occupy the Suez Canal zone and, in 
the event ofwar, had to allow Britain "all facilities and assistance in her power."31 
And Cuba was made to incorporate into its constitution the Platt amendment 
giving the United States a military base and the right to intervene and limiting 
Havana's authority to conclude treaties or incur debts.32 
But this was precisely the kind of independence the Philippines was given in 
1946: independence with strings. The United States got military bases and 
investment privileges, U.S. military advisers were to be detailed to the Philippine 
armed forces, and the Philippines was limited in the control it had over its 
currency or in accepting military aid or advice from third parties. Now it might be 
claimed that these strings were voluntarily accepted by Filipinos and thus not 
strings at all. But the circumstances were quite typical of imperialism. Economic 
aid, so desperately needed by a Philippines ravaged by war, was partially tied to 
Manila's acceptance of a privileged position for U.S. investors. And even then it 
took parliamentary shenanigans by the Philippine elite, installed in power by the 
United States at war's end, to clinch passage of the appropriate legislation.33 
Rudolph von Albertini, one of the leading historians of comparative 
colonialism, has written that, ironically, the United States "did not bring 
decolonization to an end" in the Philippines "until 1955, several years after the 
British, Dutch, and French withdrawal from the vast area of South-East Asia!"34 
It was only at this point, he suggests, that economic and military relations were 
settled on a more or less bilateral basis. This is, in fact, a common view among 
critics of U.S. policy: that while there were vestiges of colonial rule that continued 
after 1946, these were eliminated in the mid-1950s with the signing of the Laurel­
Langley agreement and the re-negotiation of the military bases agreement. But 
although these agreements removed some of the more blatantly colonial features 
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of the U.S.-Philippine relationship, these were much more changes of form than 
substance. 
U.S. investment privileges in the Philippines were actually extended under 
Laurel-Langley, though, for the sake of appearances, Filipinos were given 
reciprocal rights to invest in the United States, an even-handedness reminiscent 
of the famous French law that prohibited rich and poor alike from sleeping 
beneath bridges. With regard to the military bases, in 1956 the United States 
announced that it recognized Philippine sovereignty over the facilities. The 
essential function of the bases, however, never changed; these bases were, in the 
words of one Defense Department official in 1962, the "cornerstones of any U.S. 
staging of military operations to the west or southwest;" these bases provided the 
main logistical support for the massive U.S. intervention in Vietnam. In 1972, 
after sixteen years of amendments and adjustments to the bases agreement, 
United States authorities could still note that "nowhere in the world are we able 
to use our military bases with less restrictions than we do in the Philippines.n35 
It has been argued that overseas investment and trade are too small an economic 
stake to have any considerable influence on United States foreign policy, so while 
there may be some unfortunate behavior by the United States in the Philippines 
and elsewhere, this behavior cannot have been motivated by economic concerns. 
According to this view, whatever its absolute magnitude, foreign business activity 
constitutes a relatively minor fraction of the U.S. economy as a whole. This is 
even more strikingly the case, it is argued, if one compares profits from U.S. 
investments in the Third World to total corporate profits-both domestic and 
foreign. This argument, however, is deeply misleading in a number of different 
ways. Those who adhere to this argument have many differences among 
themselves, but they all are critical of the radical view of U.s. imperialism, so for 
convenience, I shall refer to them as "the critics." 
To show the flaws in the argument of the critics, I propose to do the following. 
First, I will demonstrate that the overseas operations of U.S. corporations are of 
considerable importance to the dominant economic institutions of the United 
States. Second, I will propose that the high overlap in personnel, motivation, and 
ideology between government and economy leads government policy-makers to 
share the corporate concern for the well-being of foreign investment and trade. 
And, third, I will examine some of the counter-arguments typically raised by the 
critics. 
To begin with, there is the question of how one is to evaluate the importance 
of the, say, 5 percent of economic activity that originates overseas. According to 
the critics, one must simply conclude that the U.S. economy does not depend 
upon assuring itself access to foreign markets for investment or trade; a 5 percent 
reduction in the Gross National Product would not cause the demise of the 
United States. But, it is one thing to say that foreign markets are not necessary for 
the survival of U.S. capitalism and another thing entirely to assert that, therefore, 
foreign markets are unimportant or of little concern to the corporations that are 
the backbone of the economy. Corporations are profit-maximizers, and they try 
to maximize 100 percent of their profits, not just 95 percent of them. Any 
corporate manager who was unconcerned about 5 percent of potential profits 
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would be ousted by the stockholders immediately, for the latter are considerably 
less sanguine about 5 percent cuts in earnings than are the critics. 
One of the critics has written that the economic stake in the Third World "is 
not a matter of life and death for the American economy but only a cruel 
convenience."36 Observe the dichotomy: either a "matter of life and death" or a 
"convenience." The word "convenience" suggests that corporations have a "take it 
or leave it" attitude toward their foreign operations. But if so, then this is a 5 
percent unlike any other 5 percent of corporate activity. To get some feel for how 
important 5 percent is to corporations, one need only consider how likely they 
would be to do any of the following, even under considerable public pressure: (1) 
lower prices 5 percent without lowering production costs; (2) raise wages 5 
percent without raising prices; (3) slow down the speed of an assembly line by 5 
percent; or (4) rehire during a period of high unemployment the 5 percent of the 
work force that had been laid off. Merely to mention these possibilities points up 
their absurdity. Profits are not pursued casually. As foreign bribes-in the 
Philippines, Japan, and most everywhere else-pollution, industrial accidents, 
deceptive advertising, price fixing, and countless other practices attest, profits are 
sought after with a vengeance. And this means the full 100 percent of profits, for 
notice that rarely have any of the listed practices been a "matter of life and death" 
for the firms involved. So although "only" 5 percent of sales or investment may 
take place overseas, one can expect corporations to pursue this 5 percent with the 
same vigor with which they try to maximize the profits from any another 5 percent 
of their operations. 
In calculating the actual magnitude of foreign economic activity, some
 
fundamental errors have been made by those who minimize the overseas
 
economic stake. Let me briefly consider some of these errors here.
 
One critic has stated that U.S. exports in 1968 were only 4 percent of the 
Gross National Product.37 But, if one is interested in determining the value of 
foreign markets to the U.S. economy, the relevant figure is not exports, but the 
sum of exports and the sales of U.S. overseas subsidiaries (subtracting, to avoid 
double counting, exports of U.S. corporations to their foreign affiliates, and 
excluding subsidiaries' sales to the U.S.). When such a calculation is performed, 
one finds that total foreign sales in 1968 accounted for 13 percent of GNP-a 
rather substantial fraction. And the percentage has increased since 1968.38 
Moreover, the proper comparison for merchandise exports is not GNP, which 
sums the production of goods and services, but total goods produced. Even 
ignoring the sales of foreign affiliates, exports accounted for 8 percent of all U.S. 
goods produced in 1968, and have grown to one seventh of goods produced in 
recent years.39 
According to one of the critics, income on foreign investment in 1968 was only 
5.6 percent of total corporate profits for 1968 and the income from developing 
nations was only 3.2 percent of total profits.4o These statistics, however, suffer 
from a number of faulty comparisons. First the foreign income figures are just for 
repatriated interest, dividends, and branch earnings. This omits reinvested 
earnings, which are, however, included in total corporate income. To this should 
be added the royalties and fees resulting from direct investment. These are 
considered by the Commerce Department to be part of the benefits of direct 
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investment ownership, and for many firms they provide a disguised means of 
transferring earnings, since they are subject to different tax and remittance laws.41 
The second error is considering foreign income and total corporate income to 
be measuring the same kind of thing because both are before U.S. taxes. But 
overseas earnings are not taxed at the full U.S. tax rate because of credit given for 
foreign taxes already paid. The effective (or actual) U.s. tax rate on profits 
earned abroad is between 3 and 10 percent42 compared to 40-45 percent on total 
corporate earnings. When all these corrections are made, we find that after U.S.­
tax foreign earnings in 1968 were, conservatively speaking, 15 percent of total 
after-tax corporate profits. For developing countries, after-tax profits were 6 
percent of total after-tax profits. And both figures have generally been higher 
since 1968.43 
Finally, it should be noted that the foreign income figures that I have been 
discussing here are all income from "direct investment:" that is, investments in 
which U.S. firms have a controlling interest or an important management voice. 
In 1960 other private investment income amounted to about one-sixth of direct 
investment income; in 1970 it was about a third, in 1980 about 90 percent, and by 
1986 it exceeded direct investment income by almost a quarter.44 
A number of critics have made the point that income from foreign investment 
amounts to only one-third of 1 percent of the Gross National Product.45 This, 
however, is a meaningless comparison for it compares profits with sales. By the 
same logic one could conclude that profits as a whole are irrelevant to the 
capitalist system since total after-tax corporate profits are typically only about 5 
percent of GNP. 
Thus far Ihave assumed that official Commerce Department figures were 
accurate. Let me indicate, however, at least one way in which these figures are 
likely to be inaccurate. By means of the accounting technique known as "transfer­
pricing," corporations are able to shift their reported assets and profits from 
country to country in order to maximize worldwide profits. In one particularly 
dramatic instance, the U.S. pharmaceutical industry in Colombia was able to 
report profits that were one twenty-fourth its actual profits, but there is other, less 
extreme, evidence from many other countries.46 Most analysts have concluded 
that reported profit rates on foreign investment bear little relation to the actual 
rates.41 
Consider now the objection that the United States has a much more 
substantial economic stake in the developed countries of Western Europe, 
Canada, and Japan than in the Third World. It is certainly true that U.S. overseas 
investment is concentrated in the industrialized nations and that the major U.S. 
trading partners are developed countries. Thus, no one would dispute the fact 
that were the United States faced, for example, with the choice between 
safeguarding its investments in Canada or Columbia it would choose the former. 
But this formulation is exactly the opposite of the problem as perceived by U.S. 
policy-makers. That is to say, from Washington's point of view it is not a question 
of either the developed countries or the less developed countries, but rather of 
both or neither. As former ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer put it, "no 
clear line exists between our very immediate interests in the security and stability 
of the advanced nations (such as those of Europe, Japan, and Australia) and 
conditions in the less developed world."48 The best illustration of this view is the 
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attitude of U.S. officials to the relationship between Japan and Southeast Asia in 
the 1950s. 
In a very literal sense, Japan's economic survival has required foreign trade. 
Geography and complementarity made China the natural trading partner for 
Japan; United States officials feared, however, that any Japanese dependence 
upon trade with China might lead to political accommodation between the two 
nations and Japan would be lost to the "Free World." Accordingly, Washington 
had to assure Japan access to other markets, and Southeast Asia was considered 
to be the natural choice. This meant that the United States had to prevent 
Southeast Asia from becoming dominated by China or even from choosing to 
develop along autarkic lines which might deny a major role to trade with Japan. 
By the mid~1960s, of course, the situation had changed. Washington found that 
by assuring the economic viability of Japan it had permitted Tokyo to escape its 
subordination to the United States and to become a major economic competitor. 
"What did we really win" in World War II? complained a member of Congress 
regarding Japanese textile imports.49 But during the 1950s, United States policy~ 
makers held the view that it was crucial to secure markets for Ja~an in Southeast 
Asia and the evidence showing that this was so is overwhelming. 0 So the 
argument that the U.S. has no serious economic interests in the Third World 
nations of Southeast Asia because Japan is many times more important is simply 
beside the point.51 It was precisely in order to preserve Japan within the "Free 
World" orbit that it was felt necessary to keep Southeast Asia fully integrated into 
the world capitalist economic system. 
So far I have been considering the United States economy as a whole. But as 
William Appleman Williams has observed, the importance to the economy of 
overseas activities "depends less upon gross percentages than upon the role in the 
American economy of the industries which do depend in significant ways 
(including raw materials as well as markets) on foreign operations."52 When one 
examines this aspect of the question, one finds that foreign activities are 
concentrated among the largest U.S. firms,53 and that to the largest firms their 
foreign activities are extremely significant.54 
If this is to have any implications for U.S. foreign policy, of course, it is 
necessary to show that government policy~makers share the view of corporate 
leaders. There has been extensive documentation of the fact that key foreign 
policy positions in Washington are, to a considerable degree, filled by corporate 
executives or by lawyers who serve the large corporations.55 There are, to be sure, 
differences between the Democrats and the Republicans in this regard. Where 
the Republicans had as Secretary of Defense, for example, Charles Wilson, the 
head of General Motors, the Democrats had Robert McNamara, the president of 
Ford. 
There has also been ample documentation of the fact that elected officials 
depend heavily on the campaign contributions of the corporate sector in order to 
secure office,56 giving us, in Will Rogers' phrase, the best government that money 
can buy, 
But the central issue is not where the policy~makers or their money comes 
from, but what the views of the policy~makersare. And on this point as well there 
is abundant evidence to show that the desire to preserve and extend 
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opportunities for private enterprise abroad has been a constant and important 
component of the official worldview.57 
In fact, it is so fundamental an attitude for U.S. officials that it is taken as a 
self-evident virtue, with any who doubt its automatic character thought to be 
either deranged or totalitarian. Thus, a Democratic member of the House 
Foreign Mfairs Committee explained that "political questions don't really enter 
into the discussion inasmuch as the goal we all seek is a better climate for 
investment generally, to reduce the money we have got to budget for foreign 
aid."5B In 1953, a high level report to the National Security Council explaining why 
U.S. oil companies should not be prosecuted for anti-trust violations abroad 
stated that U.S. officials "seek to make the point that freedom of competitive 
enterprise is the economic counterpart of the concept of freedom of the 
individual in the political and social spheres. We have sou~ht to lead the way 
toward a wider acceptance of the American way of life...." 9 Or consider the 
words of an academic who has served as an adviser to the U.S. government in a 
book on U.S.-Philippine relations sponsored by the prestigious Council on 
Foreign Relations: 
The United States has always emphasized the primary role ofprivate 
enterprise in economic affairs. During the Commonwealth period and 
immediately after World War II, this had meant, in practice, 
continuous efforts to protect the economic interests ofAmerican 
residents in the Philippines and the investments that American 
individuals and corporations had made there. Such a policy requires 
no justification insofar as it is an expression ofthe fundamental 
assumptions ofa free society. 60 
Some of the critics have themselves essentially made the same point I have. 
No doubt they do not think they have conceded anything, but they have in fact 
accepted the central argument of those who describe U.S. foreign policy as 
imperialist--not sentimental imperialism, but standard imperialism. Thus, 
according to one of the critics, "The national interest is not to protect individual 
American firms but to preserve a system of business....The American empire 
expresses its presence and exercises its influence through the capitalist mode of 
operation for which it keeps as much of the world 'open' as possible."61 One critic 
has approvingly quoted the words of another that what was threatened in 
Vietnam was not the physical security of the United States, but 
the security ofan economic and social system dependent upon the 
fruits conferred by America's hegemonic position. A world in which 
others controlled the course oftheir own development, and America ~ 
hegemonic position was broken, would be a world in which the 
American system itselfwould be seriously endangered. 62 
The critics have been quick to add that the belief in democracy has been as 
much a part of the official U.S. worldview as the belief in capitalism.63 Now, while 
it might be true that, all other things being equal, U.S. policy-makers prefer U.S. 
client states with free elections to U.S. client states without free elections, it is 
certainly not the case that the U.S. commitment to democracy has run very deep. 
Guatemala in 1954, Vietnam in 1956, and Chile in 1973 are just a few examples of 
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the less than compelling hold that the belief in free elections has had on U.S. 
officials. And when a vice-president of the United States can tell Ferdinand 
Marcos of the Philippines in 1981 that "We love your adherence to democratic 
principle,"64 the true meaning of the U.S. belief in democracy stands exposed. 
The critics have tried to refute the claim that the United States is imperialist 
by pointing to what they consider to be decisive counter-examples: instances 
where a foreign government has nationalized some U.S.-owned assets but yet 
where Washington did not intervene against, and may even have tolerated, the 
government in question. This line of argument, however, confuses the contention 
that the United States is imperialist with the very different view that the United 
States is both imperialist and omnipotent.6s If the latter were claimed, then U.S. 
acceptance of any diminution of its global hegemony would indeed constitute 
decisive counter-evidence. But, in the real world where there are obvious limits to 
U.S. power and to the U.S. ability to control events, such examples may be either 
consistent or inconsistent with the imperialism thesis-consistent if the U.S. 
course of action was the one out of the available and possible courses of action 
most likely to maximize the opportunities for investment and trade; and 
inconsistent if there was a feasible alternative that was likely to do more for 
investment and trade. Thus, the imperialism thesis does not require that 
Washington accomplish the impossible, only that government officials choose 
that course of action from among the feasible actions best calculated to promote 
economic interests. 
The critics have rarely bothered to examine any of their alleged counter­
examples in this regard, evidently content to note the U.S. non-intervention. The 
critics have pointed to a number of instances in which both U.S. government 
policy-makers and corporate officials have concluded that economic interests 
would not be best served by Washington's involvement in corporate disputes with 
indigenous governments.66 Such instances certainly disprove that the United 
States was all-powerful, but they do not disprove the economic motivation of U.S. 
foreign policy; on the contrary, they show only a different appreciation of how 
economic interests might best be served. 
Consider one case in the Philippines. Harry Stonehill was an American soldier 
who stayed in the islands after World War II and amassed a large fortune. In 
1962, he was deported from the Philippines without any public outcry from the 
U.S. embassy, proof-according to one scholar-that the United States was not 
following an imperialist or neocolonial foreign policy.67 But no one has suggested 
that the U.S. government will seek to protect every individual American. Rather, 
Washington tries to defend U.S. investors in general and it clearly would have 
been contrary to the interests of these investors as a whole for the U.S. embassy 
to openly intervene on behalf of someone universally known to have engaged in 
widespread illegal activity.68 Consider the following analogy: did it disprove the 
thesis that big business had disproportionate influence in U.S. politics when Al 
Capone was arrested by government agents? 
It is, incidentally, not at all unprecedented for the U.S. government and U.S. 
businesses to oppose the flagrant abuses of power by a single U.S. enterprise that 
worsens the business climate for U.S. corporations in general. In Peru, for 
example, the majority of U.S. business interests opposed calls for imposing 
sanctions on Peruvian sugar in retaliation for the expropriation of the U.S.-owned 
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International Petroleum Company; the oil company's behavior was viewed as 
excessive by most U.S. firms and the Peruvian government remained generally 
supportive of foreign investment.69 
Another critic has charged that the imperialism thesis explains both U.S. 
intervention and U.S. non-intervention, and by explaining everything in fact 
explains nothing at al1.7o This claim, however, suffers from a serious confusion. It 
is obviously improper to consider a theory to be confinned by a crucial piece of 
evidence regardless of whether the evidence shows A or not-A to be true. Thus, 
the fact of U.S. rion-intervention cannot be taken as proof of U.S. imperialism­
but then no one has ever made this argument. It is another thing entirely for a 
theory to be able to account for both A and not-A; this all theories do. Thus, 
Newtonian mechanics can explain why some objects are moving and why others 
are at rest. Likewise, there is no inconsistency in a theory of imperialism that 
explains why the United States intervenes in some cases and not in others. 
Indeed, any sensible theory of U.S foreign policy would have to do this. One 
scholar has done a study that shows there to be a rather small relationship 
between the amount of U.S. foreign investment in a country and whether the 
United States has intervened in that country.71 But this is like looking for a 
correlation between a bank's assets and whether the police were sent to the bank. 
Surely the police are not dispatched to banks whose assets are highest but to 
those whose assets are threatened. Likewise it would be a foolish imperialism 
indeed that in 1965 sent the U.S. Marines to Mexico rather than to the 
Dominican Republic merely because the investment stake was greater in Mexico. 
Another critic has argued that the imperialism thesis "overpredictslt in that it 
would have predicted U.S. intervention in Vietnam in 1953-54, Cuba after the 
Bay of Pigs, Laos in 1961-62, Iraq in 1958, and Chile in 1970-71.72 But the 
imperialism thesis does not predict that the United States will intervene 
whenever its interests are threatened-any more than Newtonian mechanics 
predicts that an object will invariably move in the direction of an applied force. 
Before predicting in the latter case, one would have to know whether there were 
countervailing forces and so on. Likewise, one has to know the costs and benefits 
of intervention in any particular instance; only then can one evaluate the actual 
imperialism thesis: namely, that the U.S. will intervene whenever so doing 
appears to U.S. policy-makers the best course for furthering economic interests.73 
In the Vietnam case referred to, Washington considered direct intervention, 
rejected it as impractical,74 and settled for military aid and covert assistance to the 
French. In the Laos case, the U.S. undertook small-scale intervention and 
threatened large-scale intervention unless the Pathet Lao offensive was halted­
which it was.7S U.S. covert operations were conducted against Cuba after the Bay 
of Pigs76 and, as is now well known, in Chile throughout the Allende years.77 
As for Iraq in 1958, the United States and Britain sent troops to adjoining 
Lebanon and Jordan, but judged that there was no one in Iraq who could lead 
counter-action, and that, in light of the Iraqi governmenes assurances of 
friendliness to the West and to Western oil interests, the best that could be done 
was to attempt to work with the new regime.78 Significantly, following these 
assurances-which were not necessarily unrelated to the presence of the U.S. 
troops in Lebanon-shares of the oil companies with Iraqi investments rose 
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briskly on the London stock market. And the major foreign oil firm in Iraq soon 
announced its intention to expand its operations there.79 
Certainly in none of these instances was the U.S. failure to intervene due to an 
excess of sentimentality. Washington has overthrown governments, dispatched 
large numbers of troops overseas, conducted military operations against civilian 
populations, and plotted the assassination of foreign leaders: none of these 
actions is symptomatic of hyper-sentimentality. To take a single example among 
many that could be cited, in 1954 in Manila, the CIA station chief and the U.S. 
ambassador discussed the possibility of killing Philippine nationalist politician 
Claro Recto. The plans proceeded far enough that a vial of poison was prepared 
for the job, but ultimately the idea was dropped, not for sentimental or moral 
reasons, but on "pragmatic grounds."80 
One of the critics has remarked that those who see economic factors behind 
United States foreign policy might have a "psychic need to believe that American 
grownups are inherently eviI."81 One can only wonder what motivates those who 
view U.S. policy-makers as sentimental. 
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Table I 
Merchandise Exports and Sales of Majority-Owned Foreign Affiliates 
1967-1976, 1982 
(all figures in $ billion except column 7) 
(1)	 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Merch. Merch. MOFA Merch. 
Exports Sales Sales Not 
Merch. to non- of to U.S. or 
year Exports Affiliates MOFAs Affiliates (2+4) GNP (5/6) 
1967 30.7 23.0 98.6 77.9 100.9 793.9 .127 
1968 33.6 25.2 109.8 86.2 111.4 864.2 .129 
1969 36.4 27.3 122.1 94.6 121.9 930.3 .131 
1970 42.5 31.9 141.7 109.9 141.8 982.4 .144 
1971 42.8 32.1 167.7 130.0 162.1 1055.5 .154 
1972 49.4 37.1 192.7 149.4 186.5 1171.1 .159 
1973 71.4 53.6 264.9 202.9 256.5 1306.6 .196 
1974 98.3 73.7 397.9 291.8 365.5 1413.2 .259 
1975 107.1 80.3 421.0 314.7 395.0 1516.3 .261 
1976 114.7 86.0 468.0 347.5 433.5 1691.6 .256 
1982 209.2 157.9 663.9 479.9 637.8 3069.3 .208 
Note: MOFA ~ Majority-owned foreign affiliates. This overstates by counting 100% of sales when the 
U.S. share may actually be a smaller fraction, and understates by omitting minority·owned affiliates. 
Sources 
(I)	 1967: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of 
the United States, 1971, p. 753 (hereafter SA); 1968-69, 1971: SA, 1974, p. 778; 
1970, 1972-76: SA, 1982, p. 820; 1982: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Survey of 
Current Business, July 1983, p. 58 (hereafter SCB) 
(2)	 Column I x .75 as estimate of exports to non-affiliated companies. See SCB, 
Dec. 1965, p. 12; AFL-CIO, "An American Trade Union's View of 
International Trade and Investment," in U.S. Senate, Finance Committee, 
Multinational Corporations: A Compendium of Papers, Committee Print, 93rd 
Congress, 1st Session, Feb. 1973, p. 60 
(3) 1966-73:	 SCB, May 1976, p. 27; 1974-76: SA, 1980, p. 570; 1982: SCB, Dec. 
1985, p. 49. MOFA sales before 1982 were not disaggregated into goods and 
services, so the ratio from 1982 (.909) was applied to total sales figures for 
1967-76. 
(4) Total	 sales reduced by sales to U.S. (given in SCB, Aug. 1974, pp. 28-29; May 
, 1976, p. 28;	 Feb. 1977, p. 31; Mar. 1978, p. 33); local sales reduced by 6% as 
estimate of affiliate sales and foreign sales reduced by 53% (see SCB, Aug. 
1974, part II, pp. 26-27) 
(6) 1967:	 SA, 1971, p. 305; 1968-69, 1971: SA, 1974, p. 373; 1970, 1972-76: SA, 
1982, p. 418; 1982: SCB, Dec. 1984, p. 12 
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Table 2
Merchandise Exports as a Percent of All Goods Produced 
1965, 1968, 1970, 1972-1987 
(all figures in $ billion except column 3) 
(I) (2) (3) 
Merchandise Goods 
Year Exports Produced (112) 
1965 26.5 338.4 .078 
1968 33.6 429.5 .078 
1970 42.5 459.9 .092 
1972 49.4 529.6 .093 
1973 71.4 604.1 .118 
1974 98.3 646.7 .152 
1975 107.1 694.0 .154 
1976 114.7 771.1 .149 
1977 120.8 855.0 .141 
1978 142.1 958.6 .148 
1979 179.2 1065.6 .168 
1980 220.1 1140.6 .193 
1981 232.6 1291.8 .180 
1982 209.2 1280.9 .163 
1983 206.1 1396.1 .148 
1984 224.1 1581.4 .142 
1985 220.8 1641.2 .135 
1986 225.0 1697.9 .133 
1987 254.8 1792.5 .142 
Sources 
1965, 1970, 1972-78, SA, 1982-83, pp. 820, 418; 1968: SA, 1974, pp. 778, 373; 
1979-82, scn, July 1983, pp. 58, 23; 1983: scn, July 1987, pp. 49, 41: 1984-87: 
scn, July 1988, pp. 69, 41 
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Table 3 
Profits from Direct Investments Worldwide 
1968, 1970, 1973-87 
(all figures in $ billion except column 4) 
(1)	 (2) (3) (4) 
Royalties After-tax 
& Corporate 
Year Earnings Fees Profits 90%0 +2)/3 
1968 6.5 1.5 48.2 14.9 
1970 8.0 1.9 41.3 21.6 
1973 16.5 2.5 76.6 22.3 
1974 19.1 3.1 85.1 23.5 
1975 16.4 3.5 81.5 22.0 
1976 19.0 3.5 102.5 19.8 
1977 19.7 3.9 122.0 17.4 
1978 25.5 4.7 145.9 18.6 
1979 38.2 5.0 165.1 23.6 
1980 37.1 5.8 149.8 25.8 
1981 32.4 5.8 144.1 23.9 
1982 22.9 5.6 115.1 22.3 
1983 20.5 6.3 130.4 18.5 
1984 21.2 6.5 146.1 17.1 
1985 33.2 6.7 127.8 28.1 
1986 38.4 8.4 129.8 32.4 
1987 52.3 9.3 142.9 38.8 
Note: 90% in column 4 represents a 10% effective tax rate on foreign income (see text). The 1968 corporate 
profits figure is from unrevised series. Corporate profits do not include the capital consumption allowance. 
the capital consumption adjustment, or the inventory valuation adjustment. 
~ources 
(1)	 1966-75: SGB, Aug. 1977, p. 43; 1976: SGB, Aug. 1978, p. 35; 1977-82: SGB, 
Aug. 1983, p. 22; 1983-87: SGB, Aug. 1988, p. 65 
(2) SGB,	 Oct. 1971, p. 27; Aug. 1974, p. 22; Oct. 1975, p. 49; Aug. 1976, p. 45; 
Aug. 1977, p. 41; Aug. 1978, p. 23; Aug. 1983, p. 22; Aug. 1985, p. 33; Aug. 
1987, p. 62; Aug. 1988, p. 46 
(3)	 1968; SA, 1971, p. 472; 1973; SA, 1981, p. 522; 1970, 1974-78; SA, 1982-83, p. 
545; 1979-82: SGB, July 1983, p. 27; 1983: SCB, July 1987, p. 25; 1984-87: 
SCB, July 1988, p. 45 
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Table 4 
Profits from U.S. Direct Investments 
Developing Countries Only--1968, 1970, 1973-87 
(all figures in $ billion except column 4) 
(I)	 (2) (3) (4) 
Royalties Aftertax 
& Corporate 
Year Earnings Fees Profits 90%( 1+2)/3 
1968 2.9 .4 48.2 6.2 
1970 2.9 .5 41.3 7.4 
1973 5.9 .5 76.6 7.5 
1974 8.0 .6 85.1 9.1 
1975 6.6 .7 81.5 8.1 
1976 7.0 .7 102.5 6.8 
1977 7.7 .7 122.0 6.2 
1978 9.1 .9 145.9 6.2 
1979 13.0 1.0 165.1 7.6 
1980 11.9 1.2 149.8 7.9 
1981 12.6 1.3 144.1 8.7 
1982 8.6 1.2 115.1 7.7 
1983 5.7 1.3 130.4 5.4 
1984 7.2 1.2 146.1 5.7 
1985 6.8 1.0 127.8 6.1 
1986 6.7 1.1 129.8 6.0 
1987 9.0 1.0 142.9 7.0 
Note: Royalties and fees for 1968 taken as 25% of worldwide total, based on 1969-70 ratios. See notes to 
Table 3 above. 
~~ources 
Same as Table 3 above 
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